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PROCEEDINGS  
OF THE  
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Volume XXIV]

JANUARY 1952

[Number 4

INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS IN THE  
MIDDLE EAST

A SERIES OF ADDRESSSES AND PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE ANNUAL  
MEETING OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
NOVEMBER 7, 1951

EDITED BY

JOHN A. KROUT

PUBLISHED BY

THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY  
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## P R E F A C E

**A** MERICAN interest in political and economic developments within the countries of the Middle East has been heightened during recent months by the increasing tensions in Iran, Egypt and Israel. Beneath these tensions throughout the whole Muslim world runs an intense nationalism, which gives every Western nation grave cause for concern. Can nationalist sentiment be directed into constructive channels leading to a truly regenerative power in the particular nations involved? Or will it become so chauvinistic, so dominated by the selfish interests of a few extremists, that in the end it destroys the people it pretends to exalt? What has been and what will be the impact of Western culture on the social institutions of those lands in Western Asia and Northern Africa which today occupy a strategic position in the conflict between West and East? These are some of the challenging questions raised at the Annual Meeting (Seventy-first Year) of the Academy of Political Science held in New York City on November 7, 1951.

Although the variant opinions recorded in this issue of the PROCEEDINGS set forth no simple explanation of "International Tensions in the Middle East", they forcibly underscore the need for a wider understanding in Western countries of the issues which so seriously threaten world peace on Europe's eastern and southern borders. Such an understanding is surely a vital element in any program for international security.

The officers of the Academy take this opportunity to express their appreciation to the participants in the discussion at the Annual Meeting.

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## PART I

### ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES

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#### INTRODUCTION

GRAYSON L. KIRK, *Presiding*

Vice-President and Provost, Columbia University  
Director, Academy of Political Science

**I** THINK I ought to say, first of all, how pleased we are that so many of you found your way here on this very inauspicious morning. We trust you will have no cause for regret.

We have made an effort this year to select as the main topic for our three sessions of the fall meeting a subject which is not only one of great contemporary interest but also one of fundamental importance to the foreign policy of this country and to the foreign policies of those democratic countries which are associated with us in the present struggle against totalitarian forces.

It seemed to us—and I think we were right—that what would happen in the Middle East inevitably would have an enormous influence upon what might be expected to happen in the great struggle between the East and West. In other words, the Middle East occupies a crucial and key position strategically and in a vast variety of other ways. Despite this fact, far too little public attention has been given to it, because it is an area which until very recently has not bulked very large in American thinking about foreign policy.

Our Middle Eastern interests have been relatively nonpolitical in the past and now we find that our national security interests are tied up with those of the peoples of the Middle Eastern countries in a way which demands of us far more attention and far more knowledge than we have generally and popularly had in the past.

These were the reasons why it seemed to us that this was an ideal topic for the fall meeting. You will have noted from the printed program this morning that at this first session we are to discuss economic and social issues, turning in the afternoon to problems of political strength and stability.

Now it is quite clear that one of the things which have had a disrupting influence throughout the Middle East has been the impact, under conditions of modern communications, of Western influences upon Middle Eastern society. It seemed to us that this was a topic which was of such fundamental importance that we could not omit having a paper on it.

We felt extremely fortunate in being able to persuade Professor Coon to undertake this task for the Academy because he not only has had an indispensable knowledge of long and intimate personal contact in the course of his anthropological work with the people of the Middle East, but he has also thought a great deal about this particular problem, as is evidenced by his numerous writings.

It gives me great pleasure to start our program this morning by presenting to you Professor Carleton Coon of the University of Pennsylvania, whose paper is "The Impact of the West on Middle Eastern Social Institutions". Professor Coon!

## THE IMPACT OF THE WEST ON MIDDLE EASTERN SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

CARLETON S. COON

Professor of Anthropology, University of Pennsylvania

### I. Introduction

LIKE everything else, the impact of Western culture on Middle Eastern social institutions falls into the three usual dimensions: time, space and energy. When and where has the West struck, and how hard? Influences which affected Egypt in Napoleon's time had little in common with Aramco's carefully planned acculturation program in Saudi Arabia in the time of Truman. As for space, this variable shifts at both ends. France, England, Spain, Italy, Russia and the United States have all differently affected the Middle East, and the Middle Eastern countries themselves are far from uniform in geography, climate, language and type of civilization. Concerning energy, the Western influences range from an impact force of nearly zero in such matters as Muslim religious education to nearly 100 per cent in long-distance transportation.

Faced with the combination of all these variables, we must find a framework in which to examine this problem, and to see what questions need answering, even if the answers themselves are at present out of reach. Such a framework can consist of four consecutive steps: (1) to define the words *social institutions*, (2) to list and to describe the institutions which are found in Middle Eastern society, as they were before the beginning of modern Western influence, (3) to study the Western variations and to see what they have done to the Middle East, (4) to pull the whole picture together, as a guide for future action. To follow this outline carefully and in detail would require a whole institute of researchers, working at home and in the field, over a number of years. When one sees our present lack of policy toward Middle Eastern countries, it is easy also to discover the worth of such a project.



## II. *The Definition of "Social Institutions"*

Technically speaking, "An institution is a group of people who meet together in isolation often enough, regularly enough, and long enough each time, to do something together intensely enough and emotionally enough so that as a separate entity the group builds up its own set of rules, its own internal equilibrium, and its own structure."<sup>1</sup> A *simple* institution is a natural group of a few people who all know one another; its structure is usually informal, with a leader whose authority may be revealed only in moments of crisis. A *compound* institution is a group or league of simple institutions, in which the chain of command includes several steps, as from grand commander to regional to local chiefs. When, however, a large institution begins to include separate subgroups of persons who do different things, as for example an army with its various specialist corps, then we are dealing with a *complex* institution.

During the last two centuries the Western nations have seen a great increase in the complexity of their own institutions, which, while rapid, has been progressive and orderly, so that our social systems have been able to absorb the stresses and strains. The social institutions of countries in which our new inventions and devices have been more suddenly introduced have not always been able to absorb these blows so easily, for the jump from simple to complex can be too great for the adult human nervous system to achieve, particularly in the field of coördination. While Middle Eastern workmen are highly skilled, and can learn new skills readily, they are rarely able to coördinate the different steps required in the timing of a complex technique. Although they differ in no innate or inherent way from the rest of us, their old social systems contained few complex institutions in which the people themselves were given responsibility, and their experience has thus given them little background for fine timing and precise interdepartmental coördination. We have given them machines without the training in human relations needed for their operation. We have sold them newspaper presses and radios without the training in moderation needed to quell the mobs aroused through uncritical

<sup>1</sup> Coon, C. S., *A Reader in General Anthropology* (New York, 1948), p. 604.



statements, which otherwise would have reached but few ears, now broadcast over our technical devices.

Apart from complexity, social institutions are usually divided on a functional axis, into the family, the economic institution, the religious institution, a cluster of secondary or derivative organizations known as associations and foundations, and the state. In the simplest known societies, a human being belongs to but a single institution, the family. As the consumption of energy by human beings increases, as techniques improve, a division of labor arises and increases in complexity, until more and more institutions of different kinds have been created. In the Muslim world before its critical exposure to Western influences, the institutional pattern was about as varied as that of medieval Europe. Family, commercial house, religious community, associations and foundations, and state, all were present.

### III. *The Family*

The simple, biological family of father, mother and children, living in its own house and having little to do with grandparents, uncles, aunts and other collaterals, is the pattern familiar to us, but rare in the rest of the world. We have developed this kind of family pattern through the use of labor-saving devices, and the scarcity and high wages of servants, and because a son rarely follows his father's profession. In the Middle Eastern households labor-saving devices are still largely unknown. Servants are numerous and cheap. Housing is expensive. Sons learn their trades from their fathers. Hence the old biblical family, with father, one or more wives, children, including married sons, their wives and children, and a number of servants, slaves, or both, provides the necessary authority and enough hands to do the work of grinding, baking, spinning, weaving, washing and other drudgery. In a warm country where refrigeration is lacking, a large family is the most economical feeding unit since perishable foods must be eaten the same day they are cooked. The head of the family and his grown sons will sit at first table, and the common dish will be passed down the line to the younger women, the servants and small children, who will clean the bones.

In villages it is more economical for a man to enlist the aid of his sons in agricultural work than to hire outsiders. Kin-

ship, based on the extension and elaboration of families, forms the structural framework of tribes. In the Middle Eastern family, the line of authority is strict and formal. Age is honored, and the father controls even his middle-aged sons. The boy baby is pampered by his parents, while the girl child is taught deference and shyness. The teen-age son, crown prince of the household, gets a rude shock when thrown into the outside world. In the old Middle Eastern civilization his dealings with outsiders were so closely regulated by custom that this shock was at one time more tolerable than it has lately become.

#### IV. *The Economic Institution*

An economic institution is a group of people, belonging to one or more families, who work together as members of a team, above the level of a simple partnership. The complexity of an economic institution is a function of the complexity of the techniques employed and of the volume of production. Simple tools mean simple relationships; complicated and varied tools mean complicated and varied relationships. In the old-time Middle East, most technical processes, while simple, required high individual skill; a shop included a master, one or two journeymen, and an apprentice or two. The master bought the raw materials and sold the finished goods. The typical processing institution consisted of four or five persons whose mutual relationships were thus simple and informal. A typical trading house would include the wholesale merchant, a secretary, and three or four porters hired from a common pool when needed. A shipping concern might include the owner, living in his home seaport, a number of sons and nephews acting as agents in other cities, and a small clerical staff.

Middle Eastern civilization was characterized, therefore, by a large number of small, simple and independent economic institutions. In the towns these were organized into a loose trade federation under the market provost, who kept order, insured fair practices, and smoothed out difficulties between individuals. In the city where enough men practiced each profession to warrant it, each trade had its guild, and the guild chiefs formed a council under the market provost. It was the most efficient system for the kinds of work involved.

### V. *The Religious Institution*

In the more complicated human societies, as in the Middle East, religious communities meet at regular and stated intervals to renew their feeling of oneness through communal prayer. In the Middle East the crises which evoke the need for prayer are constant and severe. The land has long since been deforested, the soil eroded, the population expanded beyond the threshold of comfort and safety, food rendered scarce, and disease made endemic. Infant mortality is high, and the rains are fickle. Years of drought may empty whole villages. These calamities defy accurate prediction. Man is ignorant and God knoweth all; the fate of the individual and of the group lies between the hands of God.

Under such conditions, atheism is far too hard on the human nervous system; Middle Easterners have to be religious. But in the Middle East religion performs still another function; members of the religious minorities held monopolies on certain kinds of activities forbidden to Sunni and Shi'ah Muslims. Jews could lend money, at interest; Armenian Christians could sell alcoholic beverages to persons too pious to make or sell liquor, but willing to drink it in secret. By concentrating on a number of special skills each people was able to keep the standard of workmanship high. Some groups, by being socially despised, were able to travel freely where first-class citizens might be robbed or even killed. By no coincidence the despised groups who could travel freely were usually engaged in the most essential crafts and professions, such as iron-working and trading. First-class Muslims, however, could usually travel in safety if going on a pilgrimage, and pilgrimages did much to bring peoples of different countries together to exchange ideas and to make arrangements for trade. In many ways religion was the key to the whole social system, and any outside influence that affected the social system would in turn disturb the religious institution.

### VI. *Associations and Foundations*

Since religion provides the dominant tone to Muslim civilization, the secondary institutions which grew up in the Islamic world after the Arab expansion are cast in a religious pattern. Early Muslim puritanism, while functional in the small popu-

lation of mobile traders and nomads who inhabited central Arabia in the Prophet's day, was clearly not adapted to the religious needs of the farmers and craftsmen of the richer lands which the Arabs conquered. Villagers need some local symbol to help out a universal abstraction. Craftsmen need a patron deity, or at least a saint, to intervene with God for members of their profession. Old caves and rocks and life-giving springs, worshiped of old, could not surrender their power at once; their jinns were gradually replaced by Muslim saints. The caretakers of the saints' tombs and their clients formed minor religious associations.

Starting in Iran, a number of learned mystics arose a few centuries after the conversion of this country to Islam. By means of breathing exercises long known in India and China, and by the repetition of special religious formulas, they were able to achieve a physiological state of abstraction in which the soul of the individual merged with that of the infinite. These men acquired followers, and founded cults, which spread as far as Spain and Morocco, and India. Known as dervishes or *ikbwan*, the members of these international cults organized themselves into thousands of local chapters, each with its shrine. Although disapproved and discouraged by the strict and orthodox, they persisted, since they formed a needed social weft to hold the Islamic community together. Now some have taken on a more interesting political function.

In America, in the days before the income tax, old ladies used to leave large sums to endow a foundation for feeding pigeons, or caring for indigent cats and dogs. Some of our more public-minded capitalists dedicated the bulks of their fortunes to such less specialized foundations as those bearing the names of Rockefeller, Carnegie and Ford. A large foundation requires an administrator of outstanding probity, and a staff. In Islamic countries the same system has long been in force, among Christians as well as Muslims. Here a foundation is called a *waqf* or *habus*, and its administrator a *nadhir*. Such a foundation may be dedicated to a specific purpose, or to general charity. In the absence of stocks and bonds, the property of a Middle Eastern foundation is almost always in real estate, both agricultural and urban. The agricultural workers on foundation lands usually enjoyed greater security than on private estates,

and the tenants in a block of foundation-owned shops could depend on fair treatment from their landlord. Many of these foundations were linked to shrines and mosques, and all prospered under the benevolence of a religious sanctity which protected them from the vagaries of government. They enjoyed the same privileges as church and university properties in America which are free from taxation, and used this cover for an equal variety of profitable enterprises.

Educational institutions, in the Western World largely divorced from church, state and economic institution, were in the Muslim world linked to religion. Primary schools were all in the hands of mullahs or *fqibs*, and the curriculum largely religious and thus legalistic. Universities were under the control of the *'ulama*, the head jurists of the nation; and their curriculum, except for a few centuries of special enlightenment, was devoted largely to religious and juridical matters. Although free, education was rare; for most adult males had to learn a skilled trade in the years which university training would require. The educated man, able to read and write, could use his hands to hold no other implement than the pen. His literacy, linked to holiness, exempted him from manual labor, unless he were a Christian, whose cultural ability to use his hands for more than one purpose stood him in good stead later on.

### VII. *The State*

The over-all institution which engulfs the members of families, shops, churches, brotherhoods and universities is the state. The degree to which the state predominates over all its component institutions is variable. At one end stand the Communist nations, in which the state is a monolith of hardest stone, and near the other end are found nations like our own, in which the state exists only to maintain order among a group of free individuals. Differing from both the Soviet and the American ideals, the Muslim state was theoretically subordinate to the religious institution, since the laws that governed it were derived from holy writ, and all Muslims fell theoretically under the control of the Prophet's successor, the caliph. While the pilgrimage also was international, the exigencies of geography, separating the Muslim world into discrete packages, made the creation of separate nations inevitable.



In each such nation the other institutions, familial, economic, religious and associational, were so finely developed and so well integrated that most of the details of peace-keeping fell in their hands. Taxation was largely religious, and international warfare uncommon. No elaborate political organization was needed.

In each state the principal source of disequilibrium lay in the coexistence of two types of country and two kinds of people. The first was the government land, with its villages and towns and cities, and its formal political administration. The second was the land of rebellion or insolence, the mountains and deserts where the arm of the central government could not reach, and where the nomads and hill-farmers governed themselves through the ancient channel of extended families, clans, tribes and confederations.

Economically an asset to the nation, the tribes provided meat, skins, wool, steeds and beasts of burden. Although usually in defiance of the central government, they also provided a backlog of well-nutritied and well-disciplined personnel, excellent material for the army, the police and even administrative positions. Relations between the tribes and the government varied; sometimes open warfare prevailed, but usually some kind of agreement was reached between the head of the state and the head of the tribe which guaranteed a degree of local self-government. It was the existence of these tribes, and the desire to keep them at bay and to extract taxes, that made the existence of national armies necessary, rather than the threat of international warfare. In most Muslim nations internal security was variable, depending on the strength of the ruler of the day, and the distance of a given place from his capital. However, by standard fees paid to tribal chiefs, travel could usually be achieved.

The most characteristic facts about the central government were two: the treasury and the king's private funds were one and the same; the government was completely centralized in that the governors and their staffs were all sent out from the capital city. Over and above the guild chiefs, market provost, ward chiefs, mayors, village headmen, and the like, provincial administrators were strangers, whose principal ambition was to make a fortune and return to the capital to enjoy it. All the

world being divided into the Dar al-Islam, or friendly Muslim states, and the Dar al-Harb, or hostile non-Muslim nations which were beyond the diplomatic pale, international relations of a formal nature were at a minimum, and usually relegated to some minor office, as, in Ottoman Turkey, the Ministry of Marine.

At the indefinable, regionally fluctuating time when the impact of the West first began seriously to be felt, the Middle East was divided between the authorities of three principal sovereign nations: Iran, Turkey and Morocco. Everything between Iran and Morocco belonged to the Ottoman Sultan, who bore the title of Caliph of Islam. Turkey, being a great Power, presented a solid political block in the space now occupied by ten nations, colonies and protectorates. In Morocco the political institution was anachronistically and anarchically of the simplest possible pattern. In Iran the old system perfected by Cyrus and Darius, and modified by the addition of Shi'ah legalism, still obtained. In Turkey the old Persian system had been taken over and embellished with elaborations derived from many quarters, including indigenous growth. The Turks and the Persians possessed complex political institutions; the list of their departments reads like the Washington telephone directory under the heading "United States Government". Of the two the Turkish was the more elaborate, because it covered the wider, more populous and more varied territory.

One characteristic of all three sovereign governments at the times of which we speak was that in each case the administrative personnel was drawn from an extremely small pool. In Morocco most public servants came from a dozen ancient Fez families, which have also produced the contemporary nationalist leaders. In Iran most governors were members of a few aristocratic families resident in the capital. In Turkey, however, the administrators and generals were slaves of the Sultan, drawn from a pool of captured Christian youths, converted and indoctrinated in childhood, rigorously trained, and owing allegiance to no kinfolk or region of the Empire. As long as the Turks continued to rule by this system, bringing in fresh blood each generation and showing no favoritism, the Empire prospered. But the main fact which emerges from this study is that, in all the Middle East, no provision was made to train the rank and file of the population for the responsibilities of government.

The villager and townsman had no vote, no choice in the selection of the foreign governor from the capital who collected his tax money. Nothing in the local educational system prepared him to run for or to hold office. A tribal chief might raid the capital and set himself up as king, but a villager could never become a member of the élite civil service. Hence when the Turkish Empire collapsed it left a vacuum not only in the geopolitical map but also in the supply of personnel trained to take over political administration. This gap has not yet, in either sense, been filled.

### VIII. *The Variety and Nature of Western Influences*

Although there has never been a period since the West began that the peoples of the Middle East and the Western countries have not been in mutual contact, the Western influences which have served to upset the ancient and traditional way of life of the Middle Eastern peoples and to create the present dangerous international situation did not make themselves felt before the start of the nineteenth century. Only in a few countries, notably Egypt and the Levantine states, did the first half of the nineteenth century feel the Western impact with any strength, while in a few other countries, notably Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, the full charge was to come only within the last ten or fifteen years.

Although the Western Powers have changed since they first began to influence the Middle East, early mistakes still hang on. In some places, old abuses continue, and in others the sore still smarts after the lash has been thrown away. In some countries the process of Westernization by imitation has advanced so far that the same frenzied crowds that watched the heads roll in Paris nearly two centuries ago are now massing in the public squares of several Middle Eastern capitals, screaming for the heads, not of noblemen, but of foreigners. In a very few countries, the ancient Middle Eastern way of life still retains sufficient integrity and strength so that knowledgeable Westerners may still hope to steer the direction of their blow; in these countries, at least, our position may still be capable of salvage.

Another difference lies in the social institutions of the Western Powers. England, France, Spain, Italy, Russia and America have had by far the most to do with the Middle East. Between



them family and economic, religious, political, educational and other institutions differ profoundly. Each has affected the Middle East in a different way, and each has influenced its own special part or parts of the Middle East, at different periods. How shall we handle so many variables, periods, countries and institutions? The most feasible outline seems to be by using institutions as a primary axis of division, since it is about institutions that we are talking.

#### IX. *Western Economic Institutions*

Western economic institutions and the techniques on which they are based have had far more influence on Middle Eastern institutions than any other class. Furthermore they have influenced every kind of institution in Middle Eastern society, in every country. It is, in fact, this overemphasis of economic institutions and their techniques, to the relative exclusion of less tangible but equally important Western institutions and techniques, that has brought on much of our present trouble. Western methods of transportation, communication, trading, banking, extraction and processing have affected every Middle Eastern country, shaking to the roots the whole social structure, with its finely adjusted and interlocking multiple division of labor.

By the middle of the last century steamships had replaced the Arab and Persian sailing vessels on Middle Eastern waters as main carriers of high-priced goods, pilgrims and passengers, thus putting an end to the international camel caravans such as that described by Burton. This shipping gave the European Powers control over who went where, particularly on the pilgrimage. It also carried a number of Middle Easterners to European countries to work, to study, to play and to agitate.

In North Africa, Egypt, the Levant states, Iraq and Iran, Europeans built railroads. By World War II every Middle Eastern country with the possible exception of Yemen and the southern Arabian protectorates had come to be served by trucks and buses, mostly American. Road building accompanied the trucks wherever Europeans or Americans were actually on the ground. The French laid down paved highways in tribal territory, as soon as they had conquered it. The Americans made excellent roads in western Iran, the British in the east, and the

Russians in the northwest. In Yemen an American engineer built a road, complete with steel bridge, up the mountain escarpment from Hodeida to San'a. Where local governments have been entirely responsible for road maintenance, in some countries they have kept smooth pavement only on the streets of the capital cities and a few miles outside, permitting the wealthy landowners who live in the city to drive around in it and its suburbs in Cadillacs and Chryslers, and to reach the airport where planes are available for Europe, America, and the holy places of pilgrimage.

In every Middle Eastern country, Morse messages rustle over telegraph wires in special Arabic and Persian codes. Although sometimes slowly, messages get through. Most countries also have telephones. While these do not provide house service in every city, nevertheless it is possible, with patience, to talk with friends in any part of the country, and even between countries. In every country Muslims own radio sets, and listen to government speakers broadcast news, propaganda and prayers. By means of public address systems a member of the crowd gathered in the central square of a town has as little chance of thinking his own thoughts as a passenger in a Washington bus.

Without fuel and electric power, transportation and communication could not function. Fuel means coal, oil and gasoline. Usually coal has to be imported, raising the cost of railroading. Although most of the Middle East's oil production used to be shipped outside, in each oil-producing country a certain proportion has always been allocated to local use. However, between monopolies, high taxes and production costs, the price of gasoline usually runs to the equivalent of fifty cents a gallon near the very cities where it is refined. Electric power is produced by water in a few places. In most of the Middle East, water power is seasonal and scarce, hence electric power, which usually comes from coal or oil, is expensive, both for lighting and for industry. Transportation, communication and power are more expensive in the Middle East than in the West. Since the average Middle Eastern income is far below that of even the most impoverished Western European country, it is clear that these advantages are not available to the majority of the people, but are confined to a small class in each country

which maintains a Western standard of living. The West has tended to widen the social gulf between rich and poor in the Middle East, by dangling, in the faces of the poor, conveniences and luxuries of which they had never before heard, and which they now cannot have, while giving the rich new and expensive tastes, and the need for more and more income.

In our period trading with the West has meant the export of raw materials to pay for cheap manufactured goods, which in turn have destroyed native industries. For example, the use of case oil has introduced the square five-gallon tin, which Middle Easterners now use for hauling water in place of pottery jugs. The ceramic art has declined, along with hand weaving. Most of the art objects produced by the patient skill of Middle Eastern hands can be better bought in Brussels and New York than in Fez or Tehran. Fine brass trays, miniature paintings, beautifully carved wooden boxes, first-class leather work—the skills by which these beautiful things were made are no longer being handed on, except in the hothouse atmosphere of government-controlled institutions.

What do we find in their place? Oil tins, wooden chests covered with flattened beer cans advertising Schmitz or Schlitz; second-, third- and fourth-hand G.I. uniforms worn by men riding donkeys; cheap lithographs, enameled iron bedsteads, and all the rest of the trash that the West has been able to unload on the East; as well as the remnants of a whole class of skilled urban craftsmen whose children now have to turn to other trades.

Trading with the West has affected the social structure in still another way. In North Africa and in the countries of the old Turkish Empire and in Iran, both Jews and indigenous Christians have quickly become go-betweens, to their considerable profit, staffing the offices of European firms, building up large trading houses of their own, and forming an insulating layer between Westerners and the Muslims. What many Europeans and Americans see of the Middle East is filtered through Jewish or Armenian lenses. For this we are distrustful. Since the Koran forbids usury, old-fashioned Muslims cannot go into banking, which was long the profitable monopoly of Europeans, Jews and indigenous Christians. While in Egypt, Iran and elsewhere, Muslims, some of whom were trained in America,

are now employed in State Banks, they have had less experience.

Middle Eastern mountains are young, and useful ores scarce, except in three regions: Morocco south of the Atlas, the Armenian highlands and Afghanistan. In Morocco the French, who have closed off the mining area to foreigners, produce such vital ores as cobalt. The Armenian highland, divided between Turkey and the U.S.S.R., contains also iron and copper. In Afghanistan, Americans are beginning to revive ancient mines under government contract. While Western mining has had little effect on the social institutions of the Middle East, its companion industry, the oil business, has been one of the prime channels of Western influence, as anyone who reads the papers, listens to the radio, or watches television knows.

Oil has influenced every kind of Middle Eastern institution. However, the oil business should be treated as two separate phenomena, the older activities in Iraq and Iran, and the newer in Arabia. Both the British, who were the prime movers in the Iraq and Iran installations, and the Americans, who are behind the Arabian ventures, want to obtain oil and to make money. While their motives have been basically the same their manner of operation has differed in terms of differences in the situation at home. Britain is overpopulated. Jobs are scarce, and living is better abroad than at home. For centuries Englishmen have been brought up on the tradition of doing a stint of thirty years or so in the Colonies, followed by a comfortable retirement. Englishmen naturally like to keep the available jobs for themselves. Most Americans, spoiled by the good life at home, would consider working overseas for thirty years a hardship, even with air-conditioned houses, first-class company stores, and all the conveniences of Texas, in the middle of the Arabian desert. To train Iraqis and Persians to take over the elaborate skills of the oil business, with its need for split-second coördination, would not be easy, and it would put Britons out of jobs. In Arabia, so to train Arabs is well worth the effort to the company, because of the great expense in keeping Americans in the field.

By providing gasoline the oil business has affected transportation, already covered. It has caused the rise and fall of banks, and other complex economic institutions. It has affected the state because oil has become, in at least four countries, a principal source of national income. Since national security is es-

essential for the peaceful operation of the oil business, oil companies are interested in governments. It has been said that oil companies sometimes influence members of parliament, ministers and even potentates; in fact so much has been said about oil in the Middle East that my only purpose here is to show that it is but one of many factors in a very complicated situation.

While factories have arisen in many Middle Eastern nations, much foreign merchandise is still imported, for local manufacturing has run into a number of serious difficulties. First of all is the shortage of coal, and of iron ore, preventing heavy industry. Without heavy industry all machinery has to be imported. Owing to the scarcity and seasonal variability of rainfall, little water power is available. Owing to the high cost of truck and train fuel and the poor condition of the roads, transportation of raw material to factory and of finished goods to consumer centers is expensive. Owing to faulty nutrition and inadequate medical facilities, many factory workers are unable to keep up the daily attendance record needed for efficient production. Owing to the retention of Islamic ideas about the seclusion of women, it is not always possible to employ female labor. Owing to the ingrained Middle Eastern system of independent craftsmanship, it is difficult to get skilled workers to put in full and regular hours. Owing to the absence of any need for coördination in their older culture, few Middle Easterners who have not been trained abroad are capable of filling managerial positions competently, and bottlenecks develop. Arabic script typewriters are present, but very expensive. International Business Machine calculators and sorters are absent. Bookkeeping is a headache.

For these and other reasons, such as a state monopoly of manufacturing, few Middle Eastern manufactures can compete with imports from the West. The situation might be helped, however, if the present-day landlords could transfer their capital from agricultural lands to industry, thus freeing the villagers and establishing a competitive system. As things stand today enough factories have been built, and enough people are employed in them, for a class of industrial workers to have arisen. Wherever industrial workers are to be found, Communist agitators will be discovered under the nearest stones. The West has brought with a new occupation the corresponding occupational



disease. However, factory work affects families favorably in places where the company provides buses to and from the villages, permitting farmers to work off season and thus to add to the total family income. It affects the mullahs, who object to women going to work with their faces exposed; veils might catch in the machinery. It affects the state, of course, by providing a new, concentrated, easily reached body of voters and potential agitators.

#### X. *The Western Family*

In most of the Middle East, few whole Western families transplant themselves permanently, but individuals reared in families affect the Middle East. Take, for example, the British middle- or upper-class family, from which overseas managerial personnel is drawn. The young man is cared for by nurses and nannies throughout infancy and childhood, and at the age of twelve is sent away to school. Throughout life he sees little of his parents and siblings. This early training has a tendency to make him a man of little talk, reserved and self-reliant, disliking crowds, and preferring solitude or the company of a few friends of his own nationality. His ethnic personality is almost exactly the opposite to that of Persians and urban Arabs, who love company and feel uncomfortable if forced to live alone. British reserve, the habit of hiding out within the walls of an exclusive club, and a tendency to compare everything foreign to its British counterpart in an unfavorable light have given many Middle Easterners the idea that the British are "snooty". No one likes to be looked down upon, and some Middle Easterners feel that Englishmen regard them as second-class human beings. Although much of this is simply a combination of shyness, boredom and a low interaction rate, with no insult intended, the British receive credit for having committed the unpardonable sin of treating the aristocratic Muslim as an inferior. No doubt much of this stems from experience in India, where the situation looks superficially the same with all kinds of people in all kinds of clothing showing every degree of Westernization at once. Middle Eastern peoples do *not*, however, have a caste system. Muslim society possesses social mobility and is in certain respects very democratic. In dealing with them, the one thing that never pays is an appearance of rudeness.

All Western Europeans are brought up in the debris of a graded social system, with nobles and rich industrialists at one end and laboring people at the other. Western Europeans demand respect from servants and underlings. It is customary for them to berate a waiter when he spills the soup, and to pass withering remarks to a porter if he drops a suitcase. One addresses the cook with a stern face. In North Africa the French habitually address the native peoples in a loud voice, and call every Muslim *tu*. This attitude of social distance employed by Western Europeans is foreign to Muslim ideas of the brotherhood of man, and rubs them the wrong way. More than any other single factor, this attitude is responsible for modern nationalism in the Middle East, or so Middle Easterners have told me. That is what they believe.

Only two nations in contact with the Middle East fail to employ this system, the Americans and the Russians. Some Americans, however, accustomed to imitate the British and French whom they consider old hands knowledgeable at this game, have taken over European manners. In this one respect, the Russians have an advantage over us, for they have no reason, real or fancied, to imitate Western Europeans, and no Western European allies to pull out of the soup. However, since the mid-thirties the Russians' honeymoon with ethnic democracy has been over. In Turkestan, for example, they too have been treating the native peoples like inferiors, in an unsubtle way. Word of this has leaked across the border, and this Russian advantage over us may be on the way out.

#### XI. *The Western Religious Institution*

A few years ago it used to be fashionable in intellectual circles in this country to make fun of missionaries. Anthropologists complained that the missionaries destroyed the old religion before they could get out in the field to study it, and that the missionaries, by introducing clothing to savages, gave them tuberculosis as well. In the Middle East it is frequently asked, "Why spend money trying to convert people who already have a perfectly good religion?"

To this several answers may be given. In the first place, the Middle Easterners are not savages. In the second, instead of giving the local people diseases, the missionaries cure them. In

the third place, whatever their objective, their primary result among Muslims is not conversion in which they actually succeed more than most of us realize, as much as a general cultural influence in the direction of better education and an increase of mutual confidence in the family, in business and in government. Missionaries, working as pastors and physicians, have saved the lives and souls of thousands of human beings. Our mission hospitals have been the best in the Middle East, and the Medical School of the American University of Beirut, over which Dr. Dodge long presided, has trained hundreds of first-class physicians and surgeons to staff the other hospitals of their home countries. Having been chiefly responsible for modern medicine in the Middle East would be enough of an achievement, but the Missions have also run schools. Many of the prime ministers and other cabinet officers of Middle Eastern countries were educated in mission schools, where they were constantly exposed to the healthy type of family life current in America during the nineteenth century. This exposure has shown them how it is possible to give women freedom without license, how a man who is educated can still work in dignity with his hands, how a high standard of living can be maintained without graft, and how it is possible for ordinary human beings to trust each other without an elaborate exchange of oaths.

In my opinion there are only two things wrong with our missionaries in the Middle East. There have not been enough of them. They have set standards of behavior which contrast too strongly with that of many of the other Americans who have followed them. The missionary business has been largely an American affair, with the British a close second and other nations trailing. It has given us an advantage which we should support and expand, before the current wave of nationalism makes impossible the further operations of these fearless and devoted men and women. The men whom the missionaries have trained are our best friends in the Middle East.

## XII. *Western Educational Institutions, Associations and Foundations*

Until the present century Western schools were largely mission schools, out of which grew a number of universities. Two principal fashions have been followed, the American and the



French. French education, emphasizing mathematics, memory and the law, appeals more to the upper classes in many Middle Eastern countries because their old Muslim educational tradition is also slanted to these same subjects and techniques. One Western criticism sometimes made of Middle Eastern higher education is that too much importance is placed on theory and high marks, and too little on laboratory work and experience. Another is that, since in each country education is under a government ministry, it is not only standardized, but also subject to close political control in the choice of textbooks, subject matter and attitudes; hence the freedom of thought which our Western university education is supposed to foster is sometimes replaced by an incitement to nationalism. In North Africa the few Arabs and Berbers who have succeeded in getting a university education are stuffed with law and politics in preference to a useful profession such as engineering or medicine, in which good jobs are open only to Europeans. Law and politics under pressure produce nationalism.

Possibly more defective even than our own schools in teaching geography, the official Middle Eastern educational institutions have produced a generation of semi-Westernized young people, with big ideas and little perspective. As in some European countries, university students specialize in demonstrating and rioting. We have student riots too, but only twice a year, after a big football game and in the restless warmth of spring. Ours have nothing to do with politics unless some Communist front has engineered them, in which case they soon peter out. Behind the body of the American college students stand several generations of older people who went through the same mill. The Middle Eastern student, however, is a pioneer. The male student's father may be a fat landlord, whom he is taught to despise, although it is the landlord's money he is spending; the mother of the sweater-wearing coed is probably confined in some kind of harem. The coed's rides outside the city in big American cars provide her with a social opportunity for which her upbringing has given her no experience. At the same time the Hollywood movies, in which sweaters and big cars are a dime a dozen, give her a dreamworld blueprint for behavior which will enrage the mullahs. The trouble that such young women get into and cause is one of the more overt forms of disequilibrium

resulting from the introduction of Western educational institutions in the Middle East.

The Red Cross has inspired its Middle Eastern counterparts, the Red Crescent, and the Red Lion and Sun. However, whereas such associations are private in the West, in Middle Eastern countries they are run by the government. The Boy Scouts has also spread to the Middle East, in some countries with splendid results. The Rockefeller Foundation in particular has concentrated on Middle Eastern problems of late, under the leadership of John Marshall. Its support of the Near East Foundation, under the able guidance of Dr. Hayden and Mr. Theodore Noe, has been responsible for much DDT work in Iran, and agricultural improvement along with adult education, ably aided by the Iranian government. This type of work promises to be of great influence in the future if world events will so permit; aside from the missionaries no other outfit has given evidence of so much promise in raising the standard of living and producing a stable and prosperous society.

### XIII. *Western Political Institutions*

Being conventional history, the story of the impact of Western political institutions on Middle Eastern countries needs only outline treatment here. It has three principal aspects: colonization, the establishment of protectorates, and indirect influences.

Direct colonization appears permanent only in Algeria. Over a century ago the French found this geographically and ethnically heterogeneous country underpopulated and disorganized. By imposing peace, they put an end to mutual bloodshed, increased the acreage of agricultural lands over pasture, produced more food, and thus fostered the breeding of a large population of agricultural workers. The French colonists, including many Alsatians, built up huge estates and local dynasties of landlords, turning the Muslim residents into a lower class, few of whom have been given political franchise, although the country is officially administered as three departments of Metropolitan France. Nearly a century later Italy attempted a similar wholesale colonization program in Libya, now an independent nation.

In Tunisia, Morocco and Syria (including Lebanon) France also undertook the rôle of protecting Power. In Syria and Lebanon, where the contract was with the League of Nations,

the French eventually left. In Morocco and Tunisia the contract was with the local ruling houses, which so far have found no lever to rid themselves of their protectors. The theory behind the French protectorates in North Africa was first to subdue the tribesmen and create peace and order in the land, after which all sorts of improvements were to be set in motion, and local personnel trained to take over the reins of government as soon as they were ready. As far as the foreign observer can see, and this is not very far because the French discourage foreign observers who speak Arabic, their program has had two phases.

First is that of General Lyautey and his followers, French Army officers of a high social class, men dedicated to enlightenment and public service, who carefully studied the manners and customs of the peoples under their command, and endeavored, as some still do, to rule the outlying tribes and villages with paternal impartiality and understanding. Second is that of the horde of French business men and petty civilian officials who flocked to the North African protectorates in the wake of the military, to make money quickly, with a *je m'en fou* flip of the hand for the future. These greedy men or bold pioneers, according to the point of view, by taking the best lands for their own farms, and excluding the native peoples from the chance of equality in their own country, have undone the work of their predecessors. They have also failed notably to train the Moroccans for self-government, so that even if the nationalists achieve independence they will still need foreign advisers. Jealous of the United States and trying to exclude our trade, they have tied a large stone around our necks in our attempts to bring about unity against the mutual foe, communism.

The British too have assumed protectorates, in Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Kuwait, Bahrein, Oman, the Aden Protectorate and Egypt. Only those situated on the Arabian peninsula do they retain. In the Middle East the British have never tried to colonize and farm, for none of the lands under British control were sufficiently underpopulated, nor was the climate suitable. Strategically speaking, they were neither near enough for safety, as in Algeria, nor far enough for safety, as in Australia. While the British also have not overexerted themselves in training native personnel for government, neither have they set themselves

up as permanent overlords with the Muslims as a lower class. Their main objective seems rather to have been to maintain the *status quo*. From the anthropological viewpoint it seems reasonable to keep the people of Socotra, for example, untouched until they can be thoroughly studied and adequate plans made for their introduction into the modern world with as little pain as possible for both parties concerned.

The Spaniards, in their Moroccan protectorates, have followed no one else's example. They have maintained their territories partly for strategic reasons, to stalemate Gibraltar in control of the Straits, partly for prestige, and partly to draw on the Riffian pool of manpower. In that they have not set up large agricultural estates or industries, they have interfered with native life less than the French, and their venture has cost them money.

The principal indirect influence Western governments have had on Middle Eastern nations is in providing models for administrative systems. Parliaments in Egypt, Iraq, Iran and elsewhere are usually modeled after the French, Swiss or British houses, or some combination of these. While no one has tried to imitate the American Senate and House of Representatives, they have independently invented the filibuster.

Russian influence on the Middle East, unlike ours, has been almost entirely political. They have set up Communist parties, whatever the name, in every country they could reach. Turkey being closed to them, their largest and most immediate target has been Iran, where the Tudeh party, established by disillusioned intellectuals as a tool against corrupt landlords, was taken over before or during the Second World War. The Russians set up a state in Azerbaijan, and another among some of the Kurds; both of which collapsed. It is very likely although hard to prove that the Russians have had much to do with the sudden rise of religious brotherhoods modeled after the medieval Assassins, and the program of assassination which these devotees have initiated throughout the Middle East. It is also likely that they have put the teeth into the erstwhile trivial student demonstrations in Tehran, Cairo and elsewhere. All along the line from Casablanca to Peshawar, the Communists stand ready to profit by our division and our mistakes.

American influence, as stated, has been channeled to the Mid-

dle East largely through nonpolitical agencies, which as far as it goes has been fortunate. People would rather be helped by private agencies than by foreign governments, because the implication of interference is less apparent. Until the last twenty or thirty years, we have, as a government, maintained only nominal interest in the Middle East, keeping only legations in the capitals. Now we have embassies. Instead of a staff of three or four, and an equal number of overworked clerks, we now support hundreds in each post. Trained in the Foreign Service school in how to get along with the peoples of the Middle East, a host of eager young college graduates is sincerely trying to learn the local languages, interact in the social life of each capital, and otherwise perform their duty ably and with enlightenment. How much easier would their task have been if the President of the United States, just four years ago this election time, had been willing to leave our handling of the Palestine situation to the State Department instead of making it a domestic issue? If our allies have in various quarters hung stones of various sizes and weights about our necks, by this one deed we fastened a boulder to theirs. Let us hope that we can educate our politicians to a state of world awareness a little less parochial than that of their Middle Eastern counterparts now engaged in nationalist gestures. Only through educating our people, so that they know as much about the Middle East as they do about Western Europe, can they be expected to elect legislators and executives who can further our country's interests in the Middle East, an equally important area. We left our knowledge about China to the experts, with no educated public body to evaluate their opinions. This we cannot afford to let happen again.

#### XIV. *Conclusion*

In conclusion it can be said that the impact of the West on the social systems of the Middle East has been uneven in two senses, in strength and in balance. In Turkey and Lebanon, which have long had Western ties, it has perhaps been strongest and most evenly distributed. In Yemen it has been weakest, and in North Africa possibly most inequable. One can generalize enough to say that most Middle Eastern countries have become so Westernized that they could not return to the old



medieval Islamic ways no matter what their mullahs preach. With notable exceptions, we have given them a glimpse of a new life which their overpopulated and worn-out landscapes cannot support. We have helped a small privileged class in each country to widen the gap between itself and its source of income, the farmers and herdsmen. We have seen the growth of a new society, neither Islamic nor Western, which has not yet had time to shake itself down to a stable state. To what extent this instability is anyone's fault is academic. It is our business to find out all we can about this new civilization, and to develop an intelligent policy. Only thus can we deal with Middle Eastern countries firmly, wisely, and in a friendly fashion, for the mutual benefit of all parties concerned. It is particularly up to us Americans, whose missionaries have given us a priceless hundred-year start, to write the Middle Eastern peoples a first-class ticket. First-class nations are either your enemies or your friends. It is easier to deal with either than with a hopeless mass of half-starved and hysterical humanity, prime Communist fodder. The right way is the cheap way, in the end.

#### REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

CHAIRMAN KIRK: Thank you very much, Professor Coon!

It is quite clear that one of the things which will make for or against future political and social stability in the Middle Eastern area will be further economic development. For this reason, we felt that our meeting today must include a discussion of prospects, good or bad, for further economic development, and we undertook to bring before you an outstandingly competent economist specializing in this area.

We are fortunate this morning to have with us Dr. Charles Issawi of the Department of Economic Affairs of the United Nations, who will discuss the whole question of the "Prospects for Economic Development". Dr. Issawi!

## PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

CHARLES ISSAWI

Department of Economic Affairs, United Nations \*

**M**ANY a Western poet has described, in glowing terms, scenes

Where the gorgeous East with richest hand  
Showers on her Kings Barbaric Pearl and Gold.

Many an Eastern statesman has presented, in Washington, a depressing account of his country's needs and an impressive inventory of its resources—and promptly requested a loan, acting no doubt in the belief that his people should have more than “a loaf of bread” and “a flask of wine”. I am, alas, neither poet nor statesman, and cannot give you a colorful description of the Middle East nor even an exact balance sheet; for on both sides of the account there are vast imponderables, which can be recognized and described, but not measured.

Perhaps the best course would be to begin by assessing the natural resources of the region, its land, water and minerals and their relation to its rapidly growing population; then to describe its industrial equipment and discuss its potentialities, singling for special treatment the predominant oil industry; after that to estimate the financial resources available and those required; and finally to attempt to evaluate such intangible, but more important, factors as the dominant culture patterns and social institutions and to analyze the changes which are taking place in them.

The definition of the Middle East used by the United Nations covers the Nile Valley (including Egypt and the Sudan); the Fertile Crescent (including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine and Jordan); the Arabian Peninsula (including Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the small sheikhdoms); the Iranian plateau (including Iran and Afghanistan); Cyprus and Turkey. The

\* The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations or any other organization.

total area of the region is about 3,700,000 square miles, a figure somewhat above that of the United States and slightly below that of Europe west of the Urals. The population of the Middle East is about 100 million, and it is growing at, probably, over 1 per cent per annum.

The ratio between population and cultivable area varies widely. Broadly speaking, three main zones may be distinguished: a thinly populated, mountainous, relatively rainy region in the north, covering Turkey and the Iranian plateau; a flat, dry, thickly populated region in the south, covering the lower Nile Valley, the settled parts of the Arabian peninsula and the southern half of the Fertile Crescent; and an intermediate flat, thinly populated zone consisting mainly of the Tigris and Euphrates valleys and the northern part of the Persian Gulf, which has much uncultivated land and in addition contains the bulk of the region's oil reserves. A breakdown by country brings out some striking differences. In the Sudan, there is only .1 of a hectare of cultivated land for each inhabitant; in Egypt 0.12; in Lebanon 0.17; in Israel about 0.20. These ratios are among the very lowest in the world, being comparable only to those of Japan, Korea and Indonesia. On the other hand, Syria has .66 of a hectare of cultivated land for each inhabitant, Turkey close to 1 hectare, Iran 1.2 and Iraq 1.6. These figures are well above those of all other Asian countries and can stand comparison with those of most Latin American countries.

Of course these man-land ratio figures tell only a small part of the story. They need to be supplemented by information regarding both the way the land is utilized and the extent to which it is utilized. As regards the first, intensity of cultivation tends to vary directly with density of population. In Egypt, cotton yields are by far the highest in the world while wheat and barley yields are well above the European average, falling only slightly below those of the United Kingdom. This is a result of the excellent system of irrigation and drainage, the lavish use of chemical fertilizers, the careful breeding of new varieties, the intensive application of labor, and, naturally, the excellence of the soil and climate. In Palestine and Israel, the world's best oranges have been grown. In most of the other countries, and especially in Lebanon, some fruits and vegetables



are cultivated under conditions which produce good results. But by far the greater part of the region's land is devoted to cereals the yields of which are as low as those obtained in countries practicing extensive cultivation, such as Argentina, Australia and Canada, which support a much thinner rural population.

Production per man is low even in those countries which use intensive methods of cultivation. Output of grain has been estimated at one third of a ton per head of farm population, against one ton in pre-war Eastern Europe and two tons in Western Europe.<sup>1</sup>

These disappointing results come from a wide variety of causes. Perhaps the most important are the inadequacy and uncertainty of the rainfall. By far the greater part of the region receives under eight inches of rain, and over half of it gets under four inches. Moreover even in the wetter parts, such as Lebanon, the bulk of the rainfall is concentrated in one or two winter months while the summer is rainless, facts which facilitate soil erosion and greatly increase the difficulty of cultivation. Another important handicap is the system of land tenure prevalent over most of the area. The greater part of the land belongs to absentee landlords who let it out on short leases which deprive the share croppers of any incentive to introduce improvements. Needless to say, the methods at present utilized are very inadequate: little use is made of fertilizers, tools are primitive, and not much has been done to improve animal and plant strains.

In recent years some progress has been made in mechanization and the use of fertilizers and insecticides in several countries, and there is no doubt that an improvement in education and techniques, accompanied by a relatively small capital investment, could substantially increase output. But, in the absence of an agrarian reform, the organization of coöperatives, and an intensive provision of credit, equipment, education and health services, it is doubtful whether such a rise in production can do more than keep pace with the growth of the population.

The extension of the cultivated area offers more possibilities. In some of the more densely populated countries, notably Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, the

<sup>1</sup> Doreen Warriner, *Land and Poverty in the Middle East* (London, 1948), p. 12.

margin of cultivation has been pushed close to the limits imposed by present technological methods. But if vast and very costly irrigation works are carried out, it may be possible to extend the cultivated area by a quarter or a third. In the other countries, however, such as the Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey, there is good reason to believe that the cultivable area could be doubled. Of course, this too would necessitate the investment of vast sums of money, but such an investment would be justifiable even by the strictest economic criteria.

It is at this point, however, that we are faced with one of the many imponderables mentioned at the beginning of this paper. So far, I have assumed that no great technological change is taking place. But in fact a far-reaching revolution may be coming about. Interest in the possibility of utilizing solar energy is growing, and no less an authority than Dr. James Conant recently pinned greater hopes on it than on atomic energy. Now if there is one thing the Middle East is rich in, it is surely sunshine. Concurrently, experiments are being carried out, in this country and elsewhere, to distill sea water by evaporation. Consider what this means to a country like Egypt, with about 96 per cent of its territory desert but a coast line of nearly 1,000 miles; or to Arabia, where both the proportion of desert and the length of coast line are greater; or, stepping slightly outside the region, to Libya and North Africa. I should perhaps add that, in Egypt and Israel, increasing attention is being given to the possibility of utilizing underground and rain water in the desert and of planting suitable crops and trees.

The limiting factor to cultivation in the Middle East is almost everywhere water, not land. Most of the land is fertile, some of it is very fertile, and whenever it is vivified by the touch of water it grows excellent crops. During the four or five weeks following the winter rains, the desolate Western Desert of Egypt is covered with a beautiful many-colored carpet of flowers, and the Syrian desert becomes green with grass. If means should be found to make underground or sea water cheaply available, the agricultural potentialities of the region would be immense.

At this stage a provisional balance sheet may be drawn on the following lines. The agricultural output of the region probably can, without very great efforts, be increased so as to

keep pace with the growth in population; in one or two countries, however, this may prove difficult. Given institutional reforms and a large capital investment, a much greater increase may be expected. The utilization of solar energy may transform the whole picture.

The next aspect to be studied is mineral resources, and it is easy to make an inventory of the very limited number of minerals, other than oil, to be found in the region. Cyprus, true to its name, exports copper ore, small quantities of chromium and asbestos. Egypt has an export surplus of phosphates and low-grade manganese; in addition there are substantial deposits of iron ore, which will shortly be worked. The Dead Sea contains vast quantities of potash and bromides; under the Mandate, Palestine was an important producer of potash and there is no reason to doubt that both Israel and Jordan will soon resume production. Iran and Afghanistan contain a variety of minerals, but apparently none in large quantities. The same may be true of Yemen. Saudi Arabia probably holds appreciable reserves of iron ore. Finally there is Turkey which meets its own requirements of coal, lignite and iron, is one of the leading producers of chromium, and exports small quantities of copper.

The above list is not impressive. Of course, the greater part of the region has not been prospected and it may well prove to be richer than is thought at present, though the geological formations do not encourage such a belief. Another important point to bear in mind is that even where minerals have been located it is difficult to extract them because of poor communications or, as in parts of Egypt and Arabia, because of the shortage of water. Once more, the aridity of the region proves to be one of the main obstacles to its development.

Industrial development in the Middle East is still in its early stages. The one attempt at industrialization in the nineteenth century, that of Muhammad Ali of Egypt, was thwarted by foreign opposition, after a promising beginning. Until the 1920's, political conditions, and more particularly the prevailing tariff system, precluded any vigorous attempt at industrialization. The achievement of political independence by some countries after the First World War, and the catastrophic fall in agricultural prices during the depression, convinced the

Middle Eastern governments, together with those of most of the underdeveloped countries, of the need to diversify their economy and reduce their dependence on exports of raw materials. During the Second World War, demand for local industrial goods increased severalfold, manufacturers made large profits, and many thousands of workmen acquired new skills working in Allied Army workshops. The volume of industrial output in the post-war period has been almost two-thirds greater than that of the pre-war years.

At present conditions vary greatly. In Israel a widely diversified industry is rapidly developing. In Egypt and Turkey a few branches, notably textiles and food processing, are in a position to meet the bulk of domestic needs and others are being created or expanded. In Iran, Lebanon and Syria, some progress has also been made. The rest of the region is almost completely unindustrialized. But in no country, except Israel, does industry, excluding petroleum, account for more than 15 per cent of the national income.

Development is impeded by the obstacles prevalent in the majority of underdeveloped regions. Perhaps the most important is the narrowness of the national markets, due to the smallness of the population, the low purchasing power of the mass of the inhabitants, and, until fairly recently, the low esteem in which domestic goods were held by the upper classes. The poverty of the Middle Eastern countries, the lack of interest on the part of foreign capital, and the preference of the wealthier groups for other forms of investment have also limited investment in industry. In recent years, however, local private capital has shown increasing interest in industry and there has also been a little foreign capital investment.

The limited range of minerals, and above all the scarcity of coal and iron, have handicapped industry. Until recently, fuel was expensive, but cheap oil is now available in most countries. Agricultural raw materials are more abundant, but their quality often leaves much to be desired and it is usually difficult to obtain sufficient quantities of uniform standard. In spite of marked improvement during the last two decades, the shortage of managers, technicians and skilled workers still makes itself felt. Productivity in industry has increased and is now considerably higher than in agriculture but, "except in a few

plants equipped with up-to-date machinery, it still remains low measured by international standards."<sup>2</sup>

All these obstacles will no doubt continue to make themselves felt for some time, but they will probably be overcome, as they have been overcome elsewhere, in the normal course of development. Industry is bound to play an increasing part in the Middle Eastern countries, with advantage to their economic, social, political and cultural life. It is, however, most unlikely for a long time to come to displace agriculture as the occupation of the bulk of the population. After all, even the spectacular growth of Japanese industry did little more than absorb the population increase, hardly drawing on the excess rural population.<sup>3</sup>

For thousands of years, the Middle East has been earning more or less substantial amounts from the tourist and transit trades. The Pyramids of Egypt have often been quoted as an example of wasteful expenditure. But such critics forget the contribution which the Pyramids have made to Egypt's balance of payments since the days of Herodotus. The same is true of the other "sights" of the Middle East, such as Baalbeck. Still more important are the Holy Places of Palestine, Arabia and Iraq, which draw hundreds of thousands of Christian, Muslim and Jewish pilgrims each year.

The transit trade of the Middle East has recently gained in importance; for to the traditional land routes and the Suez Canal have been added the air routes. Middle Eastern airports, notably those of Cairo, Lydda and Beirut, play a vital part in the world's system of air communications. There is every reason to believe that both the tourist and the transit trades will gain in importance during the next few years.

It is now time to turn to the greatest single asset of the Middle East, its petroleum. The bare statistics tell a sufficiently eloquent tale. According to the latest estimates, made at the beginning of this year, the Middle East contained half the

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East*, supplement to *World Economic Report*, 1949-1950.

<sup>3</sup> Irene B. Taeuber, "Population Increase and Manpower Utilization in Imperial Japan", in *Modernization Programs in Relations to Human Resources*, Milbank Memorial Fund, 1950.



proved reserves of the entire world. These were distributed as follows:

Kuwait .....	15 billion barrels
Iran .....	13 " "
Saudi Arabia .....	10 " "
Iraq .....	8.7 " "
Qatar .....	1 " "

Egypt and Bahrein, between them, accounted for half a billion barrels; and Turkey has small reserves. It is also likely that oil deposits exist in Afghanistan, Israel and Syria.

Owing to the recent discovery of many of the fields, as well as to the over-all policies of the oil companies, Middle Eastern production has only recently attained a stature at all commensurate with its potentialities. Total output of crude oil rose from 46 million barrels in 1928 to 121 million in 1938; at the latter date it represented only 6 per cent of world production, excluding the Soviet Union. Since then the increase has been greatly accelerated, production totaling 266 million barrels in 1946 and 652 million in 1950. The latter figure represented 18 per cent of world output, again excluding the Soviet Union; and unless some unforeseen catastrophe should take place, there is every reason to hope that both the absolute and the relative growth will continue and that Middle Eastern oil will account for an ever increasing proportion of world output. At present, the region is drawing on its proved reserves at a rate which is a fraction of that of other producing areas.

Refining capacity has also been considerably expanded, and the Middle East contains the world's largest refinery, that of Abadan. Nevertheless, at present only about half the output of the region is refined locally, the rest being exported in its crude form. Together with the Caribbean, the Middle East is the major oil-exporting region, supplying the bulk of the needs of Africa, Asia, Oceania and the greater part of those of Western Europe.

But the matter does not end here. Owing to favorable geological formations, and to concession terms which allow the companies to choose the most favorable layout for their operations, the productivity of Middle Eastern wells is enormously higher than that of competitors. In 1949, daily average production of each well in the Middle East was 3,700 barrels; the corre-



sponding figure for Venezuela was 201 and for the United States only 11. Moreover practically all Middle Eastern oil is obtained from flowing wells, whereas most of that of other regions has to be artificially lifted; this further reduces the costs of production. Both wage rates and labor costs are much lower than those prevailing in other regions. Finally, as will be seen in a minute, royalties and other payments to local governments are relatively small.

As a result of all these factors, costs of production in the Middle East are only a fraction of those of competing regions. Figures are, naturally, difficult to obtain but, in the Senate Hearings of 1947, it was disclosed that the cost of production of a barrel of crude oil, including royalty payments, was only 41 cents in Saudi Arabia in 1945 and 25 cents in Bahrein.<sup>4</sup> In 1948, average costs of production in Venezuela were \$1.54.

Nor, finally, should it be forgotten that costs of transport from the Persian Gulf to its principal markets are lower than those from the Caribbean. The Middle East is, naturally, in a better position to serve Asia, Oceania and East Africa, and, with the completion of the major pipe lines to the Mediterranean, its competitive power in the European market has also become greater.

Turning from this general view of the oil industry to its impact on the economy of the Middle Eastern countries, the following facts may be noted. Over 100,000 employees are directly engaged in petroleum, at wages somewhat above those prevailing in other industries; of these, however, only a very small number are in the higher technical or administrative grades. Petroleum has been supplied to most countries, for local consumption, at reasonable prices. Wages and royalties paid by the companies have constituted the largest source of foreign exchange, covering in most cases half or more of the country's imports of foreign goods. Finally, royalties and tax payments by the companies have formed an important item in government revenue, accounting in recent years for about a tenth in Iraq, a sixth in Iran and one half or over in the Arabian peninsula.

<sup>4</sup> U. S. Senate, Eightieth Congress, *Hearings before a Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program*, pp. 25008 and 25022.

These are important contributions, but there is a danger that they be overestimated. Too often the Middle Eastern governments are pictured as swimming in a boundless sea of royalties. This is certainly true of the producing countries of the Arabian peninsula, but not of the rest of the region. The governments of Afghanistan, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Sudan, Syria, Turkey and Yemen, comprising 70 per cent of the region's population, derive little or no benefits from the oil industry. Even in Iran and Iraq, the two oldest producers, the total contribution of the oil industry to the national income, in the form of royalties, wages, taxes and other local expenditures, has not in recent years exceeded 10 per cent. In some of the small countries, which are rich in oil and poor in everything else, little is being or can be done to use oil royalties for productive purposes. One is reminded of that excellent Arabic proverb: "God gives nuts to those who do not have teeth."

Until recently the rate of royalty and tax payments in the Middle East was very low, ranging in 1948 between 13 and 33 cents a barrel, against an average of 86 cents in Venezuela. In the United States, where royalties represent merely payments to the owners of the land, the average in 1949 was 42 cents, while taxes paid by oil companies amounted to a still higher figure. During the last year, however, almost all the concession agreements have been revised and royalty rates have been substantially raised. This fact, together with the anticipated expansion in production, should result in a large increase in oil revenues, which may well amount to \$400 million a year in the very near future.

This brings us to the next topic of discussion: the availability of capital. Without a large-scale application of capital, Middle Eastern resources can simply not be developed. Recently a group of experts, appointed by the United Nations, estimated at what I believe to be the somewhat excessive figure of \$1,300,000,000 the annual amount required by the Middle Eastern countries (excluding the Sudan), if they were to raise their national income per capita by 2 per cent annually.<sup>5</sup> Of this amount, they estimated that \$540,000,000 would be provided by domestic savings, including oil royalties, the balance to

<sup>5</sup> *Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries*, May 1951.

come from abroad. The anticipated increase in royalties will correspondingly reduce the amount of foreign capital required, but it will still be large. I hasten to add that, at present, there are few signs that this will be forthcoming. Israel has received much foreign capital, both private and public. Turkey has benefited under the Military Assistance Program and the Marshall Plan. Much money has been invested in the oil industry. In the rest of the region, however, there has been only a tiny trickle.

Can anything be done by the Middle Eastern peoples themselves either to activate the flow of foreign capital or to replace it from their own resources? It is at this point that we have to grapple with the most important and the most elusive of our imponderables: the spirit of the Middle Eastern peoples. Without at least a brief consideration of this subject, no discussion of the prospects of development can be complete.

In many ways the performance of the Middle Eastern countries during the last thirty years has been disappointing. In the main, they have failed to deal effectively with their basic economic and social problems. In one or two countries, there are definite signs of a decline in the standard of living. There has been much political unrest, expressing itself recently in a spate of assassinations. To the outsider, the whole scene seems to be dominated by unrealism and xenophobia. He is apt to dismiss it as mere sound and fury, signifying nothing.

Such a picture is, however, both too dark and oversimplified. It omits the most important feature of all, the painful process of Westernization and modernization of the region which has been taking place during the last hundred years.

All Middle Easterners suffer from acute historical nostalgia, and all like to dwell on the days when the Islamic civilization led the world in the arts of war and peace. But for various reasons, both intrinsic, such as the failure of Islam fully to absorb Greek thought, and external, such as the unbelievable devastation wreaked by the Tatars, that civilization started declining after the thirteenth century. When in the early decades of the nineteenth century, as a response to the impact of Europe, the Middle East began to Westernize itself, it may be said to have started from below scratch.

Perhaps the following scattered examples will convey an idea of the state of affairs. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, wheeled traffic was unknown in Egypt. In 1838, a foreign traveler failed to find a single bookshop in Damascus or Aleppo. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the number of students in all the schools of Arab Asia and Egypt, whose population was at least 25 million, was under 150,000. A Syrian writer recently stated that he remembered the days when there was not one qualified doctor or dentist in his country.

Things have greatly changed since then. Egypt, Israel and Lebanon have an excellent system of railways, roads, harbors and airports, and it may be categorically stated that lack of transportation is no longer an obstacle to their economic development. In most of the other countries much progress has also been made but, owing to their great size and the low overall density of their population, they are still handicapped by inadequate means of transportation.

The same is true of health. Leaving aside Israel, which has more doctors in relation to population than any country in the world, it may be noted that Lebanon has one doctor for every 1,500 inhabitants, and Syria and Egypt one for every 4,000. Health conditions have greatly improved, though still leaving much to be desired, and major epidemics, which were once both frequent and highly destructive, now seem to be a thing of the past.

In education there has been an improvement in both quantity and quality. At present, at least 75 per cent of children of school age are provided with education in Lebanon and about 50 per cent in Egypt, Syria and Turkey. There are at present three universities in Egypt, with a fourth under way, two in Iran, Israel, Lebanon and Turkey, and one in Iraq and Syria. A distinguished group of scholars and writers has been produced by the Middle Eastern countries during the last two decades.

One more important social advance must be mentioned: the education of women and their participation in almost all fields of activity. This process has gone furthest in Israel and Turkey, but the Arab countries have also achieved much. Girls constitute over one third of the school population in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey and women students can be found

in every faculty of their universities. Women have entered most professions and are successfully competing with men.

In the political field, it may be noticed that most of the countries of the region have achieved their independence, most are practicing, although imperfectly, constitutional parliamentary government and most have begun to organize their system of administration on a rational, modern basis.

Coming to the narrower field of economic enterprise, many encouraging features may be noted. The growing, grading and packing of cotton in Egypt is a model of its kind. In Palestine, orange cultivation reached a high level on both Arab and Jewish farms. Several Egyptian industries are managed in an efficient way. Some of the Middle Eastern airlines, notably those of Turkey and Egypt, have an excellent safety record. The present cotton boom in Syria shows that farmers respond readily to new economic opportunities. The shrewdness of Levantine merchants is notorious and those of Beirut carry on an extensive gold trade with ramifications stretching from Mexico to India and the Far East. The central banks of Egypt, Iran and Turkey have maintained a high standard of efficiency.

Many of the cultural, political and social obstacles impeding economic progress have been removed, but many more still remain. There is, first of all, the fact that the region is broken up by many political frontiers, some of which correspond to ethnic and cultural differences but most of which are completely artificial. This Balkanization of the Middle East not only strangles trade and prevents intra-regional specialization but also increases the burden of administration, foreign representation and defense.

A second obstacle is the social structure of almost all the Middle Eastern countries, marked by great inequality of wealth and a low level of living for the mass of the population.

The growth of population has also pressed heavily on economic advance. During the last hundred years, the output of Egyptian agriculture has risen at least eightfold, and that of industry has expanded still more. But almost all of this increase has been absorbed by the population growth, and in recent years the standard of living seems to have declined. Unlike some more fortunate regions, the Middle East has not been



able to relieve its population pressure by emigration.<sup>6</sup> On the contrary, it has had to absorb a large-scale Jewish immigration into Palestine and, after the establishment of the state of Israel, about three-quarters of a million Arab refugees, who represent a heavy burden on the neighboring countries. This population growth, which may be accelerated during the next few years by the improvement in health conditions, is one of the most intractable problems facing the Middle East, along with most other underdeveloped regions.

A fourth obstacle is the prevailing attitude of the Middle Eastern peoples toward their governments. For long centuries the government was always alien, hated and, whenever possible, disobeyed. Disrespect for law is a normal feature under alien rule; after all, it has been estimated that in colonial days nine tenths of the American merchants were smugglers.<sup>7</sup> In that part of the world, however, government was in addition despotic and oppressive, and the reaction of the people went beyond smuggling. In the seventeenth century, the prosperous little port of Sidon was blocked with rocks by its inhabitants to prevent the fleets of their suzerain lord, the Sultan, from entering it. Such an attitude, once ingrained, dies hard, as some of the European countries discovered after their liberation from Nazi occupation, and it will take some time before the Middle Eastern peoples have toward their governments the same feelings as the British or the Americans.

Last, but not least, there has been, and still is, foreign interference. This has, more often than not, been exercised to block necessary reforms and hold up progress. Even where it has not been great, its presence has provided an irritant, which has distracted attention from basic economic, social and cultural problems. Feeling has now reached the boiling point and there is a determination to end foreign influence at all costs. This explosive situation may, of course, easily end in complete chaos.

Is there any hope that these obstacles will also be overcome and that the Middle East will get down to the task of rapidly

<sup>6</sup> The principal exceptions to this statement are Lebanon and Hadramaut, in southern Arabia.

<sup>7</sup> Ernest L. Bogart and Donald L. Kemmerer, *Economic History of the American People* (New York, 1946), p. 196.



developing its resources? The answer to this must be based on faith.

Personally, I think that the Middle East will succeed in breaking through the vicious circle in which it is at present imprisoned. Two main avenues are open before it: either to enlist foreign capital and help, and thus lighten its burden; or to make a gigantic effort to provide out of its own resources the capital and skills necessary for development. When it is remembered that the average annual per capita income in the region is about \$100, the magnitude of the second alternative, and the hardship it involves, become plain. It is the less desirable of the two, but unless foreign help is forthcoming it is the only possibility. Of course, it would involve a vast and elaborate system of controls to ensure that available capital is invested in productive enterprises, instead of being hoarded or used for money lending or speculation, as is the case at present. It would probably involve a totalitarian form of government and society.

Turkey seems firmly to have chosen the first path, that of outside aid. Its foreign policy has definitely been, in recent years, more realistic than that of its Iranian and Arab neighbors and it has also had a more constructive domestic policy. Thus, to take one of many examples, it is the only Middle Eastern country to have attempted an agrarian reform. (I have not discussed Israel, since its background is predominantly Western and its problems are different from those of its neighbors. Moreover, it has already secured a relatively enormous amount of foreign help.)

Several factors may perhaps help to explain Turkey's better showing. It has certain natural advantages, such as climate, abundance of land and the possession of many minerals. It has never been subject to foreign rule, and has therefore been able to train a relatively experienced ruling class and army. It began to feel the impact of Europe as early as the seventeenth century, and was forced earlier to adapt itself to meet the new pressure; the Arabs, on the other hand, were shielded from the European impact by the interposed Ottoman Empire, while the Iranians were too far away to be greatly affected. Finally, Turkey experienced the terrible upheaval of the First World War and the subsequent Greek War, in the course of which its

colonies were lost and its aristocracy ruined. The suffering and stresses of that period, vividly depicted in Irfan Orga's novel *Portrait of a Turkish family*, prepared the way for a revolution in outlook and a drastic reform of social institutions.

But when all this has been said, it must be added that the West has made it easier for Turkey to behave sensibly. Turkey's achievements have received full recognition and its shortcomings have been overlooked. Above all, Turkey has not been subjected to a systematic and prolonged vilification as have the Arabs. If the words I have used seem excessive, I would suggest a perusal of the New York press and of the *Book Review* section of the leading newspapers.

Will the example of Turkey prove contagious? That depends, to a large extent, on the Middle Eastern policy of the Western Powers. If these states show sympathy and understanding, and if they are prepared to help the Middle East, much unnecessary suffering may be avoided and much waste eliminated. But the final responsibility rests with the Middle Eastern peoples. They are faced with a tremendous challenge and will, I feel convinced, in time make an adequate response, as they have repeatedly done in the past. When that response will occur and what shape it will take, it would require a prophet to foretell.

#### REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

CHAIRMAN KIRK: Thank you very much, Dr. Issawi!

During the course of that admirable economic analysis, Dr. Issawi referred to the refugee problem. This has been one of the unhappy by-products of the political tensions that have existed in the Middle Eastern area in recent times. It has produced in the Middle East a problem of great magnitude and complexity. Curiously enough, it has frequently been overlooked in this country. Because of its importance and the lack of public familiarity with it, we felt that this problem ought to be discussed by someone who has had a first-hand acquaintanceship with it. Dr. Richardson, as you will note from your program, spent a year or a little over that as a camp administrator in Gaza. He wrote his doctoral dissertation at Columbia on the general subject of the refugee question.

For these reasons we are indeed happy to have him with us today. Dr. Richardson!

## THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

CHANNING B. RICHARDSON

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THE specific beginnings of a refugee movement are always difficult to discover, since they usually occur in the midst of civil confusion and fear which obscure the facts. The flight of over 800,000 Arabs from Palestine in 1948 is no exception to this generalization. That year opened to the sound of bomb blasts and gunfire in the Holy Land. Insecurity and fear had increased since the General Assembly of the United Nations had resolved that Palestine should be partitioned between the Arab and Jewish communities and since the British had announced that they would lay down the Mandate on May 15, 1948. Over 1,000,000 Arabs and about 625,000 Jews were apparently determined to use violence to enforce their claims. With the civil authority breaking down and large-scale violence sure to come, the first Arab refugees probably began to leave Palestine in February. These small groups were mostly wealthy people who could afford to take cars with them, as well as considerable household goods. They fled chiefly into Lebanon. After February, the exodus continued to grow. On April 5, 8,000 Arab children were evacuated from Jaffa and Haifa. On April 9 Jewish terrorists massacred an isolated Arab village near Jerusalem, thereby stimulating a sense of panic in the hearts of many Arab villagers. In fact, this massacre probably did more than any other single act to create the fear which started the flood of refugees.

After the termination of the Mandate on May 15, open warfare broke out and the refugee movement increased in magnitude. The new state of Israel was invaded by the armies of five Arab nations intent upon driving it into the sea and upon aiding their Palestinian brothers to establish another Arab state. Military action—often of the guerilla type—became the order of the day. Confusion became compounded as rumors filled the villages. It was said that one must leave home and go to

welcome the invading Arab armies, returning within a few days with the victorious troops. It was stated that the British would give no protection. It was said that one should remain calmly at home. To the average Palestinian Arab all this fear and confusion were too much. He fled, filling the dusty roads with long columns of hungry miserable people, most of whom expected to come back to their abandoned lands within a few days or weeks. Today, more than three and one-half years later, 880,000 Palestinian Arabs are still homeless, forming one of the most vexing problems of the explosive Middle East.

In one sense, the Arab refugees had a small bit of good fortune. Their plight was part and parcel of a problem which was high on the agenda of the United Nations. They were and are in the international limelight. Governments with the means to help have an interest in helping. Further, the refugees fled into neighboring lands of similar cultures. The Arab refugee from Palestine, however, would answer that these facts have actually worked him harm. He blames the United Nations for his plight, feeling that its intervention prevented the realization of his hopes for an independent Arab Palestine. He blames the British for allowing Jewish strength to grow prior to May 15 and for allegedly preventing the Arab Legion from following up its victories over the armies of Israel. He bitterly blames the United States for its support of Israel. He blames the Arab nations for their lack of strength and ineffective leadership which combined to give victory to Israel. It is unnecessary to point out the opportunities which exist here for the Communist to "fish in troubled waters". The Arab refugee problem, like all others, has become dominated by political considerations. The humanitarian aspect, the attitude which attempts to alleviate human misery simply because it is the decent thing to do, has been constantly under the shadow of the larger political issues involved. Nevertheless, the United Nations tried at first to solve the refugee problem on a humanitarian, or nonpolitical, basis.

The first effort along humanitarian lines was made by the United Nations mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte. During the summer of 1948 he noticed the swarms of refugees creeping toward havens in Lebanon, Syria, "Arab Palestine" and Jordan. Recognizing the close connection which would be

established between the refugee problem growing before his eyes and any future political or military solution to the larger Palestine problem, he acted rapidly. As part of his staff he established a temporary Disaster Relief Project. This *ad hoc* group began to function in September as a stimulating and coordinating center designed to increase the small amounts of direct relief being given to the refugees. With neither funds nor personnel, it called meetings of representatives of the many foreign philanthropic groups who were endeavoring to bring aid in the refugee camps. These meetings served to channel such aid as there was into the areas most in need. Also during the fall of 1948 the Arab states into which the refugees were pouring attempted to give out allowances of money and flour. Soon, however, their resources came to an end. The threat of epidemics grew in the hundreds of crowded villages in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. On the horizon the cold and damp winter months held other threats to the physical health and political stability of the Middle East. By December, the Director of the Disaster Relief Project estimated that there were at least 760,000 refugees in grave need. The United Nations had to supply a refugee relief program or see wholesale deaths of people made homeless by a situation it was attempting to control.

Accordingly, the General Assembly established a more formal relief organization to bring the vitally needed aid. Entitled the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, this new agency began its work on January 1, 1949 and was scheduled to run for nine months. Its assigned rôle was, again, that of coördination rather than that of operation of the relief program. The agency was unique in that the actual operation of the relief program was entrusted to three voluntary nongovernmental organizations. Each of these three was given a specific geographical area. The American Friends Service Committee operated in the Gaza strip in southern Palestine, and brought aid to 200,000 refugees. The League of Red Cross Societies brought aid to 310,000 refugees in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. The International Committee of the Red Cross carried out its tasks in Israel and "Arab Palestine", taking care of over 400,000 refugees. Within these areas each voluntary agency had



almost complete autonomy. Costs were met by the contributions of governments, made to the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, a means of financing which made financial stability and long-range planning almost impossible. Since the resources of the operation were so uncertain, the services given the refugees were forced to be the absolute minimum. Other United Nations agencies, especially the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, coöperated. After three extensions of life, U.N.R.P.R. closed its books on May 1, 1950. It was then found that this unique relief operation had kept over 900,000 people alive, on a diet of 1,500 calories daily, at a cost of about \$2.00 a month for each refugee! It was the United Nations answer to the humanitarian problem posed by the Arab refugees, but clearly was no solution.

Count Bernadotte was also the first to recognize the political implications of the refugee movement. Up until the time of his death his attitude was that the refugees had the right to return to their homes as long as they were peace-loving and wished to get along with their Jewish neighbors. This idea was perpetuated by the General Assembly in a resolution passed on December 11, 1948 which established the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. Paragraph 11 of that resolution stated that "the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible." The Commission was instructed to facilitate the repatriation or resettlement of the refugees. Since December 1948, all the negotiations between the Commission and Israel and the Arab states have emphasized the importance which the latter attach to the fact that the United Nations has gone on record asserting the right of the refugees to return to their homes.

The Conciliation Commission plunged into its tasks, hampered by the fact that the Arab delegations refused to sit with the representatives of Israel. The position of the new nation regarding the refugee problem was that its solution should be made part of a general over-all settlement between the parties



concerned. Israel stood ready, however, to discuss the matter of assets belonging to Arabs who had fled and which had been blocked by her. Firmly ruling out any large-scale repatriation on military grounds, Israel was, nevertheless, willing to discuss the repatriation of a small number of families to join their breadwinners who had remained in the new state. Under this scheme, late in 1949 and in 1950, about 2,500 wives and minor children were allowed back into Israel to join fathers or husbands. On any other possible solutions to the refugee problem, the Conciliation Commission was unable to make headway.

With the stalemate continuing, in August 1949 the United Nations made a new effort to find a solution to the vexing question. It sent an Economic Survey Mission to the Middle East. Headed by the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the T.V.A., the Mission was given the task of studying the economic resources of the Middle East to ascertain how they might be made to help solve the problem of 900,000 homeless people. Within the refugee camps, it was received with unrest. The Arab governments received it with something less than warmth. Any effort to "resettle" was seen by the refugees as an act of approval of the flight from Palestine and its causes.

After a tour of the area, the Mission issued a balanced and realistic report. Noting that the poverty of the refugees was the same problem which affected all people and governments of the Middle East, it did not outline a spectacular list of projects. Rather it suggested four small pilot projects which could be started at once and which would point the way toward the slow creation of economic strength for the region. It suggested that U.N.R.P.R. should gradually diminish its relief rolls while embarking on a series of works projects designed to take heads of families off the rolls. To emphasize this shift from direct relief to works projects, it urged the General Assembly to establish a new agency to supersede U.N.R.P.R. The General Assembly accepted these recommendations and in December 1949 created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

After some delay, this agency took up its tasks on May 1, 1950, with 950,000 people on its direct relief rolls, as opposed to the 751,000 advised by the Economic Survey Mission. After initial unrest in the camps, a process of reorganization was be-

gun. As the personnel of the three voluntary agencies withdrew, the Relief and Works Agency replaced them with its own employees in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel and Gaza. Slow progress was made on works projects due to lack of funds and resistance on the part of the refugees and the Arab governments. To the refugee, accepting employment meant foregoing the right to return home. Some weaving and housing projects were started, but in general the results were disappointing. During its first months, the financial resources of the organization were not great, and those that did exist were perforce devoted to direct relief costs to a large degree. At present there are still 877,000 people on the direct relief rolls. "Reintegration" projects have absorbed only a few hundred families. However, there is some hope that the solution to the refugee problem may soon come into sight. This hope springs from two important facts.

The first of these is a possible change in political attitudes. In February 1951, the Arab governments, acting in unison, tentatively pledged their coöperation to the new Relief and Works Agency on three conditions. These were that they would limit their contributions to public lands and services; that they would expect evidence of substantial interest from those governments which had been contributing to the refugee problem; and that any reintegration of refugees into the host countries would not prejudice their rights to compensation from or repatriation back into Israel. This change in attitude, if permanent, should mean that projects surveyed and begun by the Relief and Works Agency would be welcomed and that an expanded program might get under way. The Agency is now planning large-scale projects which will shift great numbers of refugees from the relief rolls to self-sustaining farms or businesses. It remains to be seen if the necessary coöperation will be given by the refugees.

The second important fact is that for the first time there are now available funds to open up these large-scale projects. Twenty-nine governments have now contributed to the Agency's 1951-1952 budget of \$79,000,000. This sum is more than double that available the previous year. An American contribution of \$50,000,000 is assured.

With reintegration projects showing new signs of promise, the Conciliation Commission has recently been tackling other phases of the refugee issue. Israel has again announced that she is willing to discuss with the United Nations the matter of compensation for the lands of the refugees, carefully noting her counterclaims for Jewish properties seized in the Arab states. She has also stated that she will aid in the resettlement of refugees outside her borders and perhaps will allow another limited repatriation movement to aid the Arab governments as they confront their publics at home. She will not allow any large-scale repatriation of the Arab refugees. The disposition of the Gaza strip is apparently again under consideration. With its 200,000 refugees and 75,000 inhabitants crowded into a space only twenty-five by five miles, it remains a focal point of fear and tension. The outcome of these discussions and others is as yet in doubt; the Conciliation Commission will continue to search for common ground.

The next few months will hold the answer to the questions: are the Arab states willing to face reality, that is, the presence of Israel in their midst, to accept the financial and economic aids offered to them by the Relief and Works Agency and thus to begin to solve the refugee problem? If they do so, they can utilize the refugees to start the slow process of economic and social betterment for which the entire Middle East cries out. If they thus eliminate the use of the refugee problem as a political weapon against Israel and as a bargaining weapon against the West, they will serve their own long-range interests. If, however, they allow unsolved political issues, internal or external, to continue to dominate the refugee problem, they add one more large piece of fuel to the fires of unrest and instability which threaten each government in the Middle East.

At this time it is in their power to make the choice.

## REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

CHAIRMAN KIRK: Thank you, Dr. Richardson!

One of the great American cultural influences in the Middle East has been the American University in Beirut, and one of the great American figures in the Middle Eastern area for quite a long time has been Dr. Dodge, our next speaker, who served, for many years, with almost unparalleled distinction, not only as a great American, not only as a great educator, but as a great representative of the West in the Middle Eastern area.

Now retired recently from these unquestionably arduous academic duties as an administrator—I think I can speak a little about that—he has returned to the quieter academic life as a lecturer in the Department of Oriental Languages and Literature at Princeton.

We are delighted to have him with us today and to have him discuss for us the influence of "Western Education on the Middle East".  
Dr. Dodge!

## WESTERN EDUCATION AND THE MIDDLE EAST

BAYARD DODGE

Former President, American University of Beirut  
Lecturer, Department of Oriental Languages and Literature  
Princeton University

### *The Old Imperialism*

WHEN I first went to Beirut in 1913, two ancient dynasties were ruling Western Asia, the Ottomans in Turkey and the Qajars in Persia. Both systems were medieval, despotic and largely feudal. Because of the 1907 treaty, Russia and Britain had split Persia into foreign zones of influence, while numerous Powers were hovering over Turkey like vultures over a dying prey.

After the First World War most of the countries of the Near East were controlled either by France or by Great Britain and during the Second World War foreign armies entered all of the Near Eastern states, except Turkey and some of the regions of Arabia.

### *Independence*

Smarting from the humiliation of foreign control the peoples of the Near East have demanded liberty. Turkey, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and the Arabian kingdoms have already gained complete sovereignty. Egypt, Iraq and Jordan are free except for their treaties with Britain, which they are anxious to cancel.

The young men and women in these countries are confronted by the same problems which challenged our American youth at the time of Franklin and Jefferson. The emotional orgy of revolution must give way to the sober task of reconstruction.

Several years ago I accompanied a group of Beirut graduates on a Tigris River picnic. They were not very different from American alumni at a reunion. One was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, another was a leading man in the customs service. Others were directors of education, public health, public works, agriculture, irrigation, the government industrial lab-

oratories, and some of the leading government schools. Many were business men, teachers, doctors, and members of the various professions.

I realized that these young men and women were thinking about reorganizing their legal system, which was still mixed with Koranic law, establishing proper systems of records and statistics, reorganizing the budget, audit, customs, and government credit systems. Large sections of the country still had to be surveyed, the land tenure system revised and taxes readjusted.

Industry, irrigation, agriculture, airways, highways and railroads needed development. Embassies, legations, consulates and the delegation to the United Nations had to be formed. Public health and education were also essential.

As we talked together on the picnic I realized what heavy burdens are placed upon the shoulders of the young men and women of lands newly set free.

One evening the cabinet minister temporarily in charge of the Syrian government came to dinner with me. He was a highly respected physician drafted into public service. The petroleum companies were pressing him to sign a concession for the exploitation of the oil in Syria. In a very frank way he asked: "What does a family doctor know about drawing up oil concessions?"

When my wife and I were driving across the mountains from Damascus to Beirut, a policeman stopped us. He said that the president of the Republic was in a nearby hotel and anxious to have me call on him. When I went to see the president he told me that he urgently needed a Lebanese expert to deal with some United Nations affairs. The only person to do the job was a member of our faculty and he wanted to have him released, if we could find a substitute.

The newly won independence in the Near East cannot succeed, unless a sufficient number of young men and women are trained for specialized forms of work. It is here that Western education has a most important part to play.

The French and British schools in the Near East and also our own schools of higher learning, like Robert College, the American University at Cairo, the colleges for girls at Istanbul and Beirut, the American Farm School at Salonika, and the



American University of Beirut, can make tremendously important contributions. Many students will also go to Europe and America for post-graduate study.

If we try to reform the Near East by coercing the members of the older generation, it will end in hatred and frustration, but if we teach the youth to do the work themselves, we shall gain their confidence and help them to transform their countries.

### *Modernism*

Independence is enough to be digested in one lifetime. But in the Near East the youth must simultaneously digest modernism. By modernism I mean science, technology with its factories, petroleum and farm machinery, new inventions like radio and the cinema, automobiles, European social customs, modern sports and styles of dress, and the philosophical ideas of Europe and America.

Unfortunately modernism has flooded the Near East in the wake of foreign armies, pipe line gangs and adventurers. It has been largely interpreted by commercial salesmen, movie operators, cabaret dancers and translators of radical literature. It has caught the imagination of the youth so fast that they have become as much cut off from their parents and religious leaders as the immigrant children in our cities are cut off from the older members of their communities.

Modernism brings with it tremendous opportunities, but at the same time tremendous dangers. Its most immediate and devastating effect is to wreck the religious faith of the rising generation.

From a practical point of view this breakdown of faith is most serious. It comes simultaneously with new wealth created by the presence of armies, and the mushroom growth of the oil industry. It also accompanies the emancipation of women, night clubs, and the weakening of the Muslim prohibition against liquor.

A wave of materialism is flooding across the Middle East. Public and private morals are being undermined. There is the danger that there may be more corruption than good citizenship and more social climbing than social service.

Several years ago our American Ambassador in Iraq invited me to dinner with a group of leading citizens of Baghdad. After dinner he asked them to tell me what they thought was especially needed at the American University of Beirut. One of the principal cabinet ministers, who was the son of a Muslim ecclesiastic, immediately said, "The first thing we need is religion." He was not talking about Islam, as he knew all about the religious program at Beirut. He realized that his country could never enjoy independence, unless men of faith and principle could be trained to build up the national life.

As fast as they have become independent, the Near East countries have been opening schools. The number of Turkish primary schools has increased from 5,000 to 17,000; the middle schools have increased 1,000 per cent; there are 6,000 lycées, 2 universities and many technical schools. In Iraq the primary schools have increased from 88 to 878, and the higher schools from 6 to 90. Similar figures could be given for the other states.

If the national systems of education are expanding so rapidly, why is there a need for Western education?

The best way to answer the question is to explain that these government schools have the same difficulties which our public schools are facing in New York. Expansion has been so rapid that it has been impossible to train and pay the teachers in an adequate way. Schools are overcrowded, discipline is difficult, and the children do not receive much individual attention.

It is also inevitable that in newly organized countries the politicians should meddle with the school systems. Politics enters into the appointment of teachers, the promotion of pupils, and especially the encouragement of political demonstrations, which take the children into the streets and ruin discipline.

The local methods of education are apt to be too theoretical, encouraging a white-collar psychology, rather than initiative and a respect for doing things with the hands.

It is no wonder, therefore, that the states of the Near East are sending many students to the universities and technical schools of Europe and the United States. Iraq and Syria have between them supported hundreds of students at Beirut, to be

trained as teachers, and several states of Arabia have been sending students to summer institutes. Turkey and Egypt have also engaged many Western teachers to join the faculties of their state universities.

If you talk with anybody in the Near East, you realize that what they especially need is character building. Like Diogenes of old, the political scientists are looking for the honest man. The people seek schools, which develop faith, integrity, and a love of public service. Rightly or wrongly they think that our American schools develop these virtues. The result is that so many parents are trying to send their children to our missionary schools and colleges, that Catholic and Protestant institutions alike have had to limit enrollment and refuse applicants.

The lower schools are even more important than the colleges and technical schools for the building of character. Missionary education is needed more than ever before.

The most important thing that is happening in the Middle East is the emancipation of women. But unless we can train leaders to control this movement, in a way that is wholesome, it may produce great license.

Western education must explain that Christian America is not exactly as it is painted in the movies. Unless we ourselves interpret the virtues of our Christian homes, our interest in philanthropy, our respect for manual labor, our willingness to pay taxes, and our appreciation of honest business methods, who else will explain these things to the Near East?

Thus Western education is essential, both to give the technical training needed for independence and to interpret modernism in a constructive way.

### *Communism*

The third issue which is affecting the Near East is communism. For thousands of years the farm lands have been given as estates to political favorites and important chiefs. Money lenders and successful business men have also invested their wealth in land. The result is that large landowners control about 80 per cent of the land in North Syria and Iran, and an even higher percentage in southern Iraq. In Egypt less than 1/2 of 1 per cent of the landowners hold three and a half times

as much land as half the entire peasant population. Although conditions in Turkey and Lebanon are much better, they are far from perfect.

Most of the people in the Middle East depend upon agriculture, and the majority of the farm laborers are share croppers or wage-earners. I have translated a paragraph from Professor Jacques Weulersse's book, so as to gain a picture of the situation:

Subjected to the double oppression of masters and superintendents, crushed by the double yoke of rents and debts, owning nothing, not houses or animals, not even furnishings, with no material resources and no moral ones, denied even the most elementary education, the share-croppers form an agricultural proletariat which is without hope.<sup>1</sup>

No wonder many peasant children go to the towns to seek their fortunes. Some obtain government fellowships to study. Others work in the new factories, which are multiplying fast enough to offer work to many thousands. But many children are disappointed and unemployment is always a problem. It is especially serious because there are so many refugees left over from the First World War and the termination of the Palestine Mandate, that work cannot be provided for all of them. There is also so much inflation that the rich have been growing richer and the poor, poorer.

What a perfect opportunity for Communist propaganda! You may be sure that the Communists are not losing this chance. I believe that it is true that there are four thousand Communist agents in Iran and proportionate numbers in other states like Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon and Syria.

Although the wealthy people with political influence have made communism illegal, the propaganda continues as an underground movement. The agitators encourage labor strikes, they appeal to the half-educated youth on an idealistic basis, they stir up antforeign feeling, fan the flame of nationalism, even when it is anti-Russian, and through the Muslims, Christians and Jews in Russia they appeal to their co-religionists in the Near East.

<sup>1</sup> *Paysans de Syrie et du Proche-Orient* (Paris, 1946), p. 126.

Many Americans make the mistake of thinking that the Near Eastern states are not democratic. It is true that the chiefs control a number of the legislatures, the system of land tenure in many places is feudal, and the rich evade paying taxes. But surprisingly honest elections have recently been held in numerous countries and the multitudes are learning to use their power.

The rise of the Democratic party in Turkey and the popular demonstrations, which have recently influenced government action in Iran and Egypt, reveal what a rapid evolution is taking place. We must also remember that, even though some of the leaders may be corrupt, the masses care more for independence and social justice than they do for personal gain.

During the coming years there will be a race between the skilled Communist agitators and the less radical leaders of public opinion, to decide whether the Near East will or will not go the way of China.

Once again the determining influence may be Western education. Let me mention a few examples. The Near East Foundation carried on a demonstration in rural development in a region of Iran. It did so much to make the farmers optimistic and prosperous that the Iranian government and also the American Point Four program are enlisting the help of the Foundation, so as to use the same methods throughout Persia.

The American University of Beirut has sponsored a Village Welfare Service, which has interested the students from wealthy families in the problems of the peasants. Already much has been accomplished, both to arouse a feeling of responsibility on the part of the rich and to give new hope to the poor.

I have had a good deal to do with a refugee village, which was too cut off from near-by markets to be self-supporting, and too isolated to enjoy medical care. The Karagheusian Memorial provided a clinic and a truck. The result was that disease was largely wiped out, and it became so easy to sell farm products by using the truck that the people became quite prosperous.

Communism is strong because it promises to end the two great grievances of the Near East, foreign exploitation and unfair distribution of wealth. But only by education and practical demonstrations can we develop the technical ability and altru-



ism needed to make the lands independent of the foreigner and willing to break down class distinctions.

### *Conclusion*

Thus the Near East depends upon Western education to provide the skill needed to develop strong national institutions. Western education is essential for inspiring the youth with an understanding of modernism and a desire for public service. It is also needed to show the people how by their own efforts they can raise their standards of living and gain social justice.

King Faisal spoke the truth when he said: "Education is the key to the future."

### REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

CHAIRMAN KIRK: Thank you very much!

I think you will all agree with me that we have had a series of four extraordinarily informative and interesting papers this morning. I have been in a number of meetings like this over the years, and I think this has been one of the most interesting I have ever had the privilege of attending.

## PART II

### PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL STRENGTH AND STABILITY

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#### INTRODUCTION

EDWARD MEAD EARLE, *Presiding*

Professor of Politics, Institute for Advanced Study

**A**S we have a fairly long program this afternoon, I have interpreted the duties of the chairman as being simply to introduce the speakers, not to make preliminary remarks of his own.

The general subject for this afternoon is "Problems of Political Strength and Stability in the Middle East". The first speaker is Mr. Edwin M. Wright, Intelligence Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, United States Department of State.

Mr. Wright was born in the Near East and he spent thirty-four years there, partly in the government service, including the military service of the United States. He will speak on "Conflicting Political Forces and Emerging Patterns". Mr. Wright!

## CONFLICTING POLITICAL FORCES AND EMERGING PATTERNS

EDWIN M. WRIGHT

Intelligence Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and  
African Affairs, United States Department of State

TO give perspective to the present scene, it is essential to take a brief look toward the past in the Middle East to understand the turbulence that now marks the political situation.\* In retrospect, the past seems serene and stable in comparison with the boiling agitation of today. Three centuries ago, the Islamic Middle East was largely ruled by two great empires, the Ottoman in the west (Turkey) and the Safavid in the east (Iran). These two Islamic states had sufficient internal cohesion to hold at bay any outside non-Islamic Power or Powers and to enjoy bitter and destructive civil wars between sectarians of the same faith—Sunni *vs.* Shi'ah wars. But during the last quarter of the seventeenth century, both Islamic states suffered staggering military reverses from foreign foes and the decline of the Muslim Powers became marked. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and early part of the twentieth continued the process of retreat before the force of non-Muslim states and of disintegration from within. By November 11, 1918, there was no Muslim state which had survived sufficiently to be able to defend itself. What vestiges there remained of the Islamic states were tolerated because their existence had some advantages to other imperial Powers. Russia had temporarily been removed as a threat to the Middle East, and Germany was exhausted. Great Britain and France, and to a lesser degree Greece and Italy, were busy trying to dissect the

\* The subject assigned for this paper is so broad and the time limit for reading it so narrow that it can represent only a skeletal outline of suggestions, each one of which could in itself become the subject of a special article or book. There has been no effort made therefore to be exhaustive in the treatment of the topic, but rather some ideas are herein presented to stimulate thinking on this question.

apparently dead body of the Islamic society or to salvage a few segments that retained some signs of cohesion and life.

The situation in 1951 is so drastically different from that of 1919 that it seems incredible such violent fluctuations could take place in a span of thirty-two years. The Soviet Union now is launched on a program of world conquest with the Middle East as one of its prime targets. France retains only cultural interests in Syria and Lebanon. Greece withdrew after the disaster of 1922. Italy continued to bluster until World War II when her fatal decision led to the destruction of Mussolini's empire. Great Britain alone remains, but in a rather embattled stage with many demands being made for her complete withdrawal from the area. Eleven states<sup>1</sup> have emerged, all insisting on the full recognition of their complete sovereignty. The violent fluctuations in power patterns within this generation may be generally summarized in a few brief sentences. (1) The U.S.S.R. has attained a power position of primary magnitude and has intensified its drive to seize the Middle East. (2) The Western European Powers have greatly declined in power and are incapable of maintaining their traditional rôle in the Middle East. (3) The United States has assumed a predominant part in some phases of the Middle Eastern arena, but has preferred to play a secondary or passive rôle in other areas. (4) The present mood of the vocal political groups within the Middle East is expressed by an intense emotional nationalism demanding all the rights and symbols of full sovereignty. These generalities are oversimplifications to which there are special exceptions but they indicate the broad sweep of political change within the past generation. The above four points deserve some study in detail.

### *I. The Position of the U.S.S.R.*

The birth of the communist state was accompanied by a burst of enthusiasm to liberate non-communist areas from capitalist thralldom. The Soviet Union considered the Middle East as a part of the colonial or semicolonial area to be freed and in the resolutions of the Sixth Cominform (1928) promulgated the methods, slogans, tasks and aims of communism in carrying out the program of destroying the capitalist yoke and annexing

<sup>1</sup> Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, the seven Arab states and Israel.

the Middle East to the Soviet world. Tactics varied, but in 1940 opportunity knocked in the form of a pact with Hitler by which the Soviet Union was to have a free hand in the Middle East. In the Secret Protocol No. 1 based on Mr. Molotov's conversation of November 26, 1940<sup>2</sup> the Point Four of Soviet desires reads as follows: "The Soviet Union declares that its territorial aspirations center south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean." This was spelled out in a later document<sup>3</sup> to mean Soviet bases on or near the Turkish Straits and acquisition of the territory south of the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf. Balked in these aims by the perfidy of Nazi Germany in June 1941, and impeded by the Tehran Declaration which promised to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran, the Soviet Union had to either drop her plans for extension of her power to the south, or implement them through covert means. The U.S.S.R. chose the latter and initiated a series of overt demands as soon as the outcome of the war was in no doubt. These demands included extensive oil and mineral concessions in northern Iran, bases on the Dardanelles and a "friendly" attitude toward the Soviet Union by the neighboring governments. On the covert plan, separatist movements were organized, financed, armed and protected among the Turkish-speaking population of Azerbaijan (Iran), the Kurds, and other smaller groups while so-called unofficial but hostile campaigns were conducted in the Soviet press, insisting on annexing the provinces of eastern Turkey to the Soviet federated states. Although by the treaty of 1942 Soviet troops were to be evacuated from Iran within six months after termination of hostilities, on March 8, 1946, the Soviet Union strengthened its armed forces with heavy tank brigades. These efforts at intimidation failed to paralyze the will to resist on the part of the Turkish and Iranian governments. The Soviet Union found strong opposition in the United Nations, in plans to revise the Montreux Convention regarding the Straits, and by the end of 1946 the overt phase of Soviet expansion came to a slow halt. The covert phases have continued.

<sup>2</sup> *Nazi Soviet Relations, 1939-41*, Dept. of State pub. 3023, p. 257.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 258-59.



## II. *Retrenchment of the Western Powers and Termination of the Mandates*

The United Kingdom ended the Mandate over Iraq in 1932 by signature of a treaty and by introducing Iraq to the League of Nations. France, under wartime conditions, terminated the Mandate over Syria and Lebanon without a treaty. The two states became charter members of the United Nations. Great Britain terminated the Mandate over Transjordan in March 1946 with the signature of a treaty and recognition of the Hashimi Kingdom of Jordan as a sovereign state. The Mandate over Palestine terminated May 14, 1948 as a full-scale war broke out between Israel and the Arab states following the UN partition plan decision. No treaty concluded this Mandate. The vestiges of the British dominant position of half a century earlier have been reduced to certain oil concessions in the region of the Persian Gulf and three treaties with Iraq, Jordan and Egypt. The United States had assumed no political or strategical commitments although United States commercial interests had undertaken important petroleum concessions in the area. The withdrawal of Western European controls has not always come peacefully, but no major violence had marked this transmission of authority to the states of the Near East themselves.

## III. *Nationalism as an Emerging Pattern*

The withdrawal of European political and military influence gave opportunity for emergent national groups to express their pent-up emotions in various ways. Ignoring internal problems for the moment, most of the Middle East was swept by a wave of what has been called nationalism. This term is difficult to define, is loosely used, and the emotional elements which exist within it express themselves in various forms. The ingredients of nationalism—or its outward symbols—usually contain some degree of the following elements or emotions: (1) atavism with a nostalgic desire to reestablish an imaginary golden age; (2) myths about blood and soil which justify an intolerance toward strangers or newcomers in the arena; (3) use of language as a cultural-political instrument of unification; (4) irridentism or claims to territory lost from the original fatherland; (5) economic nationalism or self-sufficiency through state controls and long-range plans; (6) military emphasis on regimentation of

the individual; (7) employment of religion to organize a state cult. Other minor factors are also of some importance but to try to contrast the nationalism of the Middle East with that elsewhere a brief analysis of the above seven elements should be of use in clarifying the term. A judgment on whether nationalism is constructive or destructive will depend on the combination and intensity of these emotions.

It is impossible to segregate these elements. In the mystic thinking that marks nationalist philosophies, the patterns blend. Particularly hard to isolate are the myths about language, blood and soil. Notable are such illustrations as the Arab belief in the eternity of the Arab language, the God-given right of Arabs in Arab lands and the theory of their common ancestry. Israeli nationalism stresses the theory that modern Jews are descendants of Abraham and the ancient occupants of Israel, that they have a God-given right to "Eretz Israel" and that Hebrew will be the bond which unites the Jewish people. In both these cases, certain territories become "irridenta" that should be reconquered, there are insistent pressures to establish internal cultural homogeneity, and religion is used as part of a state cult. The Iranians likewise enjoy myths about the origin of the Iranian peoples, their glorious past, the superiority of their language and the need to use it for political unification, a xenophobia about strangers or newcomers, and an immense irridenta. Iran cannot forget that two centuries ago, her territories were twice those of today but such is the international situation that Iran can do little about regaining her lost lands—except in the case of Bahrein. The Turks represent a strange variation from the rule. Perhaps the most nationalist group in the Middle East, the Turks have no myths going back to the dawn of history which associate Turkish blood and language with the present soil of Turkey. They were late-comers in the area. Furthermore Turkey has vigorously denounced any "irridenta" inherent in Pan-Turkism or in an effort to regain the empire of two centuries ago. Only slightly in the case of Mosul in 1923-26 did Turkey claim that province of Iraq and later claim the Sanjak of Hatay from Syria on the basis of language affiliation. Turkey has set very strict limits within which nationalism is fostered and, to the degree which this has been done, Turkey is a stabilizing factor in the area.

What makes the "irridenta" particularly dangerous in the Middle East is the fact that in some 5,000 years of written history every "nation" now existing in the area at one time controlled far larger areas than it now holds. Peripheral areas are therefore a source of constant friction. Nor is there any recognized statute of limitations on the time limit within which claims can be raised. Iran's claims to Bahrein go back to over 150 years. Armenian claims to Turkish territory went back many centuries. Greek claims to western Turkey were heavy with tradition, and Soviet claims on the eastern borders of Turkey seemed to trace back to early mythology. Zionism based its claims on the Old Testament.

Furthermore, the identification between language and nation gives rise to instability. There are Arabic-speaking groups in Iran and Turkey, Persian-speaking groups in Iraq and Israel, Turkish-speaking groups in Iraq and Iran. All states tend to be suspicious of elements which do not speak the national tongue as their family means of communication. These cultural minorities are often considered potential fifth columnists by extreme nationalists.

In the techniques to be used by Soviet agents, as outlined in the Resolutions of the Sixth Comintern, appears this phrase—"to effect a temporary cooperation with the spokesmen of the Nationalist movement". Recognizing that "national irridenta" and claims to territory based on linguistic affinity are disturbing factors in the security of the Middle East, the Soviet Union has supported those "national aspirations" which would precipitate warfare and chaos. It has therefore supported states based on cultural differentiation such as Turkish-speaking groups in Iran or Kurdish groups, Jews, Armenians, and others. The Soviet supports only those phases of nationalism which engender conflict and suspicion, but these are so numerous that they can genuinely threaten the peace of the Middle East.

#### IV. *Economic Nationalism*

In the economic aspect of attaining self-sufficiency there are wide variations among the states of the Middle East. The Turks introduced long-range plans which eventually were described by the word "statism". The state undertook industrial and agricultural development, and a fair balance was attained before World War II upset the security of the state and heavy ex-

penditures were necessary for the armed forces. The Turkish plan was revolutionary in scope—but encountered little violent resistance and moved steadily ahead until the advent of the Second World War. It has had a revival with the assistance of United States funds since 1948, so that the Turkey of 1951 shows impressive changes from the Turkey of 1921. Israel likewise has long-range plans to industrialize and become economically self-sufficient. But there is quite a contrast to the plans of Turkey. The Israeli plan is projected on borrowings or grants from abroad, while the Turkish plan was done largely by the use of internal assets. Israel's plans therefore are almost completely dependent for their fulfillment upon decisions made outside the country and, unless there is a large flow of foreign aid to Israel for many years to come, they cannot be implemented. Israeli nationalism must then closely scrutinize its own claims and actions so as not to jeopardize the importation of finances from abroad. This dependency imposes a severe restraint upon certain forms of extremism lest it endanger the security of the whole. In Iran, economic self-sufficiency was stressed in the period of Riza Shah, especially the decade 1930-1940, and in 1947 a seven-year plan was approved by Parliament. Iran has the advantage of great petroleum wealth and the present National Front government has effectively whipped up nationalist fervor by using the slogan that the wealth of Iran should be used to put an end to Iran's poverty. Thus the idea of coupling national wealth with social planning has been stressed in recent years but, because of the turbulence of the present situation, little has been accomplished.

The Arab states have shown the least in the way of national planning. Several states have drawn up valuable surveys but the approach to implementation has been leisurely and of a routine nature. Drastic taxation, rigid currency controls, establishment of materials priorities to conform to a national plan, and like measures which have marked the economic development of Western "nationalism" have not appeared in the Arab states. The failure of Arab states to press such "economic nationalism" causes some observers to doubt whether nationalism in the Arab states is a true or mature nationalism. Social welfare and group solidarity seem not to have gone beyond the stage of being slogans.

### V. *Religion as an Element in the National Cult*

The practices in the states of the Middle East in this respect vary widely. Turkey repudiated religion as a state cult and made nationalism purely laic. In spite of a noble effort to end religious discrimination, there have been incidents which echoed the old system but they have been few and far between. Pre-Islamic Turkish religion was primitive animism. Neither Islam, a religion developed in Arabia, nor the more ancient cults could be of inspirational value in a modern national state and Turkey shed them both.

Iran had a national cult before Islam, Mazda-worship, and during the years of Riza Shah's rule, many vestiges of that cult were revived. Islamic symbols were progressively purged. Had the trend continued, it is probable that Iran would have eventually dropped its association with the religion of the Arabs and reincorporated many of the holidays, attributes and rituals of Zoroastrianism but in a modern setting. However this trend came to a sudden halt with the invasion of Iran in 1941 and the forced abdication of Riza Shah. So precarious has been the internal stability of the state ever since, that none of the leaders has dared to add the religious struggle to the other items of division which harass the country. Islamic religious elements have seized the opportunity to press forward into the political arena, giving support to the government on various political and economic issues in return for concessions on religious items. This strange unity is probably temporary. Iranian nationalism is ancient and never did conform to orthodox Sunni Islam. For some centuries the heretical Shi'ah doctrine has served national ends but all Islam—orthodox or unorthodox—is nonnational to the Iranian. In any form it cannot long serve as a source of national inspiration and the conflict in Iran between imported Islamic ideas and the more ancient Iranian culture is deep if not immediately apparent. Iran's ancient national cult expressed itself in a quasi deification of the ruler by which the authority of the ruler and the God were blended in a mystic unity. This tendency was vigorously propagated during the rule of Riza Shah and is enjoying a rather phenomenal spontaneous recurrence at the present moment since the National Front party has come to power. Patriotism under these circumstances takes on the attributes of religious devotion. The leader becomes infallible and opposition is treason or heresy.



In Israel, religion plays an important part in the national cult, but three years of the existence of a national state scarcely allow time for sound analysis. The so-called Religious Bloc parties insist that the state needs neither constitution nor civil law other than the Talmudic and Torah tradition. Others would retain a few cultic symbols of religion but interpret them in a liberal manner. A few would favor a purely laic state but they realize that religious symbolism is essential to gain support for the new state among Jewish communities abroad. Therefore the World Zionist Organization at its recent meeting in Jerusalem defined the tasks of Zionism of which one was attainment of "the unity of the Jewish people". The state of Israel is the stage where this mystic unity expresses itself in overt political forms and where the state affords a haven for the "ingathering of the exiles". The phrases found in these resolutions were not clarified, thus retaining symbolic rather than explicit significance. Use of such terms as "redemption" and "salvation" are frequent in political debates in Israel as indications of the symbols of the politico-religious national cult.

The Arab states present a particular problem in the pattern of religion in the national cult. Islam is inextricably bound up with Arabism in its origins, its rise, its glorious age of conquest, and its rich heritage. The Arab therefore cannot renounce Islam as a part of the national cult as was done in Turkey, nor do they desire to revive pre-Islamic cults, such as was suggested in Iran, for the pre-Islamic stage in Arabia is looked upon with opprobrium as a time of ignorance. In Saudi Arabia and Yemen, emphasis on Islam outweighs the emphasis on the concept of a nation. There is an echo of the belief that Islam represents the foundation of a society. In its early phases, there was no recognition that the Islamic society might break up into several sovereign states but all indications are that, in the minds of the early Islamic theoreticians, there would be one society with a single central organization. The Caliph would be Commander of all the faithful. This universal concept soon broke down because of the reëmergence of national traditions or dynastic ambitions and several caliphates were established.

Nationalism, stressing divisive rather than inclusive forces within the Islamic peoples, has been in conflict with this con-

cept of a universal society wherever the national origins are non-Arabic. But in the Arab states, the conflict between national aspiration and the Islamic society has not been so marked. Furthermore, the national boundaries of the Arab states follow no natural linguistic or historic lines but to a large degree conform to decisions made by European imperial Powers for their own interests. The Arab Muslim, therefore, crosses boundaries with no sense of being a foreigner and his emotions and loyalties are easily transferred to his new home. There is an interesting passage found in the Preamble to the Syrian Constitution, which clearly points this fact out: "We further declare that our people who constitute a part of the Arab nation in their history, their present and their future, look forward to the day when our Arab nation is united in one state and will tirelessly work for realizing this sacred aspiration while maintaining their independence and liberty." This common sense of "belonging" to an Islamic society leads to such political entities as the Arab League or to such resolutions as that passed at the World Muslim Conference in Pakistan (February 1951) where it was announced that aggression against any Muslim peoples is aggression against all.

It may be concluded then that organizations based on the Islamic idea may play an important rôle in local nationalist movements but they also shift emphasis rapidly to interests far removed, if Muslim peoples are involved. This ubiquitous interest dissipates the energy of a drive on a single issue and keeps the Muslim society agitated on many issues, often not inter-related or well understood and based on emotion alone. Thus Islam as a religion can strengthen some phases of national action but it cannot be controlled to concentrate on local problems and becomes a dubious support in time of crisis. This is especially true of Muslim zealotism. Too often, in its demand to reconstruct an Islamic society, it has struck down by assassination the leader who was thinking in national rather than religious terms.

In Indonesia, certain Dutch adventurers became Muslim during World War II and led bands of mountaineer guerrillas against the Japanese. They operated under the title of units of the Dar al-Islam. When an independent Indonesia was

established, these same Dutch leaders with their Muslim fighters continued the struggle against a Westernized Indonesian state in the name of establishing an Islamic society. Nationalism and Islam are uncomfortable allies and find their greatest common denominator a negative one—xenophobia. Their positive characteristics more often clash.

#### VI. *Nationalism Is Retarded by Certain Social Problems*

Nationalism came to the Muslim world stamped with a Western trademark. It tends to be strongest where Western ideas and practices have penetrated most deeply. Furthermore, it is propagated best where Western mass media can be used—the press, the school, the radio and street demonstrations. Where these media are lacking, nationalism is likely to be retarded. These paraphernalia are present in the cities of the Middle East, but rarely in the villages or the tribes. Nationalism therefore exhibits itself primarily as a city phenomenon.

Another traditional factor limits the rapid spread of nationalism to the village or the tribe. Throughout history, there has existed a centripetal force to organize local societies under a federal government and a centrifugal desire to preserve local autonomy. This conflict between city and village, or government and tribe, has engendered antipathetic feelings on the part of the two groups. The city dweller looks upon the rustic or tribesman as stupid and inferior while the peasant or tribesman considers the city man as avaricious and unscrupulous. This antagonism is reflected in the story of Cain and Abel and has persisted to this day. The peasant or tribesman has deep misgivings about anything the city dweller does, considering it some trick by which the latter endeavors to ensnare and exploit the former. The story in the Old Testament reflecting skepticism as to the wisdom of establishing Saul as King of Israel when that state was emerging from tribalism to a national state is still applicable to Middle Eastern societies. Any nationalism which features conscription, heavier taxation or stronger central controls runs counter to the age-old desire of the peasant or the tribesman to be left alone. Inasmuch as in the Middle East peasants and tribesmen represent the majority of the population, it will be a long time before they can feel vitally devoted to any cause which is espoused by the same group which taxes them and draws off their sons into military exploits or which collects exorbitant rents from their meager resources.

VII. "*Modernism*" as an Emerging Pattern

While the Islamic society had apparently remained static for many centuries, certain forces were operating within it during the nineteenth century that were to prepare the way for rapid changes in the twentieth century. The First World War "shattered the sorry scheme of things entire." Leaders in the Islamic world became acutely aware of the retarded state of their society, especially when it was exposed to contrast with European conditions. There dawned an age of attempting to catch up with the West. In its political aspects this meant establishment or rewriting of constitutions to include many Western developments. Terms such as "liberal", "progressive", "democratic" became popular. Parliaments and elections, committees and subcommittees have made their appearance. These political institutions in their outward forms have outstripped social growth so that, in spite of their Western sound, their content is determined by the slowness of glacier-like social change. It may be expected that more of these "modern" forms will be adopted with increasing pressure upon the rate of social change. The ideas associated with "socialism" are gaining respectability. There are Islamic Socialist political parties and one hears of growing agitation for development of social security services. Because of the social lag, this desire to be "up-to-date" will meet many obstacles and handicaps. Probably the terms borrowed from Western societies will never mean exactly the same thing in the Middle East—but use of these terms alone indicates that the Middle Eastern societies are on the move. A new culture is being hammered out in the crucible of the Middle East. It is now malleable and somewhat flexible, and marked by a mixture of jealousy and fear of the West. Within the next few years, this new culture will begin to crystallize. If the Western World impresses the new Middle Eastern culture as being dominated by narrow self-interest, the new culture will probably harden in an anti-Western set of attitudes that will affect many generations to come. This would well serve the purposes of the Soviet dialectic, which plans on the total destruction of both the cultures of the West and the Middle East. It still remains to be seen whether this imminent threat will serve to heal age-old wounds and cause the West and the Middle East to close ranks for their common defense, their mutual enrichment and their common survival.

## REMARKS

CHAIRMAN EARLE: I heard this morning that a certain patriotic society had before it a resolution demanding that the President fire the Secretary of State; on second thought, the Society decided to play it safe and suggest that the President fire not only the Secretary of State, but all the rest of the Department of State as well. Judged on the performance of Mr. Wright, I should think he would be welcomed back into academic circles, should the catastrophe envisaged by this patriotic society come about.

Since Mr. Wright has touched on the imaginative qualities of nationalistic leaders in matters of territorial expansion, it is perhaps worth recalling the following story, perhaps apocryphal, concerning the First World War:

The British had promised through Colonel Lawrence and otherwise that they would set up an independent Arab kingdom from the former Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire. They were somewhat concerned, however, that their commitments to the Arabs could not altogether be reconciled with their commitments to the Jewish people and the French in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. So they sent an officer, an expert on foreign affairs, down to discuss this question with the Sherif, Sherif Hussein. The name of the officer, as I recall it, was Captain William Shakespeare. He tried to persuade Hussein, the Sherif of Mecca, it would be better to have a small, compact kingdom which he could effectively govern than to have a much larger realm which he would have trouble keeping under control. Hussein, after listening to the British argument, answered in typical Eastern metaphor: "I am the fish that swims in the sea—the bigger the sea, the fatter the fish." [Laughter]

Without other preliminaries I will introduce the next speaker, Mr. J. C. Hurewitz of the Department of Government and the School of International Affairs, Columbia University, who has written on the struggle for Palestine and whose particular interests are the subject of this paper, that is, "Arab-Israel Tensions". Mr. Hurewitz!

MR. J. C. HUREWITZ: I don't propose to go quite as far back as World War I; in fact, not even to World War II. I am primarily concerned with developments since the end of the war.



## ARAB-ISRAEL TENSIONS

J. C. HUREWITZ

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THE Middle East has become since the end of World War II an increasingly unstable area, owing to international as well as intraregional factors. On the international level the withdrawal of France from Syria and Lebanon and the steady contraction of British influence throughout the region have created a Great Power vacuum which the United States has not succeeded in filling. The Western Powers, it is true, have thus far been able to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining any foothold. But the Middle East, which abuts on the most vulnerable district of the U.S.S.R. where are located vital industrial and oil resources, becomes progressively more exposed to possible Soviet penetration as the Middle East defenses are weakened. On the intraregional level the instability arises largely from the fragmentation of the area into small, mostly non-viable states, lacking in political maturity and economic resources, and displaying a high degree of self-consciousness and of sensitivity, particularly to foreign controls from which almost all have only recently been liberated. Interstate cooperation within the region is still inchoate, and the only regional arrangement in the Middle East—the Arab League—has been erected on largely negative foundations—the opposition to Zionism and Israel and the resistance to outside domination. The League has failed even to still inter-Arab rivalries.

In this setting Arab-Israel tensions constitute only one set of factors making for regional instability. But the problem of Arab-Israel relations is the most pervasive in the Middle East and has a direct or indirect bearing on most other problems in the area. Moreover unlike the other issues of the Middle East, the Arab-Israel contest remains a factor in the domestic politics of the United States and Great Britain, a dubious distinction inherited from the period of the Palestine Mandate. Thus the problem of Arab-Israel tensions, if not always the most acute

problem in the Middle East as it is not at the very present, is nevertheless the most intricate. To those who seek to set up an Allied Middle East Defense Organization as a complement to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the very existence of such a divisive force must give the shudders.

Yet in all candidness it must be stated that the United States, England and France have made no sustained effort to lessen Arab-Israel tensions, let alone promote a formal peace settlement among the late belligerents. Admittedly the three Powers issued a joint statement on 25 May 1950 on regulating the supply of arms to the Arab states and Israel and on preserving existing frontiers and armistice lines. But this declaration was designed, not as a constructive, but as a preventive, measure, a warning to the states concerned that the three Western Powers would not abide any renewal of the Arab-Israel war or any punitive action by the Arab League against Jordan, which had a month earlier formally annexed the interior of central Palestine. Indeed, this seems to be the essence of Western policy—in so far as there is policy—toward the Arab-Israel problem: formal peace in the foreseeable future is beyond possibility, therefore let us concentrate on preventing the resumption of hostilities. To appreciate the full implication of the policy—whether it is implied or explicit is of no material difference—it is necessary to examine the handling of the problem by the United Nations, since the Western Powers have created within the international organization the machinery for dealing with the question.

The armistice agreements which Israel concluded with each of its four immediate Arab neighbors—Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria—between 24 February and 20 July 1949 provided for the termination of general hostilities and for the prevention of their recurrence. This negative objective and nothing more was the purpose of the Arab-Israel armistice. The agreements shunned all questions of a nonmilitary nature, which were expressly postponed to the ultimate peace negotiations. The armistice was thus envisaged, not as an end in itself, but as the indispensable preliminary to a formal and lasting settlement. Now with the armistice well on in its third year, an Arab-Israel political settlement seems as distant as ever. In the circumstances the deferred political issues and the rivalry they engender have kept Arab-Israel animosity at a high pitch.

The Arab-Israel armistice system was the product of negotiations conducted under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council by its Acting Mediator Ralph J. Bunche. To Bunche and his advisers must be given the credit for the ingenuity of the arrangement. The agreements were conceived as permanent nonaggression pacts and framed as instruments of the parties, upon whom was placed the primary responsibility for their execution. For this purpose four Mixed Armistice Commissions—or MACs, as they have become known in the field—were created. To this day the MACs remain the only organs outside the United Nations in which the Arab states have agreed to work directly with Israel, and it has not been uncommon in the experience of the MACs for such high military officers as the deputy chiefs of staff of Israel and one or another Arab state concerned to confer on matters of urgency.

While the parties were charged with supervising their own armistice, the Security Council itself was not wholly divorced from the system. The Council retained the Palestine question on its agenda, and, in taking formal note of the agreements, reaffirmed, pending the final peace settlement, its unconditional cease-fire order in its resolution of 15 July 1948 under Article 40 of the United Nations Charter. In the agreements the parties themselves, with a view to avoiding continual deadlock in the mixed commissions, stipulated that the chairman of each MAC was to be the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization or one of his senior aides and that every MAC might employ as many neutral observers from that organization as were required. The Truce Supervision Organization, it will be recalled, was originally established in 1948 by the United Nations Mediator to regulate the work of his truce observer personnel. When the Security Council terminated the office of the Acting Mediator on 11 August 1949, it provided for the continued existence of the organization as a separate body and requested the Chief of Staff to report to it "on the observance of the cease-fire in Palestine."

In view of the unabating Arab-Israel mistrust, the armistice system has operated with unusual smoothness. Within a few weeks of their creation the MACs completed the technical arrangements of the armistice: the drawing of permanent armistice lines, the establishment of defensive and demilitarized zones

and the attendant troop reductions and withdrawals, the exchange of war prisoners, and the location of missing persons. Thereafter the mixed commissions buckled down to the routine functions of observing the execution of the armistice and examining the complaints of the parties regarding alleged infractions of the agreements. By and large the complaints related to the daily incidents of theft, smuggling and assault which occurred along the winding armistice lines, especially those with Jordan and Egypt which differed substantially from the earlier international frontiers of the Palestine Mandate. Moreover from time to time more serious questions have arisen bearing directly on the armistice—such as alleged crossing of the demarcation lines by the troops of one of the parties, the precise delineation of the lines themselves, and alleged violations of the stipulations for the defensive and demilitarized zones. Most of these complaints were also settled by the MACs, and when this has proved impossible, as has occurred on three occasions in the past year, the complaints have been referred to the Security Council. The most serious questions of this category—the outbreak of hostilities in the Israel-Syrian demilitarized zone in the spring of 1951 and Israel's complaint in the summer against Egypt's blockade practices at the Suez Canal—resulted primarily from the failure of the parties to make any headway in their peace negotiations.

Responsibility for these negotiations was entrusted to the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, created by the General Assembly in December 1948 and consisting of France, Turkey and the United States. In instructing the Conciliation Commission "to take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them," the General Assembly made three specific recommendations. The Commission was directed to prepare detailed proposals for a permanent international régime for the Jerusalem area, which would also guarantee free access to the holy places throughout the former mandated territory; to seek arrangements among the parties which would provide for the economic development of the area—by which apparently was meant Israel and the Arab states; and to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement, economic and social rehabilitation of the Arab refugees, and the payment

of compensation for loss or damage to property. These did not of course exhaust the list of unresolved issues of the Palestine war. Other pressing questions included the final demarcation of Israel's frontiers, the ultimate disposition of the Arab fragments of Palestine, war damages, and blocked accounts.

In the very best of circumstances, the peace negotiations were most complicated. Israel had triumphed in the Palestine war, as attested by its survival within an area some 30 per cent larger than that originally allocated to the Jewish state by the General Assembly's partition resolution of 29 November 1947. But it was not a crushing victory; for the United Nations, which had interposed itself between the belligerents, prevented the war from taking its natural course. Consequently neither side was prepared to make concessions, Israel because it won the war and the Arab states because they refused to acknowledge defeat.

But the Conciliation Commission got off to a bad start and subsequently never recovered. It remained an utterly ineffectual body which accomplished none of its purposes. The Commission did prepare a statute for Jerusalem, but failed to obtain the prior agreement of Israel and Jordan, and in the end the General Assembly ignored the Commission's proposal. The Commission proved incapable of producing any workable scheme for the settlement of the refugee question, for the Arab delegations insisted on absolute priority for this question, while Israel demanded that the refugee question be considered only in the context of a general settlement. The Commission could not even induce the Arab delegations to sit with the Israelis in direct discussions.

As a result of the Conciliation Commission's almost total failure, Arab-Israel tensions have sharpened and mutual fears have multiplied. The Arab states were persuaded that Israel was bound to attempt territorial expansion, arguing that the new state could not possibly maintain itself within its present boundaries, if large-scale immigration persisted. Israel for its part was convinced that the Arab states were planning to renew the Palestine war, pointing to the widespread talk in Arab lands in 1949-50 of "a second round". While it may be assumed that the Arab military commanders who participated in the Palestine war were probably not too anxious to seek a return



engagement so soon, the Arab states nevertheless stressed the need for expanding their military establishments and increased their arms purchases from abroad. Moreover, ever since the spring of 1950 the Arab League has been endeavoring to draft a mutual defense pact acceptable to all its members. Israel was certain that the Arab rearming and military plans were specifically directed against itself and in the circumstances maintained a high degree of military preparedness.

If the Arab states could not defeat Israel by military means, they hoped to drive the new state to bankruptcy by adding burdens to its already strained economy. The Arab League sponsored an economic boycott against Israel. All trade with that country was interdicted. Iraq refused to allow the Iraq Petroleum Company to pump oil through the pipe line to Haifa. Egypt sought to intercept all Israel-bound shipping at the Suez Canal, contending that this was permissible since the Arab states and Israel were still technically at war. The companies producing oil in the other Middle Eastern states and principalities were thus prevented, even if they were prepared to allow the sale of oil to Israel, from so doing. Egypt's interference with Suez shipping also made the transfer of Jewish immigrants from Yemen, Afghanistan and even Iran a good deal more costly to Israel. Furthermore, Iraq brought economic pressures to bear on its once substantial Jewish community, forcing most of its members to emigrate. Here too it proved necessary to bring most of the immigrants to Israel by air. By blocking the accounts and sequestering the property of the departing Jews, the Baghdad government compelled Israel to accept large numbers of penniless immigrants, whose resettlement was rendered all the more expensive.

Israel took retaliatory measures. Its Foreign Minister warned on 19 March 1951 that "the value of Jewish property frozen in Iraq will be taken into account with regard to the compensation we have undertaken to pay the Arabs who abandoned property in Israel." The Tel Aviv government also steadfastly refused to permit any large-scale repatriation of Palestine Arab refugees—using the same argument as Egypt that, since a technical state of war still existed, all returning Arabs were potential enemies—and forced back across the armistice lines

Arabs who had entered territory under its control without authorization.

Not all of the tensions have in fact concerned Israel. Differences have even arisen among the Arab states themselves. In this connection Jordan has been the major target. A majority of the Arab League's members have been determined to frustrate efforts on the part of any individual Arab state to negotiate a separate peace with Israel. When word leaked out that Israel and Jordan were conducting such negotiations in the early months of 1950, the League threatened this kingdom with expulsion. The late King 'Abdallah's determination to maintain control over Arab Jerusalem was resisted by the other Arab states whose delegations favored the internationalization of the holy city. Of the two fragments of Arab Palestine which survived the war, Egypt retained military control over the smaller Gaza strip, and Jordan over the larger district of central Palestine. Egypt insisted that it was merely holding the Gaza strip in trust until the area could ultimately be restored to a reintegrated Arab Palestine. Jordan on the other hand left little doubt from the start that it intended to annex the district under its control. This move, which was formally taken in April 1950, threatened to upset the balance of power in the Arab East and to this day has not been recognized by any other Arab government.

Moreover, the Palestine Arabs who were thus absorbed by the Hashimi Kingdom created new problems. The Palestine Arabs were generally better educated, politically more articulate and considerably more factious than the original Jordan population. Since they could not be assimilated easily, they created unrest in a country where formerly law and order prevailed. The murder on 20 July 1951 of 'Abdallah, which added to the instability not only in Jordan but in the rest of the Arab East, was traceable to disaffected Palestine Arabs. The elimination of 'Abdallah has also sharpened the existing dynastic jealousies and territorial ambitions of the surrounding Arab states, and these in turn have caused concern in Israel, which has no desire to see an expanded Syria or Iraq as next-door neighbor.

Most serious of all, however, is the continued existence of the Arab refugee problem. The Arab states, for the most part, have been treating these hapless victims of the Palestine war as political pawns. Surely the Arab states must realize that the longer the problem remains unsettled, the fewer will be those who are ultimately repatriated. Yet so insistent are the Arab states not to have peace with Israel, that they refuse to take up Israel's offer to discuss the question within the context of a general peace settlement. Lebanon and Egypt are both determined to allow as few Palestine Arabs as possible to be resettled on their territory; Syria has been wavering in its stand; only Jordan has expressed a consistent willingness to admit substantial numbers. In consequence the Arab refugees have continued largely to rely on an international dole, and the floating population has presented an excellent medium for communist propaganda.

These growing tensions have resulted inevitably from the failure of the Conciliation Commission. Throughout most of the past year the Commission was preoccupied with setting up its office in Beirut for supervising the assessment and payment of compensation to the Arab refugees but was virtually inactive with respect to its chief objective of seeking an over-all peace settlement. Not until 13 September 1951, in anticipation of drafting its comprehensive report to the sixth session of the General Assembly, did the Commission reopen in Paris general political negotiations with Israel and its four Arab neighbors. Now after nearly eight weeks of discussions the efforts remain fruitless.

The Conciliation Commission's inability to lead the parties closer to formal peace has, moreover, tended to undermine the Arab-Israel armistice system, as evidenced by the Israel-Syrian and Egyptian-Israel crises in the past eight months. For this failure the United States must bear a large measure of responsibility. France and Turkey sought the leadership of the United States, as the principal member of the Conciliation Commission. But this Washington rarely provided. For unexplained reasons—of which the distractions of the Korean war were probably the most important—the United States insisted on keeping the Commission alive, long after it had proved its

utter uselessness. Washington argued that the Commission would at least serve as a watchdog in the area. But this function was already being performed more effectively by the armistice system.

Arab-Israel tensions affect the major part of the Middle East. This region is vital to our defenses, because of oil and communications and because it adjoins the Soviet Union. We are anxious to set up a Middle East command to ensure that this area is brought into our global defense arrangements. But this much seems clear: we shall not be able to set up an integrated regional command until Arab-Israel differences are settled. If that is so, a more vigorous and persistent program than that of the past to lessen Arab-Israel tensions and promote amicable relations must be undertaken.

#### REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

CHAIRMAN EARLE: Maybe you would all like a little recess.  
[Recess]

CHAIRMAN EARLE: I think now we can reconvene.

Our next speaker is Professor Majid Khadduri of the Institute for Higher International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. Mr. Khadduri was born in Mosul in northern Iraq, was educated at Baghdad and Beirut and at the University of Chicago.

He will speak on "The Anglo-Egyptian Controversy".

## THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONTROVERSY

MAJID KHADDURI

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### I

**N**APOLEON'S invasion of Egypt in 1798 resulted not only in initiating the Westernization movement—which is probably the most revolutionary feature of the modern Middle East—but also in bringing Egypt into the orbit of international politics; for, ever since the last Crusaders had departed from the East, Egypt remained outside the pale of international rivalry. Further, the Ottoman occupation (1517) reduced Egypt to a province isolated from the outside world. The Sultan, satisfied so long as the annual tribute was paid, made little or no change in the internal hierarchy of the ruling dynasty. Well entrenched in their position of power, and protected by the Sultan, the Mamluk rulers could flatter themselves that they were immune from fresh Frankish (that is, foreign) invasions. They were, however, unaware of the immense changes that had taken place in Europe and they seem to have had no idea about the corresponding decline in Ottoman power. Thus when Nelson, pursuing Napoleon in the eastern Mediterranean, arrived at Alexandria and warned the Egyptians of an impending French invasion, he was bluntly told that Egypt belonged to the Sultan and that neither he nor the French could take it from him. The proud Mamluk beys, we are told by a contemporary chronicler, dismissed the threat by a remark that if ever the Frankish forces landed, "They would be trampled under their [Mamluk] horses."

This "splendid isolation" was no longer possible for Egypt to enjoy; for, when the French expedition was expelled, Great Britain carefully watched Egypt lest she should fall again in the hands of a rival Power. British policy dictated that the Sultan's authority over Egypt should be supported at any cost. Thus when Muhammad Ali, Viceroy of Egypt (1805-1848), came very near to declaring his independence, Lord Palmerston



sought to confine his activities within Egypt's frontiers but never to acknowledge his full independence. Palmerston thought that an independent Muhammad Ali, with pro-French sympathy, might ultimately make Egypt an ally of France and thus threaten British interests in the Mediterranean. This policy of supporting the Sultan against his more enlightened vassals was often criticized as it ignored the interests of his oppressed subjects.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, Great Britain realized that this policy was no longer possible to maintain. Her endeavors to persuade succeeding sultans to put their house in order failed and the Sultan's weakness became so apparent that a policy of occupation was bound to be adopted; for, if Russian encroachment upon the Sultan's dominion could no longer be checked, then England had to take possession of certain areas which were essential to protect her interests. The Congress of Berlin (1878), which demonstrated that the policy of "bolstering up the Turk" could not be enforced, permitted the annexation by Russia of certain territories in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Thus not only had the Turkish Straits become no longer immune from Russian threat, but also the Suez Canal, a life line of British imperial communication, became exposed to danger. England's realization that it was no longer possible to depend on the Sultan's power to check Russian penetration is demonstrated by her acquisition of Cyprus and the purchase of the Khedive's shares in the Suez Canal. This shift in her policy dictated the "occupation" of Egypt. It was indeed significant that Gladstone, who had previously attacked the policy of "aggression on Egypt", should himself order the occupation of Egypt. Gladstone might have been quite sincere, when he pledged that the occupation would be "temporary", but the increasing significance of Egypt's strategic position made it exceedingly difficult for succeeding British Cabinets to evacuate. The lessons of the First and the Second World Wars show how important the position of Egypt was for the defense not only of the Middle East but also of the whole British Empire. It was indeed no mere military venture when Mr. Churchill, during the dark days of 1940-1941, decided to dispatch British forces to the Nile Valley. Mr. Church-

ill's action demonstrated that the defense of Egypt was probably second in importance only to the defense of Britain herself.

## II

The story of England's intervention in Egypt goes back to the crisis which preceded the occupation in 1882. The Khedive Isma'il of Egypt was notorious for his reckless policy of borrowing from Europe and this eventually led to foreign intervention in the financial administration of his country. When Isma'il was removed (1879), the crisis developed into an international issue. A nationalist party, led by Arabi Pasha and supported by the Army, usurped power and put an end to foreign financial control. Their slogan was: "Egypt for the Egyptians." Great Britain had no difficulty in suppressing this movement.

The Arabi movement was then dismissed as merely a military affair. No credit was given to its leaders who were denounced as office seekers. Viewed in retrospect it would seem that the movement was inevitable, since Egypt had become exposed to European ideas and influences. Nationalism was then regarded as a liberal doctrine which many new nations had adopted to achieve either their unity or freedom from foreign control. Though parochial in character, nationalism became an "international" movement which tended to engulf the whole world and it did not fail to reach Egypt. Great Britain, however, thanks to the brilliant financial and economic reforms of Lord Cromer, was spared the revival of nationalism until the turn of the century. Toward the end of the Cromer régime (1883-1907) nationalist agitation recurred because the progress achieved by Egypt was not coupled with a corresponding recognition of Egyptian aspirations to self-government.

The First World War brought in its train new circumstances which intensified Egyptian nationalism. Not only had the Allied Powers given promises of freedom to the peoples who fought on their side, but also President Wilson's principle of self-determination fired their imagination and made them extremely anxious to achieve full self-government. When, however, the war was over, martial law and the protectorate persisted in Egypt, and it looked as if Britain was not contem-

plating a change in the status of Egypt. The man of the hour who emerged to advocate Egyptian independence was Zaghlul Pasha. With two other nationalists, Zaghlul sought an audience with Wingate, the British High Commissioner, and put forth three proposals which he declared were the demands of the Egyptian people: (1) the abolition of martial law; (2) the termination of the protectorate; (3) the recognition of independence. Wingate, we are told, was taken aback, since the prevailing opinion in Britain was in favor of the annexation of Egypt to the British Empire.

From now on, the struggle that ensued was essentially that of Britain's assertion of her "imperial interests" versus Egypt's claim to be the master of her own destiny. But what Britain could achieve in 1882 was no longer possible in 1919. What made Britain's task the more difficult was the fact that after the war her forces were found everywhere in the Middle East which gave the impression that Britain was in line to inherit the dominions of the Ottoman Caliph. This prompted the Middle Eastern peoples to turn against Britain and a wave of nationalist "revolt" swept the entire area during the years of 1919 and 1920. Sir Henry Dobbs, testifying before the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, admitted that "For various reasons, into which I need not enter, my country had fallen into disfavour among Oriental peoples . . . from India to Egypt the Eastern World lay in a welter of resentment against the policy of the British and their allies, whose aim had everywhere been industriously misrepresented."

If Britain were to come to terms with these peoples she was bound to compromise with them by conceding certain fundamental national aspirations. Fortunately the British High Commissioner in Egypt was Lord Allenby—a soldier who possessed all the wisdom of the statesman—who could foresee that only a conciliatory settlement would turn Egypt into a friend of Britain. He pressed upon the British Cabinet, despite Lord Curzon's reluctance, the necessity of an immediate proclamation of independence; hence the Declaration of February 28, 1922, which abolished the protectorate and martial law and conferred upon Egypt independence, qualified only by four reservations (which were to be the subject of subsequent negotiations between the two countries). The text of the declaration follows:

1. The British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated, and Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign State.

2. As soon as the Government of His Highness [Sultan Fuad] shall pass an Act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt, martial law as proclaimed on November 2, 1914 shall be withdrawn.

3. The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt:

- (a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt;
- (b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect;
- (c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities;
- (d) The Sudan.

On March 15 Egypt was formally declared independent; Sultan Fuad assumed the title of King; and Egypt was proclaimed a hereditary monarchy. A constitution was promulgated in 1923 and a responsible cabinet, with a popularly elected parliament, was formed in 1924.

It took Britain and Egypt almost a decade and a half before they could come to an understanding on the four points. Egypt insisted on "evacuation" and "unity" of the Nile Valley, while Britain sought to protect her imperial interests in both Egypt and the Sudan. Mussolini's aggression on Ethiopia in 1935 eventually brought Britain and Egypt to reason and they agreed on a working plan for the defense of Egypt against foreign aggression by permitting Britain to station forces in the Suez Canal zone. Thus Britain gave up all other privileges under the reserved points. Owing to the difficulty for a quick understanding on the Sudan, the question was postponed pending further negotiations. Egypt was admitted into membership of the League of Nations in 1937, and the Mixed Courts, a legacy of the Ottoman Capitulations, were declared abolished at the Montreux Conference (1937), permitting a transition period of twelve years. It was thus that Egypt, save the permission of maintaining British forces in the

Canal zone, became an independent state in 1936. The Sudan remained the only thorny problem.

### III

The Treaty of 1936 was regarded at the outset as a great success, but the continued presence of British and Allied forces on Egyptian soil during and after the Second World War created in the minds of the Egyptians a dislike for the Treaty. The war resulted in the complete emancipation of a number of Middle Eastern countries, such as Syria and Lebanon, while Iran, which suffered complete military occupation, achieved success by bringing her case to the United Nations in 1946. In England the Labor government felt too that the time had come to put Britain's relations with Egypt on a friendly basis.

Negotiations for a new treaty began early in 1946. The British government announced that it intended to evacuate all its forces from Egypt, subject to the establishment of a scheme of joint defense in which both Egypt and Britain would participate. This declaration was acclaimed as a friendly gesture by the Egyptian people. Negotiations, however, proceeded slowly in Cairo which prompted Sidqi Pasha, the Prime Minister of Egypt, to visit England in October to negotiate directly with Mr. Bevin. The main points of conflict during the negotiations were: (1) the obligations of the two parties in case of aggression or threat of war in the Middle East; (2) the period of evacuation; and (3) the question of the unity of Egypt with the Sudan.

On the first question it was agreed that if Egypt became the object of aggression, or if Britain became "involved in war as the result of armed aggression against countries adjacent to Egypt", both parties should take in consultation "such action as may be necessary" until measures have been "taken by the Security Council for the re-establishment of peace" (Article 2). For the purpose of achieving this coöperation Britain and Egypt agreed to establish a "Joint Board of Defence", composed of the military authorities and experts of both governments (Article 3).

The question of evacuation was settled in a special protocol which provided that "the complete evacuation of Egyptian



territory" was to be completed by September 1, 1949, that is, by a gradual withdrawal within a period of three years.

The question of the Sudan, however, proved to be the rock on which the negotiations were wrecked. The Treaty of 1936 made no attempt to settle the Sudan question, since it was postponed for future negotiations. After the Second World War, when Egypt became involved in Arab affairs (especially after the establishment of the Arab League), certain political circles showed uneasiness about Egypt's drift toward the Arab world with the consequential neglect of the Sudan question. Some Egyptian thinkers could see no benefit for Egypt from her intervention in Arab affairs and argued that the future of Egypt lay in achieving the unity of the Nile Valley, since the control of the Nile is so important to the economic life of Egypt. Historically, however, Egypt had been vitally concerned with the two areas lying to the north and south of her territory. From ancient times down to the present, Egypt could not rest assured of security unless she controlled the eastern Mediterranean. The Pharaohs were involved in quarrels with the Hittites and now Egypt is quarreling with the state of Israel on the rights of the control of shipping through the Suez Canal. The rise of Arab nationalism and the identification of Egyptian nationalism with it have strengthened Egypt's relations with the Arab countries. The establishment of the state of Israel has further contributed toward Egypt's close coöperation with the Arab countries. This has been demonstrated not only by Egypt's desire to play a leading rôle in the Arab League, but also by her attempt to cement the relations by signing an Arab Security Pact.

In the meantime Egypt has always been keen about her connections with the regions of the Upper Nile since it was occupied by Muhammad Ali in 1821. When the Sudan was temporarily separated in 1883, consequent to the Mahdi uprising, Egypt's relations with the Sudan underwent certain changes. (The Mahdi, claiming prophecy as a Messiah, separated himself from Egypt and declared that he was going to conquer the world in the name of Islam.) The Egyptian Army could not reconquer the Sudan and thus Britain intervened to supply reinforcements. Britain, who occupied the Sudan in the name of Egypt, could not easily annex the Sudan

to her Empire even if she wanted to, owing to her quarrel with France over Fashoda. Thus Britain signed an agreement with Egypt (1899) in which authority was jointly held over the Sudan. This arrangement had been formally called the condominium. But since Egypt herself was under British occupation, the Sudan was virtually administered as a British Crown colony. This state of affairs persisted until Egypt was declared independent in 1922 when the question of Egypt's share in the administration of the Sudan was raised. To what extent Britain has been ready to surrender authority to Egypt and to what extent the Sudanese should be called upon to take part in this controversy are issues which have not yet been resolved.

During the London negotiations of 1946 Sidqi Pasha demanded the unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Crown of Egypt. (This was a modified claim of those who demanded complete unity of the Nile Valley as it existed before 1899.) Mr. Bevin's position, as he declared in the House of Commons on March 26, 1946, was that no change should be made in the status of the Sudan before the Sudanese had been consulted. During the negotiations with Sidqi Pasha, Mr. Bevin was persuaded by his advisers that for an understanding with Egypt an insertion of the clause that "the existence of a symbolic union between Egypt and the Sudan" was advisable, provided that the Sudan could exercise its right to choose its own future status. The final text of the Sudan Protocol stated:

The policy which the High Contracting Parties undertake to follow in the Sudan within the framework of the unity between the Sudan and Egypt under the common Crown of Egypt will have for its essential objectives to assure the well-being of the Sudanese, the development of their interests and their active preparation for self-government and consequently the exercise of the right to choose the future status of the Sudan . . . .

The Sudan Protocol, as well as the draft text of the Treaty, was initialed by Sidqi Pasha and Mr. Bevin on October 25, 1946, *ad referendum* to their governments. The Egyptian government submitted the Treaty to Parliament on November 26 and received a vote of confidence. Thereupon the Egyptian government informed the British government on December 1, 1946 that it was ready to sign the Treaty and the Protocols.

The Treaty, however, was never signed. Failure to do so was the result of a difference of opinion on the interpretation of the clause of the Sudan Protocol with respect to the unity under the Egyptian Crown; for hardly had Sidqi Pasha left England than the Egyptian press reported that Britain had agreed to the unity of the Nile Valley as permanent. This interpretation was not accepted by the British government since it would supersede the clause which referred to the "ultimate self-determination" which was to be exercised by the Sudanese themselves.

The disagreement was by no means a minor one. The Egyptians, regardless of the guarantees that they may get for the control of the Nile, are fully convinced that Egypt and the Sudan form but one country and that their religious and cultural ties are sufficient to justify unity. That there are Sudanese who do not speak Arabic or profess the same religion (their number may amount to two million out of six and a half) are factors which the Egyptian government does not recognize. The Egyptians accused the British of arousing certain sections of the Sudan to oppose unity with Egypt. Great Britain naturally has her own interests which could best be served by keeping the Sudan separate from Egypt, but Britain could not create an artificial independence movement if there were no genuine movement seeking full self-government for the Sudan. The leader of the *Umma* party, who advocates full independence, is the son of Mahdi who revolted in 1883. There is, on the other hand, a strong party (the *Ashbigga*) which advocates unity with Egypt. The Sudan question, accordingly, is one in which the interests and the desires of the Sudanese themselves should be taken into consideration. Direct negotiations between Egypt and Britain will not settle the issue nor can a lasting settlement be brought about unless the Sudanese are brought to the conference table as a party directly concerned with the matter. It should be up to the Sudan to decide whether she wants full self-government or unity with Egypt.<sup>1</sup>

Disagreement on the Sudan issue resulted in the breakdown of negotiations. Mr. Bevin refused to present the Treaty to the Cabinet "without [as he stated] securing an agreed inter-

<sup>1</sup> After this paper was written, the Egyptian government announced that she would agree to the holding of a plebiscite in the Sudan, provided the British forces would be withdrawn.

pretation of its terms," and Sidqi Pasha, failing to secure acceptance of the principle of "Common Crown", fell from power in December 1946.

The new government of Nuqrashi Pasha, primarily made up of Sa'dists (Wafdist dissenters) showed a more uncompromising attitude than Sidqi Pasha. Nuqrashi demanded, in no uncertain terms, the permanent unity of Egypt and the Sudan. Thus there was no possibility of coming to an understanding, even though Mr. Bevin proposed to sign the Treaty without the Sudan Protocol. Failure to reach an agreement prompted Britain to declare that the Treaty of 1936 was still in force; but the declaration aroused the indignation of Egypt. A wave of xenophobia swept the country which reflected not so much an inherent feeling against Britain as the assertion of independence in Egypt's relations with Britain. Although Nuqrashi Pasha threatened to declare a unilateral abrogation of the Treaty, he finally decided to submit the question to the United Nations Security Council.

#### IV

Egypt's appeal to the Security Council was made on July 8, 1947, complaining that "the presence of foreign troops within the territory of a Member of the United Nations Organization, in time of peace and without its free consent . . . [is] contrary to the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter and to the Resolution adopted unanimously by the General Assembly on December 14, 1946." Further, Egypt objected to the separation of the Sudan which impaired the unity of the Nile Valley against the "interests" and "aspirations" of its people. The Egyptian government, therefore, demanded (a) the total and immediate evacuation of British troops from Egypt and the Sudan and (b) the termination of the present administrative régime in the Sudan.

The Security Council placed the Egyptian case on the agenda and Nuqrashi Pasha, addressing the Council on August 5, pointed out that the Treaty of 1936 has "outlived its purposes" and that it "contradicts the Charter"; he, therefore, demanded the abrogation of the Treaty and the complete evacuation of British forces from Egypt and the Sudan. Sir Alexander Cadogan objected to Nuqrashi Pasha's arguments that the

Treaty of 1936 had "outlived its purposes" and that it contradicted the Charter of the United Nations. Not only was the Treaty freely negotiated and accepted, said Sir Alexander, but it also fulfilled a number of its aims and he saw no reason why it could not continue to fulfill some other purposes. The Treaty might be revised or replaced by another in accordance with the principles of international law and justice, but he could not see any contradiction with the Charter, since the rule *pacta sunt servanda* is a primary rule of international law upon which the Charter itself is based. The controversy was discussed from the various political and legal angles (with the Egyptian and the British representatives often refuting each other's arguments) but the consensus of opinion was that Britain and Egypt had not yet exhausted the ways of diplomacy before the controversy had been brought to the Security Council. It would seem that the Council, sympathetic as it was with the Egyptian desire for evacuation, could not see that the dispute was of such magnitude as to disturb the peace and international security. Needless to say, the Security Council, noting the desire of Britain to evacuate Egypt eventually, could not then foresee the increasing tension in Anglo-Egyptian relations when it dismissed the problem as premature for intervention. In taking this stand, which resulted in the subsequent deterioration in the Egyptian controversy, the Security Council failed to contribute to the peace and international security of the Middle East. By its action, or rather inaction, it has let Anglo-Egyptian relations develop from bad to worse.

No immediate resumption of negotiations took place owing, perhaps, to the Palestine question which had become a threat to peace in the Middle East and which occupied the attention of both Britain and Egypt during the following years. Britain declared that the Treaty of 1936 would remain binding, pending further negotiations, while Egypt asserted that she was no longer bound by its terms.

The intervention of Egypt in the Palestine war raised a number of issues which had a bearing on the Anglo-Egyptian controversy. Though technically an ally of Britain, Egypt entered the war without Britain's consultation or approval. When she suffered defeat after the first truce, Britain declared her readi-



ness to defend Egypt (since she regarded the Treaty of 1936 still binding) while Egypt preferred not to invoke the Treaty.

Another important issue was the question of the blockade, declared by Egypt against Israel, which affected British shipping through the Suez Canal. Neither Britain nor the other Powers made protests during the Palestine war, but when the General Armistice Agreement (signed at Rhodes in February 1949) came into effect, and the restrictions continued, complaints were made to Egypt. At first the blockade was relaxed and some of its restrictive practices modified, but later (since September 1950) new regulations were imposed which hampered the passage of goods through the Suez Canal. The matter was at the outset brought by Israel to the attention of the Security Council (August 1949) but no vote was taken and Israel appealed to the Mixed Armistice Commission. The Commission felt it lacked competence to discuss the Israeli complaint since its functions were limited by the Armistice Agreement to determine actual violations of its terms rather than to discuss "aggression" or "hostile" actions which were not covered by the Armistice. Thus Israel brought the matter again to the Security Council (August 1951) under Articles 33 and 37 of the Charter and asked for a vote on the dispute.

In the course of the discussion three main points were raised with respect to Egypt's restrictive practices. First, they were not in accord with the rules of international law; secondly, they violated the Suez Canal Convention of 1888; and thirdly, they were contrary to the Rhodes Armistice Agreement. These points, as well as certain other minor issues, were considered during July and August, and on September 1, by a joint proposal of three Powers (namely, Great Britain, the United States and France) a resolution was adopted in which Egypt was asked to terminate her restrictions on the passage of shipping through the Suez Canal. The resolution stated that the Security Council

Calls upon Egypt to terminate the restrictions of the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal wherever bound and to cease all interference with such shipping beyond that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and to the observance of the international conventions in force.

While the Israeli complaint was based on Egypt's alleged violations of the Rhodes Armistice and the Constantinople Convention, the Security Council's resolution seems to emphasize the ultimate objective of the Rhodes Armistice, which aimed at establishing peace between Egypt and Israel, and therefore regarded Egypt's action as an "abuse" of her right of visit and search. It would seem, accordingly, that the Council's decision was based on moral and political, rather than on legal, grounds.

The legal argument which the Egyptian representative, Fawzi Bey, put forth before the Council seems to be, from a strictly technical viewpoint, essentially sound. Egypt regarded herself still at war with Israel, since the Rhodes Armistice terminated hostilities, but did not establish peace between the two countries. In self-defense Egypt would certainly be permitted to exercise the right of visit and search of merchant vessels which passed through the Canal. The Constantinople Convention conferred upon the Ottoman Porte the right of "the defence of Egypt" by its own forces, which right devolved upon Egypt, notwithstanding Article IV which provided for the "free navigation" of the Canal; for the right of self-defense was given preference, under the Constantinople Convention, over the right of "free navigation".

Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the representative of Great Britain, contended that Egypt was not under attack or imminent threat of attack which would justify the exercise of the right of visit and search. "What matters", he said, "is not whether there is some technical basis for the restrictions but whether it is reasonable, just and equitable that they should be maintained." The representative of the United States, France, and other countries took the same stand which would seem to indicate that they were seeking a settlement which would help to ease the tension, and restore peace to the Middle East. This would be consistent with the functions of the Security Council whose purpose is not primarily to determine rights as conferred by international conventions, but to establish peace and international security. Egypt, however, convinced that she has been acting within her legal rights, did not accept the Council's ruling.

## V

Nuqrashi Pasha's failure to secure action by the Security Council in September 1947 and the subsequent participation of Egypt in the Palestine war put the Anglo-Egyptian controversy into the background for over two years. It was then felt in both Britain and Egypt that a stable government should replace coalition cabinets, before negotiations should be reopened; thus a transitional government was formed in 1949 whose main task was to supervise general elections. Since the Wafd party represents the majority of the people, the elections turned an overwhelming majority in its favor. Nahhas Pasha, leader of the party, was accordingly invited by King Faruq to form a government on January 12, 1950.

The Wafd government announced that it would resume negotiations for a "speedy evacuation" of British troops and the achievement of the unity of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian Crown. Negotiations were reopened by Salah al-Din Pasha, the Foreign Minister of Egypt, but certain slowness in the procedure was noticed, which prompted the Egyptian Parliament to ask the government for a public statement. Salah al-Din replied that it would be premature to announce the result of the negotiations, but he assured Parliament that his government's aim was, as it was announced on various occasions, to achieve the complete evacuation of British forces and the unity of the Nile Valley. No formula, it seems, has yet been found to satisfy the Egyptian demands and British interests. Under pressure of public opinion and opposing parties, the Egyptian government was forced to announce in the Speech from the Throne (January 1951) that, if negotiations failed, it would declare the abrogation of the Treaty of 1936.

From the time the Wafd government resumed negotiations, the international situation began to deteriorate. Since the Suez Canal is of such strategic significance, Great Britain tried to secure a share in its defense as part of a general defense scheme for the Middle East. Egypt, however, was adamant and would not concede any British right in the defense of the Canal. Since the Wafd government has been unable to reach an agreement after protracted negotiations during the past two years, its position in internal Egyptian politics has been weakened. The

opposing political parties argued that the only other alternative for the Wafd is to denounce the Treaty of 1936. Unfortunately the Wafd's staying in power has become dependent on achieving this end, and any compromise would disgrace its members in the eyes of the Egyptian public. What made matters worse is the Iranian move for the nationalization of oil which induced extremists in Egypt to demand, in like manner, not only the immediate abrogation of the Treaty but also the nationalization of the Suez Canal. A number of Egyptian young men, encouraged by such extremists as Makram Ubayd Pasha (leader of a dissident Wafd group), went on a hunger strike demanding the immediate repudiation of the Treaty. Despite the government's announcement that it had always intended to denounce the Treaty when the time had come, the strikers, though suffering physical fatigue and ailment, insisted that they would prefer to die if the government failed to abrogate the Treaty. It was not until Salah al-Din, the Foreign Minister, had assured the nation that the government had decided to abrogate the Treaty that the young men, after almost a fortnight, terminated their "national" fast.

In the circumstances Nahhas Pasha had either to denounce the Treaty or to resign. Negotiations had been going on between London and Cairo for the establishment of a Middle East Pact in which Egypt would be an equal partner with Britain, the United States, France and Turkey, but Egypt insisted on "evacuation" before any further negotiations should be undertaken.

While Great Britain was about formally to present the plan of a Four Powers Middle East Pact, Prime Minister Nahhas Pasha announced the abrogation of the Treaty. On October 8, 1951, a series of decrees, signed by King Faruq, were issued—one of them repudiating the Treaty of 1936, another terminating the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1899, a third proclaiming King Faruq the first King of Egypt and the Sudan, and a fourth promulgating a draft statute for the Sudan. These decrees were intended to give the Egyptian government a free hand in forcing Britain to evacuate the Sudan and the Canal zone, even if this led to a clash between the British and the Egyptian forces. Great Britain, still hoping that Egypt might be persuaded to consider the Four Power defense arrangement,

denied Egypt's right to declare a unilateral denunciation of the Treaties of 1899 and 1936. While Egypt's move might threaten the British position in the Canal, it would seem that it could hardly benefit her in the Sudan since Britain's position there is much stronger than that of Egypt.

The Four Power Pact has the advantage of replacing British forces in the Canal by an international force in which Egypt would occupy an equal position in the defense of the whole Middle East. This would remove Egypt's objection to an alliance with Britain, provided the principle of evacuation is accepted.

## VI

The impasse in the Anglo-Egyptian controversy raises the query as to why it has become almost impossible to find a formula which would satisfy both Egyptian nationalism and British defense of the Canal.

The answer to this question could be found if we analyze Egyptian nationalism, not as an isolated phenomenon, but as part of a larger movement throughout the whole Middle East. The Great Powers, and especially Britain, faced no such difficulty during the nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire, Egypt or Persia. The prestige and influence of Great Britain were so high that her intervention always brought a speedy settlement. Since the First World War, however, it has become increasingly difficult for Britain to intervene or to come to an understanding with the peoples of the Middle East. It would, of course, be idle to blame a Lord Curzon or a Mr. Bevin, who were often singled out as scapegoats. New factors have come into operation since the peace settlement of World War I which rendered nineteenth-century diplomacy either inadequate or obsolete.

The first and the most important factor is the rising tide of nationalism in the Middle East. During the nineteenth century Great Britain was known for her sympathy with liberal and nationalist movements. Since the First World War, as a result of new and explosive ideas which produced a higher pitch of nationalism, Great Britain is no longer the ally of nationalism in the East, for nationalism has focused its attack against British interests and it has become increasingly hard to reconcile the



two. The challenge of nationalism took the form of periodic ruptures which produced a corresponding decline in British influence in the Middle East. The years 1919 and 1920, and, more recently, 1948 and 1951, might be cited as significant landmarks; for during these years a rising in one country served as a signal to others which spread like wildfire throughout the area. No one has better expressed this than Marshal Lyautey who described the Muslim world as "sounding box".

During the nineteenth century European writers argued that nationalism in the East could not constitute a serious danger to the West, for it could always be suppressed. This is due to the fact that nationalism was confined to a limited class while the majority of the people were ignorant and indifferent. The increasing influx of Western ideas since the turn of the century (whether in the form of nationalism, fascism or communism) aroused lay society and it became increasingly active in politics. This has inspired the rise of "popular" leadership and the transformation of nationalism into a mass movement, not limited merely to an elite. Popular nationalism made possible the emergence of such national leaders as Mustapha Kemal and Sa'd Zaghlul (and more recently Mosadeq) who could with confidence, at moments of national outburst, defy the Great Powers with impunity.

This nationalist surge in the East was paralleled by a corresponding decline in the prestige and power of Great Britain in the system of the balance of power. During the past century Britain held in her hands the balance and she was careful to keep it in equilibrium. Since the First World War, however, Britain is no longer the holder of that position and her realization of this fact has induced her to support an international organization in which Britain would share the exercise of international power. But this very shift in the incidence of power from a balance of power to an international organization gave a chance to the Middle Eastern countries to play their part in international affairs and gave them impetus and political confidence to oppose the Great Powers. Iran, Syria and Lebanon were very quick to take advantage of the new world organization before the Great Powers had even a chance to discuss their own difficulties. In the past the rivalry between Russia and Great Britain made possible the independence of Persia as a

buffer state; but when they could settle their differences, Persian independence was difficult to maintain. The polarization of power since the last war has transformed not only Persia, but the whole Middle East, into a buffer zone between Russia and the Western democracies. Conscious of the significance of this zone, the Middle East is now toying with the idea of playing off the East against the West in order to gain certain national advantages. It is indeed owing to this East-West struggle that Russia withdrew from Iran; France evacuated Syria and Lebanon; and now Egypt has moved to evict the British forces from the Suez Canal, having successfully forced Britain to withdraw from the rest of Egyptian territory.

The present international situation, however, may not continue. Should the cold war come to an end, the strategic position of the Middle East would probably decline. It would seem, therefore, that the Middle Eastern countries should look beyond the immediate returns from this struggle between the East and West. The good will of the West would strengthen their position in any world organization and insure their independence against the domination of an expanding Power. It was indeed owing to the support of the West that the United Nations (except perhaps in the Palestine dispute) was able to defend their independence. It seems, therefore, that the interests of the Middle East would depend in the long run on following a policy which strengthens rather than weakens the United Nations. Egypt, as one of the leading Powers in the Middle East and certainly the most influential in the Arab League, could play a leading rôle in determining the future status of the Middle Eastern countries.

Yet Egypt has become obsessed with the concept of "full sovereignty" which prompted her to insist that no single foreign soldier should remain on her soil lest this should encroach upon her sovereign rights. In a shrinking world it would seem that the traditional conception of sovereignty is bound to change. No Power, however strong, can claim to be the master of its own destiny. Matters of defense and security have become the concern of the world and not of one single state. No single state can claim to be immune from aggression. If Egypt fears the domination of Britain, Russia could not be less dangerous.

## REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

CHAIRMAN EARLE: We have one more speaker, Mr. Harry N. Howard of the Department of State. Like Mr. Wright, Mr. Howard is a refugee from academic circles. He was for a number of years a professor of history at Miami University of Ohio, and while he was in that chair he wrote an excellent book, *The Partition of Turkey*.

He has for a good many years, however, been in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs of the Department of State, where he is now an adviser on United Nations questions. He will speak on "Middle Eastern Regional Organization: Problems and Prospects".

## MIDDLE EASTERN REGIONAL ORGANIZATION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

HARRY N. HOWARD

United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian  
and African Affairs, Department of State

### I

**H**AVING already devoted our attention to conflicting political forces in the Middle East, Arab-Israel tensions, and the Anglo-Egyptian controversy, it is fitting that we now turn our attention, briefly, to the subject of Middle Eastern regional organization and to some of the problems and prospects with respect thereto. It is, I suggest, a bare possibility that the prospects are somewhat less than the problems, and my paper from that point of view, I think, can be rather brief.

The problems have been so thoroughly discussed and all of the controversial issues so well covered that I shall not be forced to resort to the stratagem of a friend of mine some years ago in teaching a high-school class in science, who came to the controversial issue of evolution at that time and who told me triumphantly after the class was over that he had introduced the subject of evolution in the class, but he thought he had explained it in such a way that nobody understood what he was talking about!

### II

Of course, one can point to a number of regional arrangements, within the meaning of the United Nations Charter (Article 51, Chapter VIII) in the Middle East. These include, for example, the various bilateral alliances between the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and such states as Egypt (although this has come into controversy), Iraq and Jordan, on the other, the Anglo-Franco-Turkish pact of October 19, 1939, and such a consultative pact as that of Sa'dabad (July 9, 1937), between Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey, not to mention others. More recently, on the initiative of Pakistan, an International

Islamic Economic Organization has been formed,<sup>1</sup> with Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey as members. Essentially, however, since the Arab League is the active regional organization in the Middle East, and framed with specific reference to the Charter of the United Nations, particular attention will be devoted to it.

### III

Composed of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Hashimi Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen, the Arab League was established by the Pact of March 22, 1945.<sup>2</sup> Product of a long historical development and generally welcomed at the time, like other documents of similar import, the Pact of the Arab League was a result of many compromises.<sup>3</sup> According to the Pact, the

<sup>1</sup> Two meetings have been held, the first at Karachi in November 1949, and the second at Tehran, in October 1950. At the meeting on October 3, 1950, Mr. Ghulam Muhammad, Finance Minister of Pakistan, indicated that the United Nations had not extended sufficient assistance to the areas represented, especially to the Middle East, and that the Middle Eastern states had displayed insufficient interest in the nonpolitical activities of the United Nations. He also thought that a Middle East Economic Commission, under the United Nations, which could coöperate with the United Nations and other international agencies, should be established. At the Thirteenth Session of the Economic and Social Council in 1951 Pakistan proposed that the organization be recognized as a "Special Agency".

<sup>2</sup> For text see UNCIO Doc. 72:III/4 (May 4, 1945); Cecil A. Hourani, *The Arab League in Perspective* (Washington, The Arab Office, 1947), p. 20. On June 2, 1945, Mr. William Phillips, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, at a dinner in New York given by the Institute for Arab-American Affairs, referring to the formation of the Arab League, said: "We welcome the development of Arab coöperation and are confident that the strengthening of the ties between the various Arab countries will not only be to their common benefit but will also enable them to make important and constructive contributions to the great tasks awaiting the United Nations." See Department of State *Bulletin*, XII, 1037.

<sup>3</sup> See especially Majid Khadduri, "The Arab League as a Regional Arrangement", XL *American Journal of International Law*, 756-777 (October 1946); *idem*, "The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity: A Study in Inter-Arab Relations", in Richard N. Frye (ed.), *The Near East and the Great Powers* (Cambridge, 1951), pp. 137-177; *Memoirs of King Abdullah of Transjordan* (New York, 1950), p. 243 and *passim*. Professor H. A. R. Gibb notes that "the primary object of the League was to combine resistance to any attempts by the Western Powers to re-establish their spheres



purpose of the League is to strengthen relations between member-states, coördinate their policies, and safeguard their independence and sovereignty. Coöperation is to be effected particularly as to (1) economic and financial affairs, (2) communications, (3) cultural affairs, (4) nationality problems, (5) social affairs, and (6) questions of health. Under the Pact there is a Council, a Secretariat, and a number of committees dealing with the various functions of the League. Delegates from the member-states, each with one vote, make up the Council, which meets in ordinary session in March and October of each year, and in extraordinary session on the request of two member-states. Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, of Egypt, has served as Secretary-General since the establishment of the League, which has its headquarters in Cairo. On November 1, 1950, the General Assembly of the United Nations, on the basis of the precedent already established in the case of the Organization of American States in 1948, invited him to attend its meetings as an observer.<sup>4</sup>

of influence in the Middle East, and to the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine." *International Affairs*, XXVII, No. 4 (October 1951), 442.

<sup>4</sup> The question of extending an invitation to the Arab League was vigorously debated in the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly at the Sixth Session in 1950. The Israel Delegation, on September 30, submitted a memorandum (U. N. Doc. A/C.6/636) opposing the invitation on the following grounds: (1) The Arab League was not a "regional arrangement" within Chapter VIII of the Charter, since the area covered by members of the League did not constitute "a 'region' in any sense recognized by the United Nations", and the League was "conceived in the principle of exclusive racial and cultural identity which does not accord with the basic ideas of the Charter"; (2) the constitution of the League and the relations existing between its members did not "conform to the criterion of a regional arrangement"; (3) the only activities carried out in unison by members of the League have been directed against, not in support of, the United Nations; (4) the League was bent on "subverting the existing political status in countries outside the League itself"; (5) the League refused to coöperate with the Security Council for the restoration of international peace; (6) the procedures of the League are contrary to those practiced and approved by the United Nations; and (7) even on a courtesy basis it would be "improper" for the United Nations to issue an invitation to the Arab League. Mr. Spiropoulos, of Greece, contended that neither a legal nor a political question but one of justice and equity was involved on the basis of the precedent established in the invitation to the Organization of American States. The Sixth Committee, by a vote of 42-1-7, voted to extend the invitation, and the plenary session, on November 1, 1950, by a

## IV

It may be noted in passing that, although their influence was not a determining one, members of the Arab League, notably Egypt, were much interested in the development of the articles dealing with regional arrangements during the discussions at the San Francisco Conference, and that Badawi Pasha, now a judge on the International Court of Justice, sought a broad definition which would cover something more than the European alliance system.<sup>5</sup> There was no disposition to accept a definition, although there was no particular objection to the principles embodied in the Egyptian proposal, among others, as to regional arrangements.

The United Nations Charter made provision for some kind of integration of regional arrangements within the broader framework of the United Nations as a universal organization. Without entering into all of the details, it may be noted that the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" is recognized (Article 51). Articles 52-54 not only expressly recognize the need for coordinating the activities of regional arrangements within the framework of the United Nations, but,

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vote of 49-1-10, voiced its approval. See General Assembly, Sixth Committee, *Official Records* (Fifth Session), pp. 17 *et seq.*; General Assembly, *Official Records* (Fifth Session), p. 304.

<sup>5</sup> The proposed Egyptian definition, which had the support of the Arab League, was as follows: "There shall be considered as regional arrangements organizations of a permanent nature grouping in a given geographical area several countries which, by reason of their proximity, community of interests or cultural, linguistic, historical or spiritual affinities, make themselves jointly responsible for the peaceful settlement of any disputes which may arise between them and for the maintenance of peace and security in their region, as well as for the safeguarding of their interests and the development of their economic and cultural relations." A subcommittee of Committee III/4 turned down the proposal on the ground that, while it "clearly defined obvious legitimate and eligible factors for a regional arrangement", it could not be all inclusive as a definition. See especially UNCIO Doc. 533, III/4/A/9; 889, III/4/12. See also the remarks of Hassan Pasha, of Egypt, on June 13, 1945, before the Third Commission, in which he reiterated the Egyptian position and stated that Egypt had asked "that all allusions to military alliances and pacts of mutual assistance should be disconnected from the text on regional arrangements." Department of State, *The United Nations Conference on International Organization* (Washington, 1946), pp. 787-788.

in a way, provide the basic principles for such coördination. Among other things, Article 52 stipulates that regional arrangements or agencies and their activities should be "consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations." Pacific settlement might be achieved through regional arrangements, and, under Article 53, where appropriate, the Security Council might utilize such regional arrangements or agencies "for enforcement action under its authority". But no enforcement action could be undertaken through regional arrangements or agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against an enemy state of World War II or in regional arrangements directed against the renewal of an aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until the United Nations is charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state. Finally, under Article 54, the Security Council, at all times, is to be kept "fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security."

But of more particular interest, whatever the subsequent implementation, is the fact that the Pact of the Arab League originally contemplated a type of integration with the new international organization which was soon to be established under the United Nations Charter. Article 3 of the Pact provided, for example, that the Council of the Arab League was to "decide upon the means by which the League is to cooperate with the international bodies to be created in the future in order to guarantee security and peace and regulate economic and social relations." Moreover, resort to force between members was outlawed, and there was to be recourse to pacific settlement in disputes, unanimous decisions being binding on all parties.

The Collective Security Pact of April 13, 1950, itself a product of some long-standing difficulties within the Arab League, was even more specific.<sup>6</sup> According to the new Treaty of Joint

<sup>6</sup> Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria have signed the treaty. Iraq signed on February 2, 1951 after amending it in such a way as to place more power in the hands of the Joint Arab Chiefs of Staff, which will have its headquarters in Cairo and coördinate the training program and supply problems of the armed forces of each member-state. Iraq also reserved the right not to be bound by the League in financial matters. Jordan refused to sign the Collective Security Pact, making five stipulations: (1)

Defense and Economic Co-operation, members of the Arab League were motivated by the desire of their peoples

for the realization of a closer union for the common defense of their States and to safeguard peace and security in conformity with the principles and objectives of the Arab League Charter and the United Nations Charter, and desirous of sustaining stability and tranquillity and security, the welfare and progress of their countries.

Article 2 of the new Pact relates specifically to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, as follows:

The contracting states consider that any armed attack against one or more of them, or against their forces, is an aggression against all of them. Therefore, by virtue of the right of legal defense, individual or collective, of their existence, they have engaged themselves to assist immediately the state or states attacked and to take, individually or collectively, all measures and to use all means in their power, including the use of armed force to repel the aggression and restore peace and security.

In conformity with Article 6 of the Arab League Charter and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Arab League Council and the Security Council will immediately be informed of the aggression as well as the measures taken in this respect.<sup>7</sup>

the provision that a two-thirds majority was binding on all members should be replaced by a clause stating that execution of any decision should be the responsibility of only those who voted for it; (2) "aggression" should be defined and refer to an act by a non-League member; (3) the general mechanism of the Pact should be further revised and simplified; (4) the Pact should not affect treaties between League members and other states; and (5) an authority should be appointed to define a "threat of war". Yemen maintained its former position, indicating that the defense treaties which Jordan, Iraq and Egypt had with the United Kingdom might provoke attack. In such event, Yemen would not feel obligated to aid the victims. On May 19, 1951 the Council called on signatories to accelerate ratification, and proposed a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff to prepare defensive plans in readiness for any eventualities which might arise before completion of ratification.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. with Articles 1, 5, 6, 7 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, September 2, 1947, and Articles 1, 5, 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, in Department of State, *In Quest of Peace and Security: Selected Documents on American Foreign Policy, 1941-1951* (Washington, 1951), pp. 96-100, 100-102.

In the event of a threat to the territory, independence or security of a member, there is to be consultation at the request of any signatory (Article 3), and the signatories agree to co-ordinate their "plans and efforts" through preventive and defensive measures. To organize plans for joint defense, a Permanent Military Committee was established, which was to report to the Common Defense Council (Articles 5, 6), the latter being composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of National Defense of the signatories, or their deputies. Provision was also made for economic coöperation and development; and an Economic Council, composed of the respective Ministers of the signatories who deal with economic questions, was established for this purpose (Articles 7, 8). Article 11 of the Collective Security Pact of April 13, 1950 stipulated:

Nothing in the provisions of this Treaty affects, or is intended to affect, in any way the rights and obligations resulting or which may result from the United Nations Charter or the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and international security.

## V

A number of problems, however, may be raised in connection with the Arab League, as with other groupings, as a regional organization in the Middle East, the first of which is the fact that its membership does not include all states in the area. This might well be true, however, of any regional organization which might be formed and does not necessarily militate against the regional character of the organization under the United Nations Charter. I might say in this connection that this very fact was emphasized when the Arab League requested that its Secretary-General be invited to attend meetings of the General Assembly of the United Nations as an observer, the point being made by the Israel Delegation, which set forth a number of considerations militating against issuing such an invitation.

However, as the Greek speaker, himself a distinguished authority on international law, stated at the time, it was not so much a matter of strict legalities which was involved, but a matter of equity in view of precedents which already had been set.



Secondly, as has been well indicated in these discussions, whether considered as an entity or as individual states, the Arab League is weak politically, economically and militarily, in an area ever under the direct pressure of the Soviet Union.<sup>8</sup> The members of the League are torn with dissension, as noted in the Hashimi-Saudi rivalry, involving Egypt and Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and, generally, Iraq, Jordan and sometimes Syria, on the other, a dissension in which the project for Iraqi-Jordanian-Syrian union and jealousy over Egyptian "leadership" in the League have played a rôle.<sup>9</sup> Military weakness has led to a feeling of insecurity among all members of the League, which, in turn, together with various resentments against the West—over the Palestine question, oil problems, the Suez Canal and the Sudan—have pointed toward the development of "neutrality" in what some leaders have chosen merely to designate as a struggle between two "equally guilty" power systems. On

<sup>8</sup> In this connection two recent statements are noteworthy. In "The Plan for Arab Unity" submitted to the Arab League on January 23, 1951 by Dr. Nazim el-Kudsi (Syria), he remarked that in the opinion of military experts, the Arabs were a "negligible quantity" and therefore arms were not sent to them, adding: "The Arab League has failed Arab hopes. It has been lavish in demonstrations and words, but barren of results and deeds. Everybody knows that its prevailing spirit is out of harmony with the times, the rapid succession of events and their gravity because it has not taken the constructive road in any field, be it defense, economics, culture or social affairs. The individual Arab has not felt its existence because it has not secured anything for him and has not achieved any goal." A British writer has recently stated: "The truth is that unity is not the natural condition of the Arabs, and has never existed.... The picture afforded by the Arab League so far is one of dismal and often deliberate failure. It must be admitted that the League has gone through difficult years since its birth, and that Palestine was a terrible strain to put on the new organization. But an analysis shows that a primary defect falsified the politics of the Arab League from the outset. The League became, and to a very large extent still remains, the chosen field of inter-Arab struggle rather than the expression of a united Arab world." A. D., "The Arab League: Development and Difficulties", *The World Today*, VII (May 1951), 187-196.

<sup>9</sup> Evidently the advent of King Tallal to the throne of Jordan, following the assassination of King Abdullah on July 20, 1951, brought something of a change in the project for Iraqi-Jordanian-Syrian union, and by October it appeared that relations with Saudi Arabia might improve, while a cooling off in Iraqi-Jordanian relations seemed to have taken place. *New York Times*, October 7, 1951.

the other hand, the sense of "unity" among members of the Arab League at meetings of the General Assembly of the United Nations, on both questions of general interest and those of special concern, such as Palestine, Libya, dependent areas, and candidacies for various councils and offices, gives them a prestige, influence and power, which no single state could achieve alone, and particularly when the Arab states are able to work with other regional groupings, like the Latin American states.<sup>10</sup>

Last year, for example, when Turkey and Lebanon were both candidates for the Security Council from the same general area, it required fourteen ballots to elect Turkey to the Security Council, largely because of the alliance between members of the Arab League, on the one hand, and the Organization of American States, or the Latin American bloc, on the other. It was rather difficult to say much to either the Latin-Americans or the members of the Arab League. After all the Latin American group included about twenty states, the Arab group only five, but when you add twenty to five, you still have a somewhat larger element than you would if you had the two operating at cross-purposes.

Greek and Turkish membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as recommended by the North Atlantic Council on September 20, 1951, would appear to raise another set of problems by way of regional organization in the Middle East, presumably on the basis of the principles set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949.<sup>11</sup> Article 1 of the Treaty provides for pacific settlement, while Article 5 covers the principle of individual and collective self-defense, and under Article 7 rights and duties under the Charter of the United Nations are not affected. In the Protocol inviting Greece and Turkey to membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the principles of Article 5 would

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, M. Margaret Ball, "Bloc Voting in the General Assembly", V *International Organization* 3-31 (February 1951).

<sup>11</sup> Turkey (October 2, 1950) and Greece (October 4, 1950) accepted invitations to be associated with "such appropriate phases of the military planning work of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as are concerned with the defense of the Mediterranean", Department of State *Bulletin*, XXIII, No. 589 (October 16, 1950), 632-633.

apply to an armed attack against Turkey and in the Mediterranean.<sup>12</sup>

Similarly, granted the ultimate development of the Allied Middle East Command structure, proposals concerning which were submitted to Egypt on October 13, and rejected two days later, a number of problems would be raised, among which would be the precise relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, within that framework, the relationship with the United Nations, as a regional security organization.<sup>13</sup>

These are but a few of the problems involved in Middle Eastern regional organization. What are the prospects for such organization in the Middle East? Immediate prospects would appear to be as few as the problems are many, serious and complex. It may be noted, for example, that while a few regional meetings have been held under UNESCO, involving the nations of the Near and Middle East, and the various specialized agencies such as FAO have held and attempted regional meetings, it has not yet been possible to establish a Middle East Economic Commission similar to the Economic Commissions which exist for the Far East and Latin America, because largely of the Arab-Israel controversy. If you hold one of these meetings, for example, in the Arab world, Israel cannot attend. I know of the case of the ILO about a year ago, when a meeting in Tehran had to be called off because the Arabs would not attend, if the Israel Delegation were to attend. That does not apply to the more comprehensive organizations where the two sit side by side in the General Assembly, ECOSOC or the other more universal bodies involved.

There have been proposals for other political groupings or regional arrangements in the Middle East, including one for the Persian Gulf area and another involving Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, as well as members of the Arab League, although, because of various conflicting interests, immediate practical realization of such projects would appear to be out of the question. The entire problem of regional arrangements is one

<sup>12</sup> Department of State *Bulletin*, XXV, No. 643 (October 22, 1951), 650-651.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 647-648.

of more general interest within the framework of the United Nations and has been the subject of recent study and concern.<sup>14</sup> That the United States has been interested in these problems as they affect the peace and security of the Middle East is quite natural and well attested by the Tripartite Declaration of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, May 25, 1950, the invitation to Greece and Turkey with regard to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the development of the Mutual Security Program (May 24, 1951), and the elaboration of principles for an Allied Middle East Command.

<sup>14</sup> See U. N. Doc. A/1891, Supplement No. 13, *Report of the Collective Measures Committee*, pars. 182-186; U. N. Doc. A/1844/Add. I, Supplement No. 1A, *Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*, 1 July 1950-30 June 1951, pp. 5-6.

#### REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

CHAIRMAN EARLE: As you know, ladies and gentlemen, it is customary at these meetings to have a brief period of questions after the presentation of the formal papers.\*

Before I ask for questions, I wonder if I may speak for you when I thank all of these speakers for coming here this afternoon and reading these interesting and enlightening papers. You know from experience that it takes time and effort, and frequently time and effort at the end of busy days, to prepare papers of this sort and of such excellence. So, I think you will probably agree to my acting as your spokesman in thanking these gentlemen for the notable contributions they have made to this meeting of the Academy.

I might add that somebody or several somebodies gave a good deal of time and thought to drafting a program as comprehensive as this, and it seems to me appropriate that we should express our appreciation of the balance of the program as well.

\* Space limitations prevent us from including in the PROCEEDINGS the discussion from the floor.

## PART III

### THE MIDDLE EAST AND WORLD PEACE

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#### INTRODUCTION \*

LEWIS W. DOUGLAS, *Presiding*  
Former Ambassador to Great Britain  
President, Academy of Political Science

**Y**OUR Excellency, Ambassador Grady, Members of the Academy and its Guests: I think I should first say that at ten-thirty this evening the President of the United States is making a speech over a nationwide broadcasting system. Its significance may be very great—I have no advance knowledge. But for those who would like to hear the President we will try to adjourn this meeting in ample time. For those who would not like to hear the President—the issue is not important. [Laughter]

For four years, I should explain, Your Excellency, the members of the Academy have been liberated people—indeed it is five years. Their meetings have been held under the benign influence of democratic forces. An example of those forces has been the charm and wit with which Mr. Lamont has conducted the annual and semi-annual gatherings of the Academy. He and Mr. Burgess, both of them and all the others, have an elegance with which I cannot compete. And so now you must resubmit yourselves, at least temporarily, to the tyranny of the past, for the tyrant has returned. Doubtless this will start, as all returning tyrants have started, another revolution. [Laughter]

We are talking this evening about a part of the world which has had a peculiar significance, a very special significance, to

\* Opening remarks at the Dinner Session of the Annual Meeting.



the security of the community of civilized nations. We have all, I think, exerted a great deal of ingenuity to make this part of the world uneasy, "queesy" and even dangerous. It is extraordinary what talent we have—and this is a demonstrated historical fact—to create trouble for ourselves when possibly it might have been avoided.

This particular area is one that not only bears upon the strategic position of the civilized community. It also has peculiar importance to its economic and political stability.

Ambassador Grady has had a distinguished career. He has been in and out of universities. First I should say that he graduated from one. [Laughter] He has been a professor; he has withstood with extraordinary resolution the corrupting influences of these academic institutions. [Laughter]

Ambassador Grady has been a public servant on many occasions and in many important posts. His last and final one—I should say that he has now been divorced from public office or has divorced himself from public office—was a most important one. He is now willing to talk to us about the "Tensions in the Middle East with Particular Reference to Iran", where he has lived through the last few years. He knows the history and the facts as they bear upon this issue, an issue which is of peculiar significance to us all.

I might just say this: that no people on earth have so quickly adjusted their intellectual approaches to world problems as have we Americans. Probably no people in such a short period of time have grown out of the attitude of continental seclusion into a position of international understanding.

I think you will agree with me when I say it is one of the most extraordinary phenomena in modern history.

Ambassador Grady, who is now completely unassociated with government, can speak to us on this particular phase of the Middle East, speak to us from his own knowledge and speak to us tellingly. And I, Sir, consider it a great privilege to be able to introduce you to the Academy of Political Science! [Applause]

## TENSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO IRAN

HENRY FRANCIS GRADY

Former Ambassador to India, Greece and Iran

**T**HERE would be no great concern about the upsurging of nationalism in the Middle East were it not for the hazards inherent in its geographic position and its great resources in oil. Countries with a low standard of living must develop nationalism if they are to advance socially and economically and maintain their political independence.

The things to be done to insure progress must be understood by the people, and the national will must be strengthened to do those things. In a word there must be, to a degree at least, the patriotism that puts the national interest over that of the individual.

But nationalism which serves the selfish purposes of the few and is a vehicle for xenophobia can destroy a country and possibly its friends. Sound nationalism is constructive—chauvinistic, destructive.

The tensions in the Middle East and for that matter in the whole Muslim world stretching over to North Africa have as their basis an intensifying nationalism that can be good or bad, constructive or destructive.

While nationalism in the Middle East is particularly manifest in Iran and Egypt where concessions are unilaterally cancelled and treaties broken, it is manifest also in other Middle Eastern countries like Syria, Iraq and Jordan. There is, of course, also the imported nationalism of Palestine which is different from that of the Arab states but is intense and aggressive, and is a catalyst to the nationalisms of the countries of the Middle East area.

The tensions of the Middle East and their counterpart in nationalistic upheavals are due to a number of causes. Two world wars have shaken the world to its foundations. Deep-seated religious and social institutions have felt the impact of this revolution. World organizations like the League of

Nations and the United Nations have tended to treat the heretofore lesser countries as grown-ups and thus to encourage their assertiveness.

Great leaders have come up and found scope. Turkey under Atatürk was almost completely changed after World War I. Elsewhere in this area coups d'état and the assassination of rulers and high officials have become almost the order of the day.

With internal upheaval has come a determination to become independent of outside influence both political and economic. I believe the external is influencing the internal rather than the reverse but both forces react on each other.

Western European countries have for centuries dominated in one form or another the countries of the Middle East. In the area has been actual colonialism or semi-colonialism with the British playing the major rôle. To say that all forms of colonialism are becoming obsolete is to state what is generally recognized in principle but not always accepted in practice.

The revolt against colonialism not only in the Middle East but in the Far East and North Africa is of course another way of saying that the upsurge of nationalism is casting off all bonds. This is another way also of referring to the tensions.

Why is Iran as the center of the tensions in the Middle East of such great interest to the world today? It is one of the focal points in the struggle to contain Russia. What happens in Iran may determine whether we have or avoid World War III. There are only a few places on the periphery of the Soviet Empire which are really soft and through which an easy thrust might be made. I am referring to places where the Soviets might wish, for purposes of their grand strategy, to make a direct assault. These are Iran and to a lesser extent Western Germany. Yugoslavia, as is the case with Korea, involves the possible embarrassments of also dealing with what might prove to be awkward satellites. One suspects that the Soviets have so regarded the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists. They might anticipate in an attack on Yugoslavia by Bulgaria, Hungary and Albania complications that would give them pause. Satellites could prove difficult in any case; but with Russia not being actually at war and hence not in active control, the operation would doubtless be more complicated.

But Iran, assuming that the Politburo decided to make an all-out effort to destroy the capitalist "warmongers", could prove to be a push-over. Though Iran is the softest spot in the line around Russia, we have done little to block it up and the British have more than neutralized our feeble efforts. The indifference of the two great Western Powers toward Iran and what must clearly be Russian designs toward her is quite difficult to understand. The problem of adequate strengthening of Iran is a challenge to statesmen which has been completely missed. Perhaps London and Washington have been too busy elsewhere really to understand what is going on in the Middle East and to have an effective and integrated policy there. The frequent and frantic appeals to Washington and London to awaken them to the critical situation fast developing have had little effect until recently.

The British policy is based largely on the colonial approach—financial and economic pressures to prevent control from slipping away—and as time went on, particularly at the time I left, we seemed to be underwriting this policy. It is unfortunate that this should be the case, since the Iranians are endeavoring to cast off what they regard as the economic domination of the British through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. To endeavor to prevent this by intensifying economic pressures to which they so passionately object in any form is in my opinion doing things exactly the wrong way.

I am not discussing the merits of the oil controversy. In this regard I feel that the Iranians have been wrong in approach and method. But the British, until it has become almost too late, have likewise been wrong in this regard; and there is less excuse for them. In the relations of the Western democracies to the less-developed countries of the world there must be nothing of the colonial approach. Is it not clear that it is obsolete and hence ineffectual? The truth is it inevitably fails, and British prestige is lost where there is every reason in the interest of peace and progress that it should be maintained and built up.

Not only that, the whole West must have prestige and a sympathetic reception to their constructive endeavors in the countries that hang in the balance between democracy and

communism. And the West is judged as a whole! Any suggestion of the colonial approach is proving and will continue to prove disastrous to our common position in these countries. I feel we should persuade the British, with whom we are partners in the noble struggle to contain Soviet imperialism, that their handling of the oil problem in Iran cannot be to the benefit of our common endeavor. My criticism of our government is just there. We seem to be able to come into agreement on joint military matters affecting areas inadequately protected. We must also do so in financial and economic matters in the same areas. We are not coördinated in the Middle East in this regard, and certainly that part of the world is as important as Western Europe and the Far East.

We and the British agree in our over-all world policy, and hence with regard to Iran, but have serious differences as to implementation—at least we have had until recently! Iran is a test of our ability not only to coördinate British-American policy in the Middle East but also to do so more fully in the Far East. It is therefore of vital importance to world security that the matter be quickly worked out. This should be the first order of business of the United States State Department and the British Foreign Office.

The joint failure of the British and ourselves to do what was properly expected of us has played directly into the hands of Soviet propaganda and Tudeh (Communist) activity. Both are well organized and extremely effective. The formula we have successfully used elsewhere to meet the Communist threat has not been used in Iran though the mission I headed in June 1950 went there for precisely that purpose.

The net amount of our economic aid during the last year and a half has been less than two million dollars whereas during my two years in Greece we gave aid to the extent of over a million dollars a day. On military aid we have done better. It was only because of our aid in Greece that communism was defeated and the country saved for democracy. I earnestly hope that the reverse will not be the case in Iran.

The securing of an agreement between the Iranian government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has been for several years fundamental to the maximum success of any aid from us. However an oil agreement would have had a far better atmos-



phere for successful consummation had we moved quickly and sympathetically with our promised program of aid.

In July 1949 the Iranian government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company signed an agreement practically doubling the royalties then in effect. This agreement required ratification of the Majlis or parliament. When Razmara became Prime Minister in June 1950 he had, as carry-over legislation, ratification of the oil agreement. It had become and continued to be a political football. Razmara sought from the oil company a few additional non-monetary concessions not in the supplementary agreement as the only political basis on which he could urge passage of legislation which had failed to pass under a predecessor government. The company refused, and the British Foreign Office, though urged to do so by our government and though owning 53 per cent of the stock of the company, did not press the management to do what would have meant no real sacrifice on their part and probably would have solved the oil problem and saved Iran from the disaster which seems to be facing her.

There was no talk whatsoever of nationalization when I arrived in Iran in the summer of 1950. Dr. Mosadeq was Chairman of the Majlis commission "studying" the proposed legislation. He was head of the National Front which had only eight deputies out of one hundred and ten. With the intransigence of the oil company and the consequent passage of time, agitation for nationalization began and quickly gained momentum, particularly after Mosadeq's oil commission recommended it to the Majlis. Razmara had gone before the commission on March 4 to present the case against nationalization and three days later was assassinated as a "British agent and traitor to his country". The assassin was a member of the Fidayan-i-Islam (Protectors of Islam), a fanatical religious group working parallel with the National Front, though not demonstrably with it, for nationalization of the oil company and the expulsion of the British from the country. At least 95 per cent of the people of the country rallied behind Mosadeq on the nationalization issue. In fact the drive against the company was only incidental to a drive against what the Iranians regarded as British domination of the economic life of their country and interference in their internal political affairs.

The oil company is a symbol of their revolt against what they regard as British interference in their affairs, and I regret to say that the oil company and the British Foreign Office have failed to extinguish the flame by a realistic approach to a problem deep-rooted and passionate. Their recent proposals made by Jackson and Stokes were fair and enlightened and the Iranians should have accepted them but feelings were now running too high.

After the assassination of Razmara—the one man who in my opinion could have pulled Iran out of her difficulties and set her on the road to genuine recovery—Hussein Ala became Prime Minister for a few weeks, and then Mosadeq, the one logically to carry out nationalization (and the “economic liberation” of Iran), came to power.

From then on nationalization moved apace. The agreement pending before the Majlis would have given the Iranians about 25 per cent to 30 per cent of the company's net profits (based on those earned in 1950). This was not a proposal of extreme liberality on the part of the oil company, since in Saudi Arabia and Iraq 50 per cent is being given. While the ratification of this agreement would doubtless not have obviated further demands later, it certainly would have eliminated for the time at least the drive for nationalization and all the difficulties that this drive is bringing about.

The Foreign Office which said it was none of its affair in the fall of 1950 is trying hard to salvage something for the oil company and its own balance of payments amounting to almost \$300,000,000 a year!

Mosadeq, now in the United States and recently at the United Nations, will concede little; and the people of Iran are behind him. He thinks he can run this great oil industry and, though no one else thinks so, he seems determined to do so and to see it through.

He may make a deal to insure the continued operation of the industry, but he will in my opinion make no deal with a purely British company. Perhaps he will accept an international management company. I hope he will. It is vital to Western interests to keep the industry going. But he will not be influenced by legalistic arguments or economic and financial pressures!

In the meantime we have failed on our Export-Import Bank loan which would have been a symbol of our backing of Iran against Soviet aggression. We have paralleled the British in complete ineptness and inability to appraise the difficulties and crucial nature of the problem.

We must go ahead with our loan and aid program even if there are those who feel that Mosadeq can be gotten rid of and a "moderate" Prime Minister secured by withholding all economic aid and thus producing economic pressure. Mosadeq with the great masses of the people behind him cannot so easily be gotten rid of. Nor would it help to do so! We must find a solution through the conciliation and understanding of mutual interests. Let both the British and ourselves recognize this and act accordingly.

I fear there is a bankruptcy of American policy in the Middle East. It can be corrected only by thoroughgoing discussion with the British and agreement on policy such as we have attained in the military sphere. To agree on general objectives is not enough. We must agree on implementation. Here is the challenge to British and American statesmanship. If coördination can be effected the Middle East can become stable and achieve genuine progress. Otherwise the outlook is gloomy indeed. [Applause]

## REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

PRESIDENT DOUGLAS: Ambassador Grady, on behalf of the Academy and its guests I thank you very much indeed for this expression of your views and for the statement of facts and presentation of the case that you have made. It raises a number of serious, delicate issues, and no one—no one—can successfully argue or refute the conclusion that you have so vigorously placed before the Academy.

If there is to be any easement of the tension in the Middle East, if there is to be any resolution of problems which perhaps extend beyond the comprehension of almost all of us in this room, there must be some coördination, some unity of policy and action between the British Commonwealth of Nations and ourselves, and we should have a close association with stalwart, brave Turkey.

The whole area that extends from the Black Sea, the Caspian, down to the White Nile, is in a state of disturbance. It is pressed by internal prejudices and emotions. It is stirred by external influences. It is one of the most strategic areas on the globe. Its significance to us, even those who live in Keokuk, Iowa, is very great.

During the last two or three weeks—indeed I suppose during the last ten days—the Soviet Union has had conversations with the government of His Excellency, the Turkish Ambassador. This is an evidence of a variety of different forces and currents that are running in international politics.

This country which His Excellency represents occupies a very peculiar position. It abuts, as no other country of the civilized community abuts, upon the frontiers of the Soviet Union. It is accordingly submitted to pressures and tensions that few other countries are subjected to. It is a great influence in the Middle East itself. Its destinies lie with the European Community and the bridge between Asia Minor and Africa.

The Academy is fortunate that His Excellency, the Turkish Ambassador, is willing to speak to us tonight on the policies of his government. We are fortunate because the policies of his government affect so vitally the developments within the area to which Ambassador Grady has referred.

I introduce His Excellency, the Turkish Ambassador! [Applause]

## TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY

HIS EXCELLENCY, MR. FERIDUN C. ERKIN

Turkish Ambassador to the United States

**I**T is with a deep sense of gratification that I have accepted your courteous invitation to address your meeting tonight. The Academy of Political Science has always provided an ideal center for discussing the most important economic, political and social problems. It has become a valuable source for the diffusion and better understanding of such problems. Humanity has reached a stage in its evolution where the political coefficient covers the most widely varied spheres of human activity, where political science knows no bounds except those imposed upon it by the limited possibilities of human intelligence at grips with the formidable accumulation and crushing complexity of social problems. Thus the democracies are today compelled to solve problems of a complexity unparalleled in history. In sponsoring the approach of such problems in an atmosphere free from emotion, your illustrious Academy places the serene and inspiring light of its resources at the disposal of the leaders of all countries.

It is a great honor for me to give you here a brief outline of my country's foreign policy. The presumption of accomplishing such a task before so eminent an audience as yours can be justified only by the friendly good will and generosity of your assembly. Foreign policy is an important branch of politics. In the ideal acceptance of the term, its objective is to keep watch simultaneously over the special interests of the state concerned, and the common interests of the international society. According to this definition the foreign policy of a country is primarily based on the permanent factors of its national life. Viewed in this light Turkey's foreign policy is the product of history and geography, and of the principles of the Kemalist revolution. "Peace at home, peace abroad", said our first President, the late Atatürk. A statesman of astonishing vision and perspicacity, he gave expression through this clear-cut formula to the innate predilection and yearning of



the Turkish people for the establishment of a just and enduring peace in a world governed by principles of law.

In the Kemalist ideology there exists no antagonism between a policy motivated by particular interests and the principles of law, because, for a nation which respects law, that which is just is also that which is most conformable to its interests. These principles have been put into extensive practice by the government of the Republic and have resulted in the progressive strengthening of our relations with the other Powers, in the concluding of treaties of friendship, conciliation and arbitration with many states, in our systematic recourse to international political and judicial bodies for the settlement of our disputes with other countries, in our activity within the League of Nations, aspiring to the objective of collective security, and, since 1939, in a policy of alliances with nations desirous of preserving the peace.

The realism of the statesmen of our new régime had definitely closed, from the beginning, the era of the deceiving dreams of the Ottoman Empire. The document known as the "National Pact", approved by the Turkish Parliament in 1919, voluntarily limited the country's frontiers to the territories exclusively populated by Turks, and renounced claim to all those regions not included in such limits. Despite the now consummated loss of a whole empire, the Turkish nation resolved, entirely of its own volition and without any regret or bitterness whatsoever, to make a definitive break with an opulent but dead past. The Turkish people drew from their long experience sufficient wisdom and realism scrupulously to respect the territories and rights of others, and from their glorious history sufficient self-respect to cherish jealously their independence, and, if need be, to defend every inch of their national patrimony. All these factors taken together placed Turkey in a conspicuous position in the international scene as a thoroughly anti-imperialist nation and a solid pillar of international stability.

I hope that this brief analysis will suffice to illuminate some of the elements which have contributed to the formation of the national foreign policy which the Republic has followed until today and is resolved to follow in the future. These elements reflect the influence of the humanitarian and idealist aspects of

the Kemalist revolution on the Turkish foreign policy. We know already that history and geography have also played a determining rôle in the making of this policy.

Historians affirm in general that the Eastern question came into being on and from the day when the Turks set foot on the European continent. In my opinion this assumption proceeds from a prejudiced and biased empiricism. In reality, the Eastern question came into existence on the day when Russia, having become a major European Power, resolved to liquidate the Ottoman Empire in order to achieve her own imperialistic goals. For several centuries, and approximately once every twenty-five years, Russia imposed no less than twelve wars upon the Ottoman Empire.

In the face of such an appetite for expansion, Europe, by turns alarmed or compliant, alternated a policy of support toward Turkey when European interests were directly threatened by the aggressor, with a policy of association with the Tsar when Russian conquests were compensated through territorial gains acquired by the Great Powers of Europe—this whole system of partition being carried out at the expense of the Turks.

War was not the only means used by Russia to bring about the progressive liquidation of the Ottoman Empire. Minority groups of different religions and races, forerunners of fifth columns, were frequently used as tools to implement foreign intrigues and subversive activities for the purpose of satisfying Russian aspirations. In this way, the Ottoman Empire was being driven toward total destruction, on the one hand by war, and on the other hand by internal dissension and armed rebellion.

The striking similarity between the expansionist policy of tsarist Russia and communist Russia cannot escape the acute perception of the historian. In both cases one can discern the same will for conquests at the expense of other nations, and the same subversive and dissolvent method of bringing about the progressive weakening and final collapse of the country marked for domination. The sole difference between tsarist imperialism and communist imperialism lies in the extent of the territories coveted, and in the choice of the methods used. Whereas Imperialist Russia concentrated all her ambition and thirst for domination on the Turkish territories, totalitarian communism

extends its insatiable tentacles of conquest toward the entire world. Just as tsarist Russia, in her efforts to undermine the internal structure of the Ottoman Empire, had utilized racial and religious minority groups, the Kremlin in its imperialism, to carry out its subversive activity all over the world, now takes recourse in the no less efficacious services of the national Communist parties.

In associating, at this present hour, all the free nations of the world with the fate of Turkey in the face of Russian imperialistic and expansionist goals, history seems to bow before one of those unfathomable manifestations of a higher will, and, awakening Europe and the world from their past lethargy, indifference or ignorance over the martyrdom suffered for whole centuries by the Turkish people under repeated aggressions, now unites their destinies in the presence of the same danger and the same evil.

It was, however, the fate of tsarist Russia to disappear before witnessing the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire and gaining the enormous spoils which she awaited from this heritage. From the ruins of the Empire of the Sultans a new state had arisen—free, sovereign, jealous of its liberty and its independence. On the other hand, the Bolshevik régime which came to power in Russia had liquidated tsarism, rejected the policy of expansionism, renounced all designs on Turkey, and signed with her a treaty intended to inaugurate a new era in the relations between the two neighboring countries.

This trend toward friendship, truly exceptional in the history of relations between the two nations, lasted until the time of the signing of the Montreux Convention in 1936, which set a new status for the Straits. At that time the Russian press had already begun to exploit the preposterous theme that Turkey was playing into the hands of the imperialist Powers. The events of the ensuing years, on the other hand, had further aggravated this new uneasiness between the two countries. The definitive alignment of Turkey with Great Britain and France in 1939; the opening of Turko-Soviet negotiations with a view to concluding a Mutual Assistance Treaty; the signing of the German-Soviet Agreement clearly indicating the new orientation and the intentions of the Russian foreign policy; the rupture of the Turko-Soviet negotiations as a result of

Russian demands to modify unilaterally the Montreux Convention; the signing of the Treaties of Alliance between Turkey, Great Britain and France; the Nazi aggression against the U.S.S.R.; and, finally, the victory of Stalingrad—such is the brief enumeration of the successive main events which, save for a few ephemeral moments of alleviation, brought about the progressive aggravation of relations between the two neighboring countries, and culminated in March 1945 in the denouncing by Russia of the Turko-Soviet Treaty of Friendship.

The Soviet position vis-à-vis Turkey, dating from the Nazi aggression against Russia in June 1941, was dictated by the vicissitudes of the invasion of the Russian territory, and by the conditions under which the German retreat developed to bring about the collapse of Nazism. During the dark days when the fortunes of the war did not appear to favor the Russians, the Soviet attitude toward Turkey was always friendly, courteous, and appreciative of the services rendered by the Turks to the Allied cause in general and to the Russians in particular. But soon after the victory of Stalingrad, a notable and increasingly marked change became apparent in the Soviet policy, not only toward Turkey but toward all the Allies in general.

From the position of an aide seeking power which Russia had held until the victory of Stalingrad, she now seemed to have attained a stage of self-sufficiency and superciliousness. From this time on, one could perceive that the U.S.S.R. preferred to commit the destiny of Eastern Europe, and of peace in general, to the sole discretion of the victorious Red Army, without any regard for the spirit of the agreements formerly concluded between the Allies in view of the war, and especially of the post-war period. It was also dating from this time that the U.S.S.R. really started to create, in Turko-Soviet relations, an atmosphere of artificial tension intended to terrify the Turkish people and to prepare a propitious ground for the fulfillment of long-harbored designs. The anticipated coup was finally touched off in March 1945. Turkey was notified of the denunciation of her Pact of Friendship and Non-Aggression with the Soviet Union, under the pretext that the provisions of this treaty no longer corresponded to new conditions, and had to be improved basically.

For several months we were not informed as to the means of improving the denounced Treaty. However, soon after the Nazi capitulation, the first reports emanating from Moscow brought to light the true nature of Russia's intentions. This was in June 1945. I was at San Francisco as Turkish Delegate to the United Nations Conference. The Charter was already taking form. General enthusiasm, unanimous hopes placed in the United Nations for maintaining the peace and creating a better world, general trend toward demobilization, unqualified admiration for the U.S.S.R.—such was the atmosphere prevailing at the time chosen by the Soviet Union to reveal to us her terms for restoring friendly ties with Turkey. As the price of Soviet friendship, Turkey was called upon to cede, as a preliminary condition, to her powerful neighbor certain of her eastern Provinces and bases in the Straits. This was indeed a most unusual way of seeking friendship. The services which Turkey had rendered during the dark days of Russia's peril were forgotten. The steps taken at Ankara during the war to express the warm Russian appreciation of Turkey's correct and friendly attitude, the spontaneously promised rewards, all these facts were irrevocably relegated to the past.

It is inconceivable that Turkey could harbor any other intentions with regard to the U.S.S.R. than those of living in peace and harmony with her. But on the Russian side the problem is seen from a completely different angle. For Russia, Turkey's crime is that of being politically linked to the capitalist Western Powers. Turkey, therefore, must be neutralized. Again according to Moscow, the Straits can serve as passageway for the aggressive designs of these capitalist Powers against the U.S.S.R. The Straits must therefore be occupied by the Russians to close this outlet of the Black Sea. And so here we are once again back to the famous concept of the sanitary cordon, which reminds one of the ever-widening circles produced on the surface of the water by a stone thrown in the pond. As soon as a first security belt is created for the so-called protection of Russian territory, the need is felt for a second belt to protect the first, and so on.

Just as the maintenance of the bases in the Straits is essential to the U.S.S.R. to exclude all possibility of threat against the Black Sea, so the domination of the Mediterranean is a vital



necessity for her to protect the Straits. Proceeding in the same line of thought, how can anyone be certain that the Russian plans do not already hold the protection of the Mediterranean as wholly dependent upon the domination of the Atlantic? But why then did the Soviet Union sign the United Nations Charter? Why was the principle of a world united and mutually pledged against aggression admitted? Why was the establishment of an international police force in charge of suppressing aggression accepted? Turkey, for her part, under threat of aggression and obliged to define her position, was, in June 1945, confronted with these two facts: (1) The attitude of the U.S.S.R. authorized no hope for maintaining cordial and trusting relations between the two countries as desired by Turkey. (2) In spite of the signing of the United Nations Charter, the psychological international atmosphere at the time left no possibility of outside aid for Turkey beyond a sympathy which was certainly genuine, but scarcely effective.

Under these conditions the Turkish people, inspired by an admirable surge of unity, solidarity and defiance, unhesitatingly rejected Russia's demands. In this grim determination of an entire people, we find the profound meaning and the high moral value of one of the most fundamental principles of the Kemalist revolution: the innate love of the Turkish people for liberty and independence.

This brief historical outline serves to point out to you the tragic continuity of Russia's expansionist policy, to the detriment of Turkey, quite apart from the question of régime. The same explanations also show you that one of the determining factors of Turkish foreign policy is the need for security, and the will for survival in the face of constant threat.

It would be a tragic misapprehension on the part of the Russian people to believe that the Turkish attitude is dictated by prejudice or a spirit of hatred. The Turkish people are essentially realistic. From their distressing past experience they draw only the essential and salutary lesson needed to anticipate the future and determine their attitude in view of any surprise which events may hold in store for them. This approach is rational, it is not emotional. We still continue to cherish the hope that our powerful neighbor, reverting to a more humane, realistic and objective conception of international relations, will

in the end conform to the necessity of creating and maintaining friendly and trusting relations with all the nations of the world, including Turkey, within the framework of a global agreement which would settle all her conflicts with the outside world. I believe that I am rightly interpreting the general sentiments of the free world in affirming that our clear and unwavering conscience is a guarantee, at any time, of the possibility of establishing friendly and honorable relations with the Russians, provided that this be also the sincere desire of the Soviets.

Unfortunately, for the time being, we have not reached this point. We are still a long way from it. The various manifestations of the negative attitude adopted by the Soviets since the end of the war are at the root of the paralysis of the United Nations in its most constructive work, and of the increasingly heightened tension in the international situation. The impossibility of creating a united world as envisaged by the United Nations and the persistent threat which hovered over Turkey forced us, as early as 1945 and 1946, to sound out informally at Ankara the expediency and the feasibility of establishing a united defense front extending from the North Atlantic to the eastern borders of the Mediterranean. The United States of America, which emerged from World War II as the "mightiest" Power in the history of mankind, would, according to our views and wishes, constitute the heart and the leading spirit of this system of defense.

What we had been striving for at that time in Ankara became a reality for Western Europe in 1948 and, following a logical course of development, culminated in April 1949 in the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Turkey, a peaceful country, endowed with virtues springing from old traditions of courage and chivalry, and sincerely attached to the ideal and principles of the United Nations, felt qualified from the beginning to be a natural member of any regional defense organization to be set up in Europe. It was, therefore, understandable that, from 1948 on, she began to undertake steps in Washington to be included among the negotiators of the Pact under preparation. The qualifications adduced by Turkey did not, however, suffice for the immediate granting of her request. Turkey was in no way discouraged by this setback. Since that time, trying out various formulas and methods in turn, she has

done everything within her power to keep the issue constantly alive. Her request was not based on the selfish desire to provide against possible attack, but on the need for establishing as continuous a front as possible against any aggression, and on the community of purpose, beliefs, spirit and determination for which the whole coalition stood. Not only on her national soil, but also in far-off Korea, Turkey had taken a resolute stand, and, by every conceivable Western yardstick as regards the concept of home, family, way of life, philosophy of government, political outlook, military strength and dignity of human character, she had given proof of her eligibility to full membership in the Treaty.

As Ambassador of Turkey to this country, it is for me a subject of just and legitimate pride and of particular satisfaction to note that the initiative of the admission of Turkey into the Atlantic Treaty originated from the United States government. This action adds still further grounds for our gratitude toward the United States, and a new link in the series of successive bonds which have been established in the relations between our two countries during these recent years.

America's interest in Turkey was manifested in the most critical days of the post-war period in appreciation of the contribution which the courageous attitude of the Turkish people in the face of threat of aggression brought to the cause of peace. In fact, nothing was more natural than a harmonious coöperation between our two countries. Everything favored their rapprochement: the same ideals of peace and justice, the same historical struggle for independence, the same respect for the freedom of all nations. American interest found its first expression in 1946, in the moral support lent to the Turkish people by the great Republic. The American concern for Turkey was subsequently materialized in the Military Aid Program which added the inestimable weight and reassurance of modern arms to the courage and determination of the Turkish people. This happy collaboration has raised the level of the Turkish Army to such a point that it constitutes today one of the principal pillars of world peace.

Nonetheless, the maintaining of a large army is not without difficulty for Turkey. Like other European countries, we are confronted with a tragic dilemma. The state of danger and

insecurity forces us to continue, as in the past, to allocate almost 40 per cent of our budget to military expenditures, and to sacrifice our modest program of economic development to considerations of national defense. Due to various reasons and circumstances Turkey did not benefit from the Marshall Plan to the same extent as the other participating countries. As a result, the economic reconstruction achieved in those countries is still delayed in Turkey. Our economic and financial hardships render it therefore difficult for the economic structure of the country to constitute a healthy basis for maintaining the heavy burden of our military expenditures. We hope that we will be able to make our American friends understand this difficulty which, although a major one, is not insuperable in the atmosphere of harmony and mutual trust which reigns between our two countries.

The purpose of the Atlantic Treaty was clearly defined by the Honorable Dean Acheson at the time of its signing, when he said: "The reality lies in the affirmation of moral and spiritual values which govern the kind of life that the Signatory Powers propose to lead and propose to defend should that necessity be thrust upon them." This statement is, to my belief, the most illuminating definition of the purely defensive goal of the Treaty. No nation in the world hates war so strongly as the Turkish people. Turkey has no other ambition than to work in peace and security, to raise the standard of living of her people, and to remain a loyal member of the international community. The Turkish people make no claims on other nations, but at the same time they strongly assert that they owe nothing to anyone from their national patrimony.

The North Atlantic Treaty is the result of the obstacles raised against efforts deployed for the realization of the "One World" concept, as foreseen by the Charter, and of increasing threats of aggression. We know that the price of freedom is extremely high. Those who suspect our attachment to peace and the genuineness of our intentions have to watch the overwhelming difficulties which the free nations have to face in order to raise or to maintain the minimum of military force consistent with their national security. We cannot feel secure as long as certain big Powers maintain in the vicinity of our frontiers hundreds of divisions and utter aggressive pretensions and

claims against our national territories. The common goal of the North Atlantic Treaty nations is, not to win a war through their combined strength, but to prevent war and discourage aggression by the overwhelming potential of their coalition.

The right to legitimate individual and collective defense is recognized by the Charter. Therefore no one should object to the Pact, no one should feel disturbed and concerned about it.

In a world where the concept of distance has lost its meaning, the nations are increasingly bound together in their destiny, their joys and sorrows. Deeply convinced of this community of destiny, Turkey will enter the Pact in a spirit of international and human solidarity which will be completely satisfied only on the day when all the nations rid themselves of such corroding factors as distrust and thirst for domination, and unite their efforts to achieve the ideal of a peaceful and organized world. [Applause]



## REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

PRESIDENT DOUGLAS: Your Excellency, may I express our appreciation for the historical recitation of the record of Turkey's position which you have given us. May I thank you for some of the issues which you have defined. May I tell you how grateful we are for your reference to the community of nations that abide by the Code of Civilized Behavior. And may I make the observation that your comments about freedom are particularly pungent.

The reference which you have made to the conflict between the expenditures for defense and the expenditures for economic advancement and progress in Turkey finds echoes throughout the entire Western and civilized world. One can even hear the echoes within the walls of this room. [Applause]

And I think, Sir, the example to which you have referred must make us all, every American and every person who belongs to the civilized and cultivated community, consider carefully the dangers that we create for ourselves compared with the dangers which external forces create for us.

It is now three minutes after ten. Is there anybody who has . . . yes, I have objection to adjourning. I should like to thank, in the name of the Academy and its guests, all those who contributed so brilliantly to the sessions of the day.

I should like again to thank you, Ambassador Grady, for your speech this evening.

And once more, Sir, I should like to express our gratitude to you.

Ten-thirty is approaching. Is there anyone who knows of any reason why this session of the Academy should not adjourn? In the absence of objection, it is adjourned.



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